

JULY 1966

Commentary

VOLUME FORTY-TWO, NUMBER ONE

THREE STORIES FOR CHILDREN: ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER

Illustrated by Maurice Sendak

THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW LEFT: Tom Kahn

CHURCH & STATE — HOW HIGH A WALL?: Milton Himmelfarb

PUBLIC AFFAIRS — THE VIEW FROM EUROPE: George Lichtheim

IS THERE A JEWISH ART?: Harold Rosenberg

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NOAH GREENBERG: George P. Elliott

WHEN REFORM WAS YOUNG: Lucy S. Dawidowicz

POP MUSIC ON CAMERA: Neil Compton

BOOKS IN REVIEW

John W. Aldridge

John J. Appel

Robert A. Nisbet

Stanley Elkins

Edgar Z. Friedenberg

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 75 CENTS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inch of



h, please!

You send this to:

Gentlemen:

☐ I want to be sent to some of the nicest islands in the Caribbean. I understand the s.s. Shalom is making cruises in November, December, January and February, but that I have to decide a few things, so please send me a free brochure and then I'll tell you when you can send me away.

☐ I want to be sent to the Mediterranean and Israel. I understand the Shalom is making Holiday Cruises in March and April, 1967, and I can spend Purim or Passover in Israel with the ship as my hotel, but I want more facts, so send me a brochure. co

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____

My travel agent is _____

And we'll send you away

BE A QUEST GO
ZIM
LINES

In the Community

- Church and State: How High a Wall? 23 MILTON HIMMELFARB
The Problem of the New Left 30 TOM KAHN
Three Stories For Children 39 ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER

Public Affairs

- The View From Europe 49 GEORGE LICHTHEIM

Observations

- Is There a Jewish Art? 57 HAROLD ROSENBERG
Pop Music on Camera 60 NEIL COMPTON
When Reform Was Young 63 LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ
The Achievement of Noah Greenberg 67 GEORGE P. ELLIOTT

Letters from Readers 6

Books in Review

- Standards: A Chronicle of Books for
Our Time, by Stanley Edgar Hyman 72 JOHN W. ALDRIDGE
The Political Economy of Slavery:
Studies in the Economy and Society of
the Slave South, by Eugene D. Genovese 73 STANLEY ELKINS
Notebooks, 1942-1951, by Albert Camus 76 ROBERT A. NISBET
Jews in America: A Short History,
by Ruth Gay 77 JOHN J. APPEL
Toward a Theory of Instruction,
by Jerome S. Bruner 79 EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG

Editor: NORMAN PODHORETZ

Associate Editors

WERNER J. DANNHAUSER
MARION MAGID

Contributing Editors

MILTON HIMMELFARB
GEORGE LICHTHEIM

Business Manager

MARTIN EDELSTON

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee • Single copy 75¢; \$8 a year; 3 years \$19; 5 years \$29 • Add \$1 per year for foreign postage charge • Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. © Copyright 1966 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions • Indexed in Readers' Guide, Book Review Digest, & Public Affairs Information Service • Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by return postage.

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York 10022

ADVERTISING:

Main Office: 165 E. 56th Street, New York 10022. PLaza 1-4000.
Chicago: 105 W. Adams Street, Chicago 60603. ES 2-2444.
Detroit: 163 Madison Avenue, Detroit 48226. Tel.: 965-3353.
Los Angeles: 434 So. San Vicente Blvd., Los Angeles 90048.
Olympia 2-2100.
San Francisco: 948 Market Street, San Francisco 94104. SU 1-2744.

**"Okay, we don't start the picnic
until we find the Kahlúa"**



"A picnic isn't a picnic without Kahlúa.

"Sure, we can fry the fish and the hamburgers. We can broil the steak and the ribs and the chicken. But they just don't taste as good unless basted on both sides with Kahlúa.

"At least the chocolate cake and the brownies we brought were made with batter flavored with Kahlúa. But until we find the bottle there's no sense pouring the hot coffee. Or the hot chocolate.

"It's got to be around here somewhere, it's the first thing we put in the picnic basket and the first thing we opened when we got here. Unless we find that bottle of Kahlúa it might as well rain."

(p.s. Who's that happy dog?)

These authentic Pre-Columbian figures are from the famed Kahlúa collection of authentic Pre-Columbian figures

Don't put all your Kahlúa in one basket. Keep an extra bottle at home and then send for your free copy of our astonishingly clever Recipe Book, which tells you the many ways to enjoy Kahlúa. Do it now. Quick. Before it rains.


JULES BERMAN & ASSOC., INC. 9025 WILSHIRE BLVD., BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.



KAHLÚA
53 Proof


Coffee Liqueur from
Sunny Mexico

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



ISAAC ASIMOV comments . . .

"I have rarely read any book with such a wealth of ideas, so refreshing a viewpoint, so hopeful an outlook upon the future, and so bright and clear an estimate of the importance of the interconnection of science and society."



BUCKMINSTER FULLER says...

"Prof. J. R. Platt has one of the comprehensively operating minds rare in this era of specialization. . . . Only such minds as Dr. Platt's can apprehend events in such manner as to disclose the synergetic significance of human ecology in total evolution."

THE STEP TO MAN

By JOHN RADER PLATT.
\$5.95 from your bookseller.

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016

A STATEMENT OF AIMS

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture.

The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH
COMMITTEE
MORRIS B. ABRAM, President

THE COMMENTARY PUBLICATION COMMITTEE

RALPH E. SAMUEL, Chairman

ELI M. BLACK
CHARLES D. BREITEL
MAXWELL DANE
HARRY ELSON
RICHARD C. ERNST
MAURICE GLINERT
SYDNEY M. KAYE
LEWIS J. LAVENTHOL
HAROLD MANHEIM
ARTHUR L. MAYER
FREDERICK P. ROSE
DAVID SHER
ROGER SONNABEND
HARRY STEINER
ALAN M. STROOCK
LAURENCE A. TISCH
BEN TOUSTER

Goes
with You
Everywhere...



ACTUAL SIZE


Yashica Atoron

A marvel of camera engineering the 4-oz. Yashica Atoron ultra-miniature goes with you everywhere, takes brilliant slides, color and black & white prints. With fully automatic exposure fast $f/2.8$ lens, shutter speeds to $1/250$ th, built-in filters, it takes drop-in film available throughout the world. In complete kit, with flash, chain, case, extra filters, under \$110.



YASHICA INC., 50-17 QUEENS BOULEVARD,
WOODSIDE, NEW YORK 11377 DEPT. N

YASHICA



Remember the
boardwalk fashions
of the 40's?

Times change. Tastes change.

I've changed too...to Tempo!

Sooner or later you'll probably want to try the taste of a charcoal-tip cigarette. So why not make it the one with the taste that makes the change worthwhile? Why not Tempo? Why not today!



© 1966
R. J. REYNOLDS
TOBACCO COMPANY
WINSTON-SALEM, N. C.



SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SAVINGS

DEPT. 0766 9250 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA

☐ SEND FULL INFORMATION

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____

STATE _____ ZIP CODE _____


CHECK ATTACHED DOLLARS CENTS

OPEN MY ACCOUNT IN THE
FOLLOWING AMOUNT:

☐ PASSBOOK ACCOUNT
☐ SPECIAL ACCOUNT

TOTAL _____

you fill this out



we'll fill this up

5% per annum on all accounts!
1/2% per annum *bonus* on Special
Accounts, 3 yr. term, min. \$1,000—
yield 5½% or more per year! Note
your Special Account funds are *not*
frozen; they may be withdrawn at
will, and you still earn full current
annual rate interest! Savings insured
to \$10,000. Mail check or write for
details.

**SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA
SAVINGS**
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

OLDEST IN LOS ANGELES—SAFE SINCE 1887
MAIN OFFICE: 5th and Olive, Los Angeles, Calif.

LETTERS FROM READERS

Economic Prognosis

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Readers have written that one article in COMMENTARY was worth the cost of a year's subscription. I have felt this about several articles, but never so much as about Robert Heilbroner's, "The Future of Capitalism" [April]. Schumpeter may have wisely advised the intelligent-sia to wait in the wings for a century, but there is a new opportunity for them to make inroads on the "capitalist imagination" by science and scientific technology.

President Johnson has instructed the civilian agencies to incorporate PPBS (Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems) into the agencies' planning process. This system, though it may not be anything radically new, does involve an analytical process that provides reformers and crypto-reformers with a strategy for moving the country farther along the path to a society that will allocate its resources not only to meet the needs of disadvantaged groups but also to create a milieu in which it will be much more pleasant for all to live and work. I would suggest to . . . COMMENTARY readers, especially those working at policy and planning levels in the federal government, that they bone up on PPBS and become sensitive as to how this planning tool can be used to generate further progressive programs.

RICHARD LA BRECQUE
Alexandria, Virginia.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Heilbroner's erudite essay fails adequately to deal with those classified in the poverty category as well as with certain psychological factors involved.

Poverty is a relative, rather than a fixed state, and except for basic survival needs, bears a direct relationship to the general standard of living of a country. Few in the current poverty group would have been so classified fifty years ago. . . . Translated into relative purchasing power, our current poverty standards would be considered "middle-class" income in most Asiatic and African countries. If twenty years hence our standard of living increases by 25 per cent, our poverty "minimums" will increase in like amount. . . .

Mr. Heilbroner's oversimplified

solution of increased taxation to be imposed upon those of means is purely palliative, and solves none of the problems of the vast number currently in the poverty group who are potentially employable. . . . For this group the problem . . . extends beyond the economic one of greater "handouts." These individuals require a personal sense of dignity . . . which can only be acquired by active participation in our economic life. The answer to this fundamental problem lies in educational opportunities, job training, and work participation for all potentially employable. Coupled with that program would be the need for minimum wage standards above the then "poverty" classification.

In projecting future planning, the author states, "This is the effect of technology in steadily raising the level of well being, thereby gradually bringing to an end the condition of material need as an effective stimulus for human behavior."

This is a psychological fallacy. Material desires, regardless of levels attained, . . . are not static but constantly increasing, limited solely by what is available within each culture. . . .

These desires are inherent in man and have been manifested in all cultures and social systems. . . .

JULES BISNO
Beverly Hills, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . While I am willing to concede that capitalism will last during my lifetime, being considerably older than Professor Heilbroner, I am not so sure about the following generation. . . . I am inclined to suggest that in making his somewhat conservative estimate, Professor Heilbroner has underestimated the influence that political and economic changes in Western Europe during the remainder of the century may exercise on public opinion in this country.

. . . Our attitude toward the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, not to speak of China, cannot be taken as a basis for judging our future attitude toward the regime of democratic socialism that is foreshadowed by the present trends in many parts of Western Europe. Considering the character of the Russian revolution, . . . particularly the failures of Soviet planning and the consequent persis-

MAY WE SEND YOU THIS

FREE record and catalog

WITHOUT COST OR OBLIGATION

to demonstrate a unique service for collectors of classical music



THE COLUMBIA MASTERWORKS SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE

- AUDITION IN YOUR OWN HOME the latest classical releases from Columbia Records
- ORDER ONLY THE RECORDS YOU WANT — no obligation to buy, no minimum to purchase
- CHOOSE A RECORD FREE with every record you purchase at catalog price
- PLUS a revolutionary concept — RECORD INSURANCE

Now you can save more than ever before on the classical records you want — with no minimum commitment or obligation.

As a Charter Subscriber of the new *Columbia Masterworks Subscription Service*, you will be entitled to choose as many — or as few — records as you wish, direct from the Columbia Masterworks Catalog for about half the catalog price. You may even audition new releases at home. But you will never be obligated to buy.

How the Service works

When you mail in the coupon below, we will send you — free and without obligation — a copy of AUDITION, the 12" long-playing record shown above, plus the complete Columbia Masterworks Catalog. *These are yours to keep, whether or not you join.*

The Masterworks Catalog contains more than 2,000 of the greatest performances ever recorded. They range from Concerti Grossi to Classical Jazz. From Sweelinck to Richard Burton's Hamlet.

If you become a subscriber, you will at once be entitled to select as many long-playing records as you wish (monaural or stereo) from the Catalog or AUDITION.

A record FREE with every one you buy

With every record you buy, you may immediately choose another record free. Your records will be shipped promptly, and you will be billed — for the records you purchase only — at regular Service prices. (A small mailing and handling charge is added for each shipment.)

Every three months you will receive a new 12" long-playing record of AUDITION, containing passages from new Columbia Masterworks releases. The performing artist or a distinguished commentator provides spoken program notes and critical commentary for each passage.

You will continue receiving these quarterly AUDITION records, accompanied by supplements updating your Masterworks Catalog, as long as you are a subscriber — whether or not you buy any records.

Insurance against worn or damaged records

An additional benefit never before offered is our unique *Record Insurance*. As a subscriber, you may always replace worn or damaged records acquired through the Service for only \$1.00 each. It also entitles you to order stereo records, to replace monaural records acquired through the Service, for the same nominal \$1.00 fee.

Send for free copies of AUDITION and the Catalog

The annual subscription fee for the *Columbia Masterworks Subscription Service* is only \$5.00 — but send no money now. To receive your free AUDITION record and Masterworks Catalog, just fill out and mail the coupon. They are yours to hear, examine, enjoy and keep — without obligation. Then, if you decide to subscribe, you may also select a free record from the Catalog or from the AUDITION record immediately. Mail the coupon today!

Your first copy of AUDITION includes, among others, selections from these recent albums . . .

Bruno Walter's Mahler:
(Das Lied von der Erde and
Symphony #9.)
N. Y. Phil. / The Col. Sym. Orch.

Beethoven: "Emperor"
Concerto. Glenn Gould,
Stokowski, Amer. Sym. Orch.

Stravinsky: Pulcinella.
Stravinsky, Col. Sym. Orch.

The Virtuoso Oboe, Vol. 4.
Ladrot, oboe.
Janigro, I Solisti Di Zagreb

Tchaikovsky: March Slav.
Ormandy, Phila. Orch.

Berlioz: Symphonie
Fantastique. Colin Davis,
London Sym. Orch.

Mozart: Syms. #33 & #28,
Overture to Marriage of
Figaro. Szell, Cleveland Orch.

Khachaturian: Violin
Concerto; Szaryng.
Dorati, London Sym. Orch.

Beethoven: The "Rasumovsky"
Quartets.

Julliard String Quartet.
Bruno Walter's Bruckner
(Syms. #4, 7, & 9).
Columbia Sym. Orch.

COLUMBIA MASTERWORKS SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE, Dept. 953-O

A service of Columbia Record Club
North Terre Haute, Indiana 47805

Please reserve my Charter Subscription, and send at once my free 12" long-playing AUDITION record and Columbia Masterworks Catalog. If I decide to subscribe, I will send you \$5.00 as my annual fee, and I may immediately choose a free record. During the coming year I will receive three more quarterly AUDITION records, plus supplements to the Catalog, containing all current releases. For each record I purchase, I may choose another record free. However, I am under no obligation to buy any records. If I do not wish to subscribe, I will simply write "Cancel" across the invoice you send me and return it promptly. However, the AUDITION record and Masterworks Catalog will be mine to keep without obligation.


Name.....
(Please print)

Address.....


City..... State..... Zip.....

☐ Check here if you want AUDITION sent to you in stereo

COMMENTARY
SUBSCRIBERS
ARE ENTITLED
TO A DISCOUNT
OF 10%



4



8



12




1



5



9



13



6



10



14



7



11



15

1. "And this is the Torah which Moses set before the Children of Israel." Torah wrapper detail. German. 1812. Full color on white; matching env. 25¢

2. Searching for leavened bread before Passover. Engraving by Bernard Picart. French. 1723. Black on white, taupe border; light blue envelope. 15¢

3. Blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah. Engraving by Bernard Picart. French. 1723. Black on white, taupe border; light blue envelope. 15¢

4. Ketubah (marriage contract). A conventional Eastern design painted in watercolors on paper. Persian. 1883. Full color on white; matching envelope. 25¢

5. Dutch woodcut of 1663 depicting superstition concerning him who cannot see shadow of his head on 7th day of Sukkot. Black on white; med. blue env. 10¢

6. Preparing the Sukkah to commemorate temporary shelters of the Jews in the wilderness. Woodcut. Dutch. 1663. Black on white; med. blue env. 10¢

7. Children receiving sweetmeats on Simhat Torah after annual reading of Torah is completed. Woodcut. Dutch. 1663. Black on white; med. blue env. 10¢

8. Illumination of the initial word of the Kol Nidre. Detail from a manuscript Mahzor. Rhine Valley (?) 1380. Full color on white; matching envelope. 25¢

9. "Behold thou art betrothed to me..." Wedding detail from embroidered Torah wrapper. German. 1749. Full color on white; matching envelope. 25¢

10. Shavuot—the observance of the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai. Engraving. German. 1748. Black on taupe panel; light blue envelope. 15¢

11. Prayer, fasting, and repentance on Yom Kippur the Day of Atonement. Engraving. German. 1726. Black on taupe panel; light blue envelope. 15¢

12. Decoration of Etzru, last month of the year. Detail from embroidered Torah wrapper. German. 1812. Full color on white; matching env.

13. Rosh Hashanah—the beginning of the year. Engraving. German. 1726. Black on panel; light blue envelope. 15¢

14. Purim merrymakers celebrating the ancient feat of Haman. Woodcut. Dutch. 1663. Black on white; medium blue envelope. 10¢

15. Lighting the Sabbath candles in a seventeenth century household. Woodcut. Dutch. 1663. Black on white; medium blue envelope. 10¢



COMMENTARY CARDS

Commentary Cards are published by Commentary for general use as notepaper as well as for holiday greetings. They reproduce ritual Jewish art and representations of custom and ceremony, with subjects drawn from such diverse sources as a 14th-century Rhenish manuscript and a 19th-century Persian marriage contract.

The original works reproduced by the cards are in the collections of The New York Public Library and The Jewish Museum, and it is through the courtesy of these institutions that they have been made available for the Commentary program. The reproductions are all of high calibre involving a variety of printing processes, each selected because of its suitability to the original art. Papers and envelopes are all of excellent quality.

The cards are packaged in groups of twenty—i.e., twenty identical cards in each package. A boxed assortment of all the cards—i.e., one each of fifteen subjects—is also available. Commentary subscribers are entitled to a discount of 10% on all cards ordered.

All Commentary cards are approximately five inches square. They are issued with the imprinted greeting "A Happy New Year," and they are also available without greeting for use as notepaper. They will be ready for shipment in July.

Cards can be personalized with your name at a fixed charge of \$10 for quantities up to 1,000 and \$5 for each additional thousand.

ORDER FORM

COMMENTARY CARDS

165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Payment is enclosed for the cards ordered at the right. Cards should be shipped to:

Name _____

Address _____

City, State _____

Zip Code _____

NOTE: Residents of New York City should add 5% sales tax. Others should add applicable state and local tax.

Please add 50¢ for postage and handling of each order of cards; 25¢ for each boxed assortment of cards.

If cards are to be personalized with your name, please provide clear instructions with order, and add \$10 for up to 1,000 personalized cards, \$5 for each additional 1,000. Allow 3 weeks for delivery of personalized cards.

Quantity	Item	check one		Price	Amount
		Greeting	Blank		
___ pkges #1	___	___	___	\$5.00	\$_____
___ pkges #2	___	___	___	\$3.00	\$_____
___ pkges #3	___	___	___	\$3.00	\$_____
___ pkges #4	___	___	___	\$5.00	\$_____
___ pkges #5	___	___	___	\$2.00	\$_____
___ pkges #6	___	___	___	\$2.00	\$_____
___ pkges #7	___	___	___	\$2.00	\$_____
___ pkges #8	___	___	___	\$5.00	\$_____
___ pkges #9	___	___	___	\$5.00	\$_____
___ pkges #10	___	___	___	\$3.00	\$_____
___ pkges #11	___	___	___	\$3.00	\$_____
___ pkges #12	___	___	___	\$5.00	\$_____
___ pkges #13	___	___	___	\$3.00	\$_____
___ pkges #14	___	___	___	\$2.00	\$_____
___ pkges #15	___	___	___	\$2.00	\$_____
___ Boxed assort.	___	___	___	\$2.95	\$_____

Sub-Total \$_____

Subscribers deduct 10% \$_____

Tax \$_____

Postage \$_____

Total \$_____

tence of a low standard of living, it is easy to understand why the Soviet regime does not appeal to the average American, or Western European, for that matter. . . . But can we be certain that the same would be true if one of the countries of Western Europe should introduce a regime based on democratic socialism? The fact that many, if not most, of our political and business leaders believe that such a regime is impossible to realize, would not necessarily prevent the Western European countries, with their influential socialist parties and long traditions of state intervention, from adopting it. It must not be forgotten that the British Labour Party has a basically socialist ideology and that its hesitancy about resuming its nationalization policy is due primarily to technical economic factors rather than to a lack of doctrinal conviction or fear of strong resistance from private economic interests. . . .

Again, it is hardly necessary to call attention to the high degree of government intervention . . . in countries like Italy, France, and Sweden, where important sectors

of the national economy are owned and managed by state agencies, in some instances in close cooperation or partnership with private capital, and where most of the planning is in the hands of the state. Under those conditions, it is not so very difficult to imagine that a strong movement by a radical political party or the trade unions, a serious economic and social disturbance resulting from automation or some other basic technological development, the attainment by a basic industry of a high degree of private monopolization, or a national emergency might induce one of the Western European countries to shift to some form of democratic socialism and probably make the change without political violence or great economic disturbance. . . .

I am inclined to believe also that Professor Heilbroner overestimates the capacity of our dominant classes to . . . control and influence the social and economic results of technological developments. His assumption that "ready acquiescence" on the part of those classes is essential for the introduction of radical changes in our economy cannot

be justified by the history of reform legislation in the United States. The outstanding measures designed to eliminate the abuses of a *laissez-faire* economic policy, those bearing on interstate commerce, child labor, food and drugs, social security, trade unions, and medical care, were adopted against the most bitter opposition of very strong vested interests which are still very influential in the administration of those laws. . . .

Finally, . . . there are many indications—political, economic, and psychological—that we are going through a stage of transition, perhaps the last stages of an epoch. Considering the enormous political changes since World War I, there does not seem to be much reason for assuming that revolutionary economic and social changes will occur at a much slower pace.

LOUIS DOMERATZKY
McLean, Virginia

[Further correspondence on Mr. Heilbroner's article will be printed in our July issue.]

Critic Defended

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

With one exception, Dan Jacobson seems to me entirely just, in his review of Lionel Trilling's *Beyond Culture* [March] and so far the only reviewer who has managed to be. . . .

The exception is his censure of Trilling's style. It may be remarked that Mr. Jacobson's own prose style . . . could be that of any intelligent man. By contrast, Trilling's prose is distinctive, and it forms in his work an additional and, in the good sense of the term, a gratuitous value. "Stylistic affectations, pomposities, indirections, lofty phrases, otiose qualifications, would-be-stately adjectives"—all these do occur in Trilling at his worst, and he is at his worst, it is true, in parts of *Beyond Culture*. But this does not tell the whole tale. There is more good writing in Trilling's latest book—more elegance, to use an unpopular word, of period and phrase and diction—than any dozen other important critical works can pretend to. Incidentally, except for the opening words of the paragraph Mr. Jacobson quotes from the essay on Jane Austen's *Emma*, I do not myself find the style of it objectionable; true, there is a slight self-consciousness in the phrasing, but I can think of only three or four contemporary writers (among

ISRAEL

VIA GREECE • ITALY • SPAIN • PORTUGAL

"GOLDEN ROUTE" magic on ships
with the international flair.

OLYMPIA • QUEEN ANNA MARIA

Fortnightly departures from New York to coincide with religious and cultural festivities in Israel and Europe. Choose from a wide variety of all-inclusive Package Tours. Exceptional Cruise Voyages

July 22 and September 20. Group Departures with savings up to 25%. First Class or Tourist, enjoy

comfortable cabins, superb public rooms

• Nightclubs, swimming pools, Lido

decks • QUEEN ANNA MARIA 46-

day Mediterranean cruise,

February 24, 1967,

offers optional

5-days in

Israel.



SEE YOUR
TRAVEL AGENT

GREEK LINE

32 Pearl St., New York, N. Y. 10004 WH 3-9140 • Boston • Chicago • Cleveland • Detroit
Los Angeles • Miami • Philadelphia • San Francisco • Toronto • Montreal • Vancouver
Countries of Registry: Liberia/Greece

them, Trilling himself at his best) who could have made the point with more interest and skill—or who could have made the point at all. What Mr. Jacobson calls “abstractions—energy, style, intelligence, grace . . .”—should be meaningful enough to anyone who has read *Emma*. And must non-ambitious alliteration automatically be ruled self-indulgent? “The most basic and biological of the virtues” not only sounds good to me; in context it makes good sense.

CALVIN BEDIENT

Department of English
Emory University
Atlanta, Georgia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . It is easy to agree with Dan Jacobson that certain of Lionel Trilling's phrases, like “adversary culture” and a “second environment” have an uncomfortable shorthand ring: yet I wonder if some of the censure is not also hasty.

For instance, Jacobson singles out critically Trilling's essay on *Emma*, both for its thought and its rhetorical language. As for language, I think this version is that of an original BBC Third Program talk which, I remember at the time, went over particularly well. As for the matter, about three years ago the essay, reprinted in *Encounter*, was discovered by a group of young people preparing for their English set books and Oxbridge entrance exams, and read eagerly, including the passage about Emma's self-love quoted by Jacobson, with no worry over its rhetoric. What does this prove? I'm not setting up students as critics; but I think it shows that a group of intelligent youngsters in age about as far from Jacobson as he is from Trilling did respond to Trilling's thoughts with some immediacy, as they did during his recent Eastman lectures at Oxford.

Jacobson seems also disappointed that *Beyond Culture* did not repeat the impact of *The Liberal Imagination*. But could it have? I recall how deeply impressed I was when I first came across Jacobson's stories about South Africa. But that was at the start of the 50's. Since then, the whole dusty South-African race conflict has changed in its perspectives; above all, it has been written about so much that the vivid freshness of Jacobson's descriptions of fifteen and ten years ago could probably not be recaptured. But should one blame an individual writer because the issues around him have in general grown more complex?

History and the History of Ideas from Princeton

Political Parties and Political Development

Volume 6: Studies in Political Development

Edited by JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA and MYRON WEINER. How do political parties help to initiate, manage, and consolidate political change? By seeking answers in the experiences of European and American parties, the author draws enlightening parallels to current developments in Asia and Africa. 472 pp. \$8.50

American Intellectual Histories and Historians

ROBERT SKOTHEIM. Contributors to the history of ideas were themselves influenced by the ideas of their times. Simultaneously, their works show a steady development from colonial chronicles to professional scholarship. Both these strains are examined in the works of Moses Coit Tyler, Edward Eggleston, Charles Beard, Carl Becker, Vernon Parrington, Merle Curti, Perry Miller, and Ralph Gabriel. 336 pp. \$6.95

Parades and Politics at Vichy

The French Officer Corps under Marshall Petain

ROBERT O. PAXTON. The surprising, previously untold story of how the French Officer Corps survived the defeat of June, 1940—the most overwhelming ever suffered by a modern military force—to go on to play a cohesive part in the despised Vichy regime. 432 pp. \$9.00



Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Coming later in 1966: The first volume of THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON. Edited by Arthur S. Link and associates. Descriptive brochure and subscription information on request.



This is David Hunter. His job is to sell Rovers and Land-Rovers to people going to Europe and other places. He is very good, if we say so ourselves. In fact, a fair number of Americans have ordered cars from him either directly or through our dealers (he always assigns orders to dealers so that the car will have a service home when it is returned here) already this year. If you are not aware of the advantage of buying a car in this manner, do give him a call or drop him a note. (He has an infectious smile but you won't see that on the phone.) At the moment, he is lucky enough to have some of our new TC's that he could have at the plane or boat to meet you on arrival in Europe. The only reason he can get them is that he snags them before they are shipped here. (The car has been so well received that our dealers are taking orders for the next boat load.) He has two Mark III 3-Litres—that's the new one; no Mark II's, sorry; and most kinds of Land-Rovers. We've arranged for an answering service so that Dave Hunter won't have to stay all hours, but you can leave your name and address in the evening or at the weekend and he'll call you. (212) YU 6-0220. The Rover Motor Company of North America Limited, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017.

• "PLAY IT AGAIN, SAM"

• GIANT PHOTO MURAL . . .

- Typical "BOGIE" pose from one of his most famous movie roles. Lithographed on poster stock . . . (43"x30").
- Shipped in protective mailing tube.
- \$2.00 Postpaid.

• HUDSON INDUSTRIES, Dept.
116 Charles St., N. Y., N. Y. 10014



COMMENTARY SUBSCRIBER SERVICE

Please include a Commentary address label to insure prompt service whenever you write us about your subscription.

Mail To: Commentary Subscriber Service
165 E. 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

To Subscribe, mail this form with your payment, and check: ☐ new subscription ☐ renew my present subscription.

Subscription Rates: ☐ 1 year \$8 ☐ 3 years \$19.
Add \$1 a year postage outside U.S.A.

- ☐ payment enclosed
☐ bill me later

Change of Address

If you're moving, please let us know four weeks before changing your address. Place magazine address label here, print your new address below. If you have a question about your subscription, place your magazine address label here and clip this form to your letter.

attach
label
here

name (please print)

address

city

state

zip code

Jacobson also—to some extent—challenges Trilling's assumption that the mid-50's produced a social and intellectual watershed: a change took place whereby "communication," including communication through the arts, increased so much in the number of those practicing and the size of their audience, in fashionableness and sophistication, that the relationships of those working in communication at all levels also became subtly transformed. Surely this is no more than evident. I recently interviewed some young people in their late twenties who were all preoccupied with this transformation in which they felt themselves involved, with the ideas that group art had become more effective and individual art less, that literary technique was today easier and a distinctive individual voice much harder to acquire, and so forth. Again, one could wish Trilling had referred to this transformation less cautiously and sketchily, but when he is chided by his critics not merely for his views on these changes, but practically for referring to them, one must almost ask who is out of touch.

T. R. FYVEL

London, England

Fiscal Differences

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The article by Oscar Gass in your April issue ["The U.S. Economy—1966,"] contains a number of statements, that in the interest of accuracy and fairness, should not go unchallenged. . . .

Mr. Gass states that the cost of the increase in interest rates to those who will be hurt most is from \$5 to \$10 weekly. Now, an increase of one-half per cent in interest on a debt of \$20,000 is \$100 annually, or less than \$2 per week. To incur an increase of \$10 weekly, or more than \$500 annually, would mean that the individual had borrowed \$25,000, and that his interest costs had increased by one full per cent.

Mr. Gass quickly computes the increase enjoyed by the banks as a result of an advance in interest rates in \$300 billion of credit at \$1.5 billion annually. Mr. Gass must know that a substantial part of the loans of banks are term loans on which the interest will not be changed except as the loans mature, and similarly the long term investments carry the same interest as before. He must surely know that banks are paying more on time deposits and certificates of deposit.

Further, I am astonished that he knows that Marriner S. Eccles would not have insisted on the independence of the Federal Reserve Board. This is just what he did when he charged that the policies advocated by President Truman and Secretary of the Treasury Snyder were turning the Federal Reserve System into "an engine of inflation"—to quote Mr. Eccles.

Again, Mr. Gass points out that our price stability until recently was apparently one of the reasons that the economy did not grow as rapidly as that of a number of Western European countries. Mr. Gass should know that the rise in commodity prices and costs has troubled those governments. Incidentally, the interest rates of these countries have been substantially higher than in the United States—so that according to the reasoning of Mr. Gass, their rapid growth must have been attributable to higher interest rates.

I also think that it is not "cricket" to suggest that one member of the Federal Reserve Board is a "man of money," in a derogatory sense, whereas another is not because the former has different views than Mr. Gass. Finally, Mr. Gass might remember that the moves to curtail the rate of expansion of credit may save the families who spend a large part of their income on food and clothing, much more than the larger cost of interest to them by holding down prices.

R. L. WEISSMAN

New York City

Kashruth

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his excellent article, "Forbidden Foods" [January], Erich Isaac writes: "The Jew today . . . has much difficulty in accepting the dietary laws." Not only today does this hold true. There are intimations in Jewish literature that he had difficulty with them in the presumably more pious past as well. A significant example of this is Rashi's comment on Lamentations 1:21. On the words, "For Thou hast done it," he writes: "Thou [God], art the cause for their [the non-Jews'] hatred of me [Israel], because Thou hast made me to keep aloof from eating and drinking and intermarrying with them. If I had intermarried with them, then they would have had compassion upon me and upon their daughters' children." This rather surprising affirmation that the dietary laws and the prohi-

bition against intermarriage are the cause of Jewish suffering is in part a restatement of a far earlier homily in Lamentations Rabba on the same verse.

One gets the impression that the old rabbis were attempting to counter a popular reluctance to abide by the dietary laws when they argued that these injunctions serve as a means of inculcating self-restraint or attaining self-purification or as an index of the Jew's readiness to obey God's commands, however irrational these may seem. The rabbis even went so far as to suggest that the observant Jew was not completely deprived of a taste of the forbidden foods, since a principle of compensation mitigates the rigor of the prohibitions. For example, they said that while the ischiatic nerve is prohibited in beasts, it is permitted in fowl. Though the flesh of swine is forbidden, the flesh of the *shibbuta*, which tastes like pork, is permitted. (The millet may be meant, or a fish called by Pinay the *porcus marinus*)....

The rabbis were also unhappily aware that even the most scrupulous adherence to the dietary laws does not prevent overindulgence in eating and drinking. Those who ignored the ascetic implications of *kashruth* met with stern reproof. The Talmud admonishes the Jew to sanctify himself even in that which is permitted to him (Yebamoth 20a), and Nachmanides (1195?-1270) denounces the glutton who gorges himself with kosher viands as a "churl by license of the Torah."

(Rabbi) A. STANLEY DREYFUS
Union Temple of Brooklyn
Brooklyn, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

... Since the word *kasher* and its variations occurs in the Books of Esther and Ecclesiastes only, both of which are ... of comparatively late origin, the reader has a perfect right to refuse to share Mr. Isaac's amazement that this word does not occur in the Pentateuch in conjunction with the food laws. On the other hand, the word *trefa*, which means in biblical Hebrew "lacerated (by a wild beast)," denotes in the Talmud a clean animal with any organic defect and in rabbinical literature—*forbidden food*. This, however, is a question of semantics and has no bearing upon the food laws as such.

Mr. Isaac creates, whether advertently or otherwise, the impres-

To seek and share beauty

In the world of a Japan Air Lines hostess, art is a foremost element of everyday life. She spends patient hours at *chanoyu*, the classic discipline that makes an art form of the simple serving of tea.

in Japan a lifelong pursuit

For every young lady chosen as a JAL hostess, the art that begins earliest and is cultivated longest is the Japanese art of gracious personal service.

it is the special charm of JAL today

Savor a unique adventure in hospitality as your kimono-clad hostess proffers a refreshing *o-shibori* hot towel. Warmed sake or your favorite cocktail. A superb Continental cuisine—even more delicious in the classic surroundings of your Jet Courier cabin.




ENJOY THE SPECIAL CHARM OF JAL AT NEW LOW FARES. Take advantage of year-round savings on transPacific fares... up to 15% on winter Economy Class travel. Plan a Hawaii stopover at no extra fare. Plan also to fly JAL between the U.S. and the Orient, the Middle East... throughout Europe. See your travel agent for reservations.

JAPAN AIR LINES



The worldwide airline of Japan



COMMENTARY REPORTS

Readers and organizations have asked for additional copies of many Commentary articles on vital, controversial issues. We are publishing these Reports as a public service to:

- Discussion groups • Religious institutions • Schools • Business
- Civic organizations • Colleges • Libraries • Government

ENTER THE NUMBER OF REPORTS REQUIRED IN THE BOX AT THE SIDE OF EACH TITLE

☐ **THE DOMINICAN CRISIS**
(December '65 issue)
Theodore Draper 75 cents

☐ **THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY:**
Fundamentalism on the Right
Alan F. Westin 50 cents

☐ **NEGROES AND JEWS: The New**
Challenge to Pluralism
Nathan Glazer 40 cents

☐ **MY NEGRO PROBLEM—AND**
OURS, N. Podhoretz 35 cents

☐ **A JOURNAL OF THE WARSAW**
GHETTO, Chaim Kaplan 60 cents

☐ **AMERICAN CATHOLICISM**
AFTER THE COUNCIL
Michael Novak 50 cents

☐ **INTERMARRIAGE AND THE**
JEWISH FUTURE
Marshall Sklare 50 cents

☐ **THE NEGRO AND THE NEW**
YORK SCHOOLS
Midge Decter 45 cents

☐ **CHINA'S STRATEGY**
Donald S. Zagoria 35 cents

☐ **THE TRIAL OF JESUS**
Paul Winter 40 cents

☐ **ON READING MATTHEW**
Milton Himmelfarb 40 cents

☐ **BIG BUSINESS & THE DEMO-**
CRATS, David Bazelon 35 cents

☐ **HOW WE ARE: Are Jews Still**
Different? M. Himmelfarb 40 cents

☐ **THE AMERICAN READING**
PROBLEM
Selma Fraiberg 40 cents

☐ **VATICAN II AND THE JEWS**
F. E. Cartus 40 cents

☐ **FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS:**
The Future of the Civil Rights
Movement, B. Rustin 40 cents

☐ **COMMUNISM IN ASIA**
Donald S. Zagoria 35 cents

☐ **FORBIDDEN FOODS**
Erich Isaac 35 cents

☐ **PIUS XII, THE JEWS AND THE**
GERMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
Guenter Lewy 50 cents

☐ **P. S. 165: Portrait of an Integrated**
School, Richard Schickel 40 cents

☐ **FIVE YEARS OF CASTRO'S**
CUBA, Theodore Draper 40 cents

☐ **THE FAILURE OF URBAN**
RENEWAL
Herbert J. Gans 40 cents

☐ **UP FROM APATHY — The Wood-**
lawn Experiment: Self-Help in a
Slum Neighborhood
Charles E. Silberman 35 cents

☐ **THE STATE OF SOVIET JEWRY**
Maurice Friedberg; and **SOVIET**
ANTI-SEMITISM—An exchange
between Bertrand Russell and
Aron Vergelis 50 cents

☐ **THE MEANING OF NEGRO**
STRATEGY, D. Danzig 35 cents

☐ **JEWISH RESISTANCE TO THE**
NAZIS, Oscar Handlin; and
HANNAH ARENDT ON EICH-
MANN, N. Podhoretz 50 cents

☐ **CONSERVATISM AFTER GOLD-**
WATER, David Danzig 35 cents

☐ **THE ARAB REFUGEES: A Zionist**
View, Marie Syrkin 40 cents

REPORT USERS INCLUDE

American Friends Service
Beth Abraham Synagogue, Dayton
Brandeis University
Brooklyn College
Bryant College
City of Detroit
Comm. for Internat. Development
Conn. Council of Human Rights
Community Action Training, S.F.
Douglass College
Hamilton College
Harvard University
Jewish Theological Seminary
Michigan State University
Middlebury College
Oakland (Cal.) Police Department
Reed Street Neighborhood
House, Philadelphia
St. Olaf College
St. Paul Epis. Church, New Haven
Stanford University
Temple of Aaron, St. Paul
University of California, L.A.
University of Connecticut
University of Maryland
University of Minnesota
University of Notre Dame
University of Puget Sound
University of Wisconsin
Wisconsin State University

NEW REPORTS

☐ **MUTUAL AID AND THE**
NEGRO
John Slawson 40 cents

☐ **CHINESE VISIONS & AMER-**
ICAN POLICIES
Benjamin Schwartz 40 cents

☐ **THE WATTS "MANIFESTO"**
& **THE McCONE REPORT**
Bayard Rustin 40 cents

☐ **FUTURE OF CAPITALISM**
Robert L. Heilbroner 50 cents

QUANTITY DISCOUNTS: REPORTS CAN BE COMBINED FOR DISCOUNT

25-49 copies less 10%; 50-99 copies less 15%; 100-299 copies less 20%
300-499 copies less 30%; 500-1000 copies less 40%; more than 1000 copies less 50%

Commentary Reports, 165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

☐ Complete list of 32 Reports (value \$13.70) \$5.95 ☐ 13 Reports on Jewish affairs (value \$5.35) \$2.95

Enter the number of Reports required in the box next to the appropriate title.

☐ Payment enclosed (*Commentary pays shipping*)

☐ Bill me

Minimum order \$1.00

Orders over \$5.00 can be billed

Name

Address

City State



□ 905. SEEDS OF LIBERATION, ed. by Paul Goodman; and... THE NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA by Christopher Lasch. (Comb. retail price \$14.45)



□ 277. THE BASIC WRITINGS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL, ed. by R. E. Egner and L. E. Denonn. (Retail: \$10.00)



□ 345. COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA by E. Z. Friedenberg. (Retail: \$5.95)



□ 336. THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT by E. Digby Baltzell. (Retail: \$6.95)



□ 614. UNDERSTANDING MEDIA by Marshall McLuhan. (Retail: \$7.50)



□ 615. AFRICA'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY by Victor C. Ferkiss. (Retail: \$6.50)




□ 613. THE BIT BETWEEN MY TEETH by Edmund Wilson. (Retail: \$7.50)



□ 903. THE WORDS by Jean-Paul Sartre, and... THE HEART OF MAN by Erich Fromm. (Comb. retail: \$8.95)



□ 902. LOVE DECLARED by Denis de Rougemont, and... THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE by Morris L. Ernst and A. U. Schwartz. (Comb. retail: \$11.00)



□ 906. THE DEATH OF GOD: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era by Gabriel Vahanian; and... WAIT WITHOUT IDOLS by Gabriel Vahanian. (Comb. retail: \$10.00)


An exciting offer for discriminating readers...

ANY 3

of these outstanding selections

FREE

(—as many as 6 books, retail value up to \$39.85 if you join Book Find Club now and agree to accept four more books within a year—)




□ 352. FREEDOM IN THE MODERN WORLD by Herbert J. Muller. (Retail: \$10.00)



□ 312. MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS by Carl G. Jung. (Retail: \$7.50)



□ 256. IDENTITY AND ANXIETY, ed. by M. Stein, A. J. Vidich, and D. M. White. (Retail: \$7.50)



□ 901. THE FREE WORLD COLOSSUS by David Horowitz; and... THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT by T. B. Ross and D. Wise. (Comb. retail: \$12.90)



□ 606. MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND by Claude Brown. (Retail: \$5.95)



□ 273. THE FATE OF MAN, ed. by Crane Brinton. (Retail: \$7.50)



□ 260. IMAGES OF MAN, ed. by C. Wright Mills. (Retail: \$7.50)



□ 605. THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE by Morton Mintz. (Retail: \$6.95)




□ 904. THE MARTYRED by Richard E. Kim; and... THE FOX IN THE ATTIC by Richard Hughes. (Comb. retail: \$9.00)



□ 625. UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED by Ralph Nader. (Retail: \$5.95)



□ 607. THE ACCIDENTAL CENTURY by Michael Harrington. (Retail: \$5.95)



□ 350. THE VOICES OF TIME, ed. by J. T. Fraser. (Retail: \$12.50)



□ 318. SAINT GENET by Jean-Paul Sartre. (Retail: \$8.50)



□ 354. CHILDREN OF THE UPROOTED, ed. by Oscar Handlin. (Retail: \$8.50)



□ 638. THE GREEK MYTHS, ed. by Robert Graves. (Retail: \$6.00)



□ 276. THE CITY IN HISTORY by Lewis Mumford. (Retail: \$11.50)



□ 319. THE VITAL BALANCE by Dr. Karl Menninger. (Retail: \$10.00)



□ 343. DOG YEARS by Günter Grass. (Retail: \$6.95)

MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS INCLUDE:

- Savings up to 60% off retail on important books you want to read and own
- Special offers which enable you to obtain free books
- Fast and efficient handling of all your book orders
- Authoritative reviews of the current Selection in your copy of The Book Find News
- A bonus plan that lets you choose one book free for each three you buy as a regular member

THE FIRST THREE ARE FREE

and you can save up to 60% off retail on all the rest

Book Find Club offers you any three selections free... as many as 6 books with a retail value up to \$39.85... to introduce you to the many Club benefits our members have enjoyed for more than two decades. In addition, as a special bonus with this offer, you may choose any selection here—regardless of retail price—for only \$4.95 to begin your short trial membership.

This special introductory offer is yours if you simply agree to take four more books in the com-

ing year from the more than one hundred that will be offered to you month-by-month at special member's savings.

Then, as a regular member, you earn bonus credit for each additional purchase. Three bonus credits entitle you to a free book of your choice from our extensive list of bonus selections.

Take a moment right now to select your books, enter them by number on the coupon, and mail today to: Book Find Club, Inc., One Park Avenue, New York City.

Book Find Club

One Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

866-7C

You may enroll me as a trial member in Book Find Club and send me the 3 FREE BOOKS indicated by number below.

--	--	--

FREE BOOKS

First Selection

--

At the same time, send me the book indicated by number in this box to count as my first membership selection. Regardless of regular retail price, you will bill me only \$4.95 plus a small charge for postage and handling.

My only obligation is to purchase four more of the many outstanding books to be offered to me in the coming year at member's prices that will often save me as much as 60% off retail. Then, as a regular member, I will be able to choose one book FREE for each three I buy.

Name (Please print plainly)

Address

City

State

Zip

When did you last ask—
or try to answer—the question

What Means This Judaism?

JEW AND CHRISTIAN have asked for centuries . . . for each can find in the answers a deeper understanding of his own religion and a richer heritage to share.

For everyone who ever asked or tried to answer, **CONTRACT WITH GOD** was written. In simple language, this slender book explains the essence of Judaism and its biblical origins, stripped of the outer trappings so often mistaken for the essence.

PARTIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Whose Story—and for Whom?
God Got Through to Man (*Revelation*)
Who Wrote the Five Books of Moses?
Faith and Reason
The Test of Adversity

Christian and Jew join in hailing **CONTRACT WITH GOD** . . . see December *Pulpit Digest* and February *Jewish Digest*.

William Foxwell Albright calls it "a remarkable achievement."

Fannie Hurst sees it awakening "a new spiritual awareness."

CONTRACT WITH GOD by Reed and Reed. Foreword by Dr. Trude Weiss-Rosmarin.

\$3.95 at book stores or

FOUR SEASONS PUBLISHERS, Dept. 50
Box 1444

617 Grant Ave., Plainfield, N. J. 07061

Is the International Journal of Psychiatry for all PHYSICIANS?

SEE
FOR YOURSELF

Introductory Copy \$1.00. Contents:
BLEULER'S review of Schizophrenia;
KIEV'S Study of Folk Psychiatry;
DUNHAM on Community Psychiatry, and
KORA on Morita Therapy.

Each with critical evaluations.
Regular Single Copy Price: \$5.00

INT. JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY 27 East 62nd St., New York, N.Y. 10021

☐ ENCLOSED IS \$1 FOR SAMPLE COPY.

☐ Enter my subscription individual—\$10

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

sion that the Bible singled out the pig as inordinately abominable, but in fact the pig shares this dubious honor with the camel, the hare, and the coney, each of which lacks either one or the other of the two things that signify the clean animal, namely, the chewing of the cud and the divided hoof. Isaiah, in Chapters 65 and 66, does single out the pig and its blood as a special abomination, but he is apparently alluding to a well-known pagan ritual that involved sacrificing swine and mice in gardens and eating them among the graves and in the vaults. Since, however, the Pentateuch puts the pig on the same level with the camel, the new-fangled theory that the conquering nomads, who undoubtedly ate camel's meat, transferred their disdain for the peasants onto their pigs only is but a figment of the anthropologists' imagination. . . .

I wonder, further, where Mr. Isaac obtained the information that the rabbis prohibited the entire hindquarter of kosher animals? Has he never heard of the former experts in the larger Jewish communities of Eastern Europe who removed the sciatic nerve, the large blood-filled veins, and the non-kosher suet from the hindquarter that was then sold as kosher meat? This practice has since been abandoned because of the waste, expense, and other practical reasons involved, and not because it is difficult to remove the blood from that part of the body. According to rabbinical law, blood that cannot be removed is kosher if it has never been separated from the meat.

Contrary to the attitude of extreme rationalists and mystics, the Bible was never intended as a manual for philosophers, medics, and miracle-workers, but as a guide for every man in his relation to his Maker, his fellow man, and Creation in general. Since the Bible was not created in a vacuum, it absorbed some older traditions which seemed at the time not to be out of harmony with the monotheistic concept of the universe, but rejected others that seemed even then silly, superstitious, and therefore abominable. If some biblical injunctions happen to coincide with the laws of hygiene, they do so accidentally only, because the Bible's primary objective was man's ethical and civilized behavior. Do not commit incest, do not use false weights and measures, and do not eat rats, because such actions are unethical, uncivilized, ugly, and contaminate

the soul. Do not practice idolatry because it is infantile and leads to other practices that are abominable. . . . Believing that the violations of God's laws could only lead to moral decay and social chaos, the sages expanded them in such a manner as to avoid temptation to violate them. . . . Had Judea retained its political independence, the future sages would surely have modified many laws, but once the central authority disintegrated, those who took its place were either cowards or fanatical incompetents who felt that it was safer to prohibit than to permit. It seems, therefore, quite useless to look for a method in their madness. . . .

EMANUEL WURMBERG
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have several times observed a loose use of the word dogma in COMMENTARY, e.g. in Erich Isaac's article, where he refers to "Christian dogma" in comparing Christian and Jewish views of animals. At least in Catholic theology, this is a technical word. Any standard textbook will explain that a dogma is a truth revealed by God and infallibly taught as such by the Church.

There are very few dogmas in Catholicism although there are, of course, a great number of theological, and even more philosophical, opinions held by Catholics as individuals. The teaching about the nature of animals, to which Erich Isaac referred, would be a good example of something that is philosophical opinion and very far from being the Christian dogma that he says it is.

(Reverend) VINCENT A. BROWN
Church of St. Clement Pope
South Ozone Park, New York.

MR. ISAAC writes:

May I state for the record that I am not amazed at the lateness of *kashruth*. I am somewhat startled however by Mr. Wurmberg's letter. Unlike Mr. Wurmberg, I believe the semantic field of a word is important. "Christianity" as a common and widely used term is a modern word, and the word corresponds to a new world picture and self-image of Christians. Similarly, the point with *kashruth* as a late term is that it came to designate a way of life.

I didn't intend to overstress the pig question, and in my opinion the article does not do so. As for the hindquarter, I can only refer

Mr. Wurmberg to the weight of responsa which were unfavorable to his "porshing" experts. In recent times rabbis came out strongly against it. I am surprised that while he was about it Mr. Wurmberg neglected to point out that observant Sephardic, Yemenite, and other non-Eastern European Jews eat hindquarter meat.

I argued against the theories of nomadic or hygienic origin of the prohibitions: so apparently does Mr. Wurmberg. I am reminded of a letter the "Wormser rabbi," Chaim Yair Bacharach, wrote to a questioner to discourage Wurmbergian displays: "Through such a knowledge the young man will also be able to acquire esteem and fame, when he will impress the audience by his explanations and interpretations, or when . . . he will make a loud impromptu comment and show his knowledge. Such a kind of erudition can also be profitable for him because he can in this way acquire the reputation of being a Hebrew scholar, and thus the chance to get a wife and fortune."

In reference to Father Brown's letter, I should have said "doctrine" instead of dogma in view of the technical meaning dogma has acquired in the modern Roman Catholic Church. But if my term was misleading, Father Brown's characterization of the teaching on animals as simply philosophical opinion held by some individuals is even more so. The Church's teaching on contraception is not dogma, but that has not prevented it from being authoritative and binding upon Catholics.

Memories

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Lionel Trilling's elegiac essay on Tess Slesinger's novel, *The Unpossessed*, recalled to me an earlier time ["Young in the Thirties," May].

Tess had just returned to New York from Reno after her divorce from Herbert Solow. She answered an ad for a secretary to work with V. F. Calverton, editor of *The Modern Monthly*. He hired someone else and turned over to me the letters of the unsuccessful applicants. At that time I was an associate editor of Calverton's magazine and in the middle of my first novel, which was going haltingly. I thought that if I could dictate parts of it, I could manage to get through a rough draft. Tess Slesinger's letter seemed the most

promising; it was witty and to the point; it suggested, without saying so, that she was desperate about getting work. But what was even more attractive to me was that she had just published a novella in *Story Magazine* called "Missus Flinders." I had read the story, and had admired it.

We worked together for about three months, when she left for a better paying, full-time job, but long before then I had become aware of her extraordinary presence, sinewy and sensitive, in which self-doubt and self-esteem in proper proportion joined to make her seem burningly honest.

She had had offers from publishers to extend her novella into a novel, and a great many hours of our working time were spent in talking about writing problems, hers and mine.

Since her novel was a *roman à clef*, she worried about whether she would be hurting others, fighting with herself over the issue of loyalty to her vision of the book against loyalty to the people who might recognize themselves in it. She found that writing as an act was painful and she stopped for weeks at a time. She had severe headaches which, with my newly-won graduate degree in psychology, I diagnosed as masking a fear of writing. Perhaps I was not entirely wrong, but it wasn't the coward's fear, it was rather the fear of not being good enough. She had a vision of the responsibility of authorship, a passionate perfectionism so great that, to answer Mr. Trilling's question, it may explain why she never wrote a second novel. She told me that she felt easier in the short form, the story or novella, and as I remember *The Unpossessed*, it is really less a novel than two or three long sketches.

I think, too, that Tess Slesinger was profoundly dismayed and sickened by the political storms breaking across those days of our lives. It is difficult today, as Trilling remarks about similar events, to understand how bloody and cruel were the internecine wars of the 30's among the Stalinists, Trotskyists, Lovestoneites, et al. Everyone was a little Lenin plotting death to the Social-Revolutionaries. But the wars were catastrophic enough to cause sensitive artists like Tess Slesinger to run away from them, from New York, and even from writing itself, in order to avoid the daily accusations of treachery and the awful turning away of one

Is there a future for Negro youth ?

Provocative answers from

SAMUEL D. PROCTOR

Special Assistant to the Director,
Office of Economic Opportunity

How did Negro youth get where they are? What's ahead in their education? jobs? politics? social equality? How much should they rely on white friends? What must they do now for themselves?

A profound challenge to Negro and white alike—from an outstanding Negro university educator and Special Assistant to Sargent Shriver.

Just published. \$3.95 at stores.

ASSOCIATION PRESS

New York 10007

Publish Your Manuscript!

If we think your manuscript has unusual possibilities, we will offer you a straight royalty or partial subsidy basis. Send manuscript for free editorial report or write for Brochure CC.

Pageant Press, 101 Fifth Ave., New York 3, N. Y.



WRITE FOR MONEY!

Enrich your style through Herbert Spencer's and Edgar Allan Poe's classic principles that have influenced many of the world's great authors, indispensable for writers eager to get published! Send \$1.00 to PAGEANT PRESS, Dept. CCA 101 5th Ave., New York 3

The Academy for Jewish Religion

The Academy is a general school of Jewish Theology, for the training of rabbis, combining both students and instructors of the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform groupings.

Applicants please write to:

THE ACADEMY FOR
JEWISH RELIGION
112 East 88th Street
New York, New York

The Struggle for Indochina 1940-1955

ELLEN J. HAMMER. The present work brings together in one volume *The Struggle for Indochina* (1954), and *The Struggle for Indochina Continues* (1955), a detailed account of the Geneva Conference of 1954 and its immediate aftermath. "The most authoritative work on the subject in English."—*The Economist* (London). "An indispensable source."—*Saturday Review* \$8.50

The Early Elizabethan Succession Question, 1558-1568

MORTIMER LEVINE. This is the first full study of the critical early years of succession history, from Elizabeth's accession in 1558 to the turning point in 1568: the death of Catherine Grey and Mary Stuart's flight to England. Considers the legitimacy of the Suffolk claimants, the eligibility of an alien to ascend the throne, and the influence of the succession tracts of the period. \$6.95

The Censorial System of Ming China

CHARLES O. HUCKER. This is the first book-length study by a modern scholar, Chinese or Western, of the traditional Chinese censorial system—a system of regular surveillance over all governmental operations maintained by special government agencies and their officials. Analyzes in detail the actions of censorial officials in two radically different periods within the Ming dynasty. \$10.00

Stankevich and His Moscow Circle, 1830-1840

EDWARD J. BROWN. A biographical study of a young intellectual who was the center of a group that included such men as Turgenev, Bakunin, Herzen, and Belinsky. A compelling evocation of the intellectual and emotional atmosphere of Russia when the intelligentsia was struggling to express itself, and Russian literature was taking its first steps toward greatness. \$5.00

At your bookstore

Stanford University Press

friend from another because of something said about the latest theses from the Comintern.

Tess Slesinger's life was cut short by cancer but her writing life was cut shorter by the tragic loyalties of the 30's, that time which ruined a generation of artists.

I am pleased and moved that Mr. Trilling has reminded us all.

MICHAEL BLANKFORT
Los Angeles, California.

A Judge's Personality

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"A Note on Felix Frankfurter" by James Grossman [March] contributes to a better understanding of a complex, not to say complicated, figure.

Though it may be too early for a definitive evaluation of the Justice as a jurist or as a man, it is already clear that he had an important impact on American jurisprudence as teacher and as judge. It is fairly open to serious question, however, whether his judicial statesmanship was equal to his craftsmanship in the law.

If he did not succeed in greatness as a judge—as Mr. Grossman is constrained to conclude somewhat reluctantly—it may have been due to certain defects in his temperament, highlighted by Garson Kanin's perceptive observations. These aspects of Justice Frankfurter's personality are not without significance. The image of a judge often reflects the attributes of the man beneath the robe. And these are important; for judges, like other men, as Cardozo carefully pointed out, are "subject to the empire of subconscious loyalties."

(Justice) SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER
Supreme Court of the State
of New York
New York City

The Nature of Law

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Melvin L. Wulf's review of *Politics and the Warren Court*, by Alexander Bickel [April], contains an inner contradiction which goes to the very heart of the problem of the Supreme Court.

Mr. Wulf suggests that Bickel's preference for the processes of inducement and persuasion over coercion by law is weakened by its resulting "preference for preserving traditional democratic institutions rather than subjecting them to the risks of open political conflict."

Such an approach, Mr. Wulf goes on to say, suggests an overly "skeptical view of the utility of the law and the immorality of discrimination." Yet Mr. Wulf himself concludes this very same book review by requesting that "Civil libertarians . . . should re-assess their priorities and candidly decide whether they are willing to jeopardize the prestige of the Supreme Court and consequently the authority of its pronouncements on issues of grave public concern for the sake of vapid prayers . . . which children will easily survive."

Two important points emerge: (1) The prestige of the Supreme Court is indeed in jeopardy but must somehow be preserved; and (2) whenever an issue of "grave public concern" arises involving "immorality," one should seek and expect redress from the Supreme Court. But just what is the standard for "immorality," or for "grave public concern"? Furthermore, as the Supreme Court decides case after case on the basis of "morality" rather than law (i.e., precedents and well-developed principles), public acquiescence is sacrificed, as demonstrated by the growing movement for constitutional amendments on school prayers. . . .

In addition, Mr. Wulf credits Bickel with "the best qualities of civilized liberalism—intelligence, logic, and sympathy," yet at the same time he criticizes Bickel for lacking "passion, the one indispensable force if we are to shake our society from the racial status quo." This sort of attack, if not outright anti-intellectual in its tone, could be directed against all those who believe that history teaches the efficacy of orderly change, instead of the chaos of passion. . . .

DAVID I. CAPLAN

New York City

MR. WULF writes:

I wonder what Mr. Caplan thinks are the ingredients of his "precedents and well-developed principles." Sugar and spice and everything nice? They are in fact the expression by judges of their views of how social conflicts should be settled, and how the interest in preserving freedom can be accommodated to the competing demands of an orderly society. These judgments are necessarily composed of human, not mathematical, ingredients. They reflect considerations of fairness, predictability, or morality, depending on their subject matter. Commercial law must be predict-

COLOR THE HORIZON — BRIGHT!

Headlines have been tipping the story right along. "Millions sign up for Medicare." "Thousands register for Project Head Start." "Giant urban renewal project begun."

And as the story of the Great Society unfolds, one thing becomes clear: Not only will the lot of millions of Americans be improved, but important economic forces will be set in motion.

What effect all this will have on various industries makes exciting reading for any investor. That's why you may want a copy of our brand new booklet, *"The New American Horizon."*


Take education. The huge increase in the number of school-age children means new schools, new desks, new libraries, new books, new teaching tools and techniques. Expenditures for education in 1975 are estimated at \$61 billion, compared with \$38 billion last year.

New federal health programs also promise great benefits to business. Medicare payments in the first full year alone should total something like \$3.5 billion for 19 million senior citizens. There'll be new hospitals and nursing homes, too. And a parade of new drugs.

Then there's the challenge of urbanization—the slums, the transportation snarls, the problems of water and air pollution. Federal funds for community development are estimated at \$1.2 billion next year, and expenditures will increase in the years ahead.

Want to know more about the probable impact of the Great Society on the American economy and the stock market? Just write for our new booklet, *"The New American Horizon."* It carefully explores six industries and the companies which stand to benefit most, gives you enough facts and figures to help you reach sensible investment decisions.

"The New American Horizon" is yours for the asking. Just send us the coupon below.



Yes, please send me a copy of *The New American Horizon*.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY & STATE _____ ZIP _____

YOUR PHONE NO. _____



**MERRILL LYNCH,
PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH INC**

MEMBERS NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND OTHER PRINCIPAL STOCK AND COMMODITY EXCHANGES
40 PINE STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

able; rules of evidence must be fair; and race-relations law must be moral, or just, or ethical, or virtuous, or whatever you want to call it. In the end, however, they are all based on subjective assessments.

Some judge-made law—contract law, for example—is relatively stable because the relationships it is intended to regulate are themselves relatively stable. On the other hand, constitutional law, or more precisely for our purposes, race-relations law, must be more flexible in order to accommodate changing national values. . . .

If Mr. Caplan prefers that civil-rights law be predictable rather than moral, he should be prepared to defend the racist concept embodied in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, though I for one won't bother to argue it with him.

Which, I suppose, will reinforce Mr. Caplan's charge of anti-intellectualism. To the extent that I have strongly held views about matters of grave public concern, I plead *nolo contendere*.

Policing the Police (Concl'd)

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We are pleased to draw the attention of all to Thomas R. Brooks's latest article on the New York City Police which appeared in the New York Times Magazine of April 3, in which he greatly modifies his prior views. . . . ["New York's Finest," August 1965; "A Controversy on the Police," February].

In the interest of accuracy in this forum, however, we wish to state unequivocally that at no time have we advocated the exemption of the police from criticism or public regulation as Brooks charged. Further, the objection is not even to a civilian review board, per se, but

to a standard of review and criticism that Mr. Brooks's assertions gave good cause to dread. For example, he described an incident of a "young man" with a gun surprised by a policeman in the act of holding up a liquor store. There is a chase and the "young man" is fatally shot.

Mr. Brooks's point, of course, is that the "young man's" gun wasn't loaded and he did not shoot back at the police and wouldn't have been given a death sentence if apprehended. Mr. Brooks probably believes, too, that part of a policeman's training should enable him to tell if a brandished gun is empty or not; the felon should not face unnecessary hazards; and the anguish felt by someone who is robbed at gunpoint means nothing. . . .

A current word about street drug addicts—not from a "standard text in the field." Irving Lang, of the New York County District Attorney's Office, has compiled the results of city, state, federal, private, and foreign research. He states: "Studies have shown that the vast majority of addicts, 75-80%, are in conflict with the law before addiction. Addiction is symptomatic rather than causative." Incidentally, 38 murders in New York City during 1965 were committed by addicts. Mr. Brooks states that this is not a crime committed by addicts.

In New York City in 1965, there were 203,303 arrests and 2,888,637 summonses as well as one policeman killed and 478 injured in making arrests. There were 324 complaints made against the police and Mr. Brooks, in his more recent piece, reports 17 as substantiated. The number substantiated is higher—about 10 per cent or double Brooks's figure. In any event, however, the claim is that the figure

would be much higher if not for fear of police reprisal. A member of the Philadelphia Civilian Review Board reported in February a total of 15 suspensions since 1958, and stated, "About 350 out of 400 complaints heard deserved commendation if not acquittal."

Finally, the Bar Association of New York has stated that their study and experience indicate the whole matter of brutality to be overblown. Even the modified Thomas Brooks of April 3 reports, "Police brutality . . . is perhaps not as extensive as civil rights activists believe. . . ."

More significant than Mr. Brooks's discussion of numbers of complaints about the New York City Police is, we believe, that in this competition of interests, which is indeed the real tragedy, the community interest is still the loser. We all know people who are reluctant to make a complaint to the police about a crime—to get involved—but not from fear of the police taking their names, rather that it will all come to naught, and they will be subject to reprisal by the accused. There is a public interest, and as Sidney Hook has said, fanatical devotion to one civil liberty is the diminution of others.

What we, Mr. Brooks, and the public can realistically hope and work for is an enlightened, professional police force. We still maintain that to achieve this end criticism must be responsible if only in the sense of being accurate and realistic. Mr. Brooks in his last outing comes much closer to this stance; we commend him but regret that his present views did not appear in these pages.

DAVID B. DURK
RONALD REIS

New York City

a mark of respect

Riverside
MEMORIAL CHAPEL, INC.

FUNERAL DIRECTORS

Charles Rosenthal
Carl Grossberg

Edward Rosenthal
Leo J. Filer

Morton Rosenthal
Lawrence Grossberg

NEW YORK • BROOKLYN • BRONX • WESTCHESTER • LONG ISLAND • MIAMI

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An important addition to The Commentary Library

The Commentary Library provides subscribers with books that will be of particular value to them as subscribers, and will ultimately reflect the editorial character of COMMENTARY itself. Additional books, to be announced in each issue of the magazine, will be offered at reduced prices whenever possible. Buyers will receive bonus credit applicable toward the purchase of selected Bonus Books on the Library list.

Other titles available in The Commentary Library

Beyond the Melting Pot. The revealing study of immigrant groups by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan. (1 bonus credit) List \$7.50 **\$5.95**

The Commentary Reader. Twenty-year anthology edited by Norman Podhoretz, introduction by Alfred Kazin. (1 bonus credit) List \$12.50 **\$9.95**


Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed. Translated by Shlomo Pines; introductory essay by Leo Strauss. (2 bonus credits) List \$15.00 **\$13.50**

The Complete English-Hebrew and Hebrew-English Dictionaries. Over 120,000 entries in each. (2 bonus credits each) List \$14.95 per vol. **\$12.95; both \$25**

Scroll of Agony. A personal diary written in the Warsaw ghetto under the Nazis by Chaim A. Kaplan. ALSO AVAILABLE AS A BONUS BOOK (1 bonus credit) List \$6.95 **\$5.75**

Ben Shahn's Haggadah. A celebrated edition with translation and notes by Cecil Roth. For year-round enjoyment. (3 bonus credits) List \$20.00 **\$16.50**

The Edmund Wilson Trilogy. A chronicle of the literary world from the early twenties to the present. (2 bonus credits) List \$18.50 **\$12.95**



special price: \$6.95

In his classic, multi-volume, history of the religion of the Jews, the great historian, Yehezkel Kaufmann develops a revolutionary view of the nature of Israel's monotheism. In contrast to most Biblical scholars, he maintains that the Israelite religion, though rooted in the high civilizations of the ancient Near East, was "absolutely different from anything the pagan world ever knew; its monotheistic world view had no antecedents in paganism. . . . (and) was the fundamental idea of a

national culture, and informed every aspect of that culture from its very beginning."

Translated from the original Hebrew by Moshe Greenberg, this one-volume abridgement is designed to introduce the essence of Professor Kaufmann's epoch-making researches to English readers.

List price \$8.50. Offered to Commentary subscribers with 2 bonus credits at \$6.95.

Bonus Books

Night

"Elie Wiesel's book is a most eloquent and moving description of the Night through which Jews and, indeed, all humanity passed during the Nazi holocaust." —Avraham Harman. List \$3.00. Offered as a bonus book for \$1.25 plus 1 bonus credit.

Scroll of Agony

Regularly available to subscribers at \$5.75, is now also offered to them as a bonus book for \$3.00 plus 3 bonus credits.

American Jewish Yearbook

Regularly available to subscribers at \$6.50, the current Yearbook is now offered as a bonus book for \$3.50 plus 1 bonus credit.

The Commentary Library

165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

I am a subscriber to Commentary and would like to order the books indicated on the right. Payment for these books is enclosed. Please send to:

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip Code _____

Add 25¢ postage for each volume to be mailed within the U.S.A.

Add 50¢ postage for each volume to be sent abroad.

— Religions of Israel	\$ _____
— Wilson Trilogy	\$ _____
— Beyond Melting Pot	\$ _____
— Maimonides' Guide	\$ _____
— Scroll of Agony	\$ _____
— Commentary Reader	\$ _____
— Haggadah	\$ _____
— Eng-Heb Dictionary	\$ _____
— Heb-Eng Dictionary	\$ _____
— Both Dictionaries	\$ _____
Sales tax	\$ _____
Postage	\$ _____
Total	\$ _____



The Hungarian boy with a passion for science... now makes precision tools for General Motors



Louis Simonffy lived in a world of order. A world of laws and theorems and formulas. First as a student of the gymnasium in Miskolc, Hungary... later as a mechanical engineer at Budapest... and finally as head of his own factory.

Suddenly this orderly world so full of promise came crashing down in the inferno that was World War II. Louis and

his wife, Elizabeth, joined the vast army of displaced persons, and for six long years they drifted through the ruptured cities of Europe.

After much difficulty, the Simonffys were able to make their way to the United States, and the pieces started to come together again. First came a job as a drafting clerk, then a better one

as a draftsman, and finally, in 1950, a job with General Motors. Today, Louis Simonffy is one of the ablest and most respected toolmakers in the Company.

For him it was a long and arduous road from Budapest to Detroit. We, at General Motors, are happy to welcome such talented people aboard. GM turns out superior products because of them.



General Motors is People...making better things for you

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHURCH AND STATE: HOW HIGH A WALL?

MILTON HIMMELFARB

THE JEWS ARE probably more devoted than anyone else in America to the separation of church and state. At times, hearing some of us talk about separation, or reading the statements of our organizations, one has the impression that we think ourselves more loyal to the Constitution and more skilled in its interpretation as well—although of course nobody ever says that in so many words. Thoughts protected against expression, as this one is, can be foolish. We are not more loyal to the Constitution or more skilled in its interpretation, we are only more separationist. And with every passing year our separationism comes closer to being part of the “old order” that Tennyson, in those verses that used to be so popular, wanted to see “yielding place to new;/. . . Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.”

The case for the regnant Jewish ideology or emotion goes this way: Granted, there must be something special in our own experience and memory, and some strong feeling about what is in our interest, to account for our separationist fervor; but we perceive and intend separation to be for the good of all as well as for our own good. Thirty years ago the Jews more than anyone else warned against Hitler and Nazism. Afterward, everybody could see that we had been right, that we had not merely been pleading our own cause when we said that resistance to Hitler and Nazism was not a Jewish interest alone but the interest of all. Similarly now in church-and-state matters.

Because the Jews have had to pay for the lesson—so the case continues—we know that separation of church and state is good and the absence of separation is bad. A country with separation is democratic, tolerant, open, free; a country without separation is despotic, persecuting, closed, unfree. The greater the separation, as in America and France, the more democracy and tolerance; the less the separation, as in Spain, Tsarist Russia, and the Papal States before the unification of Italy, the less democracy and tolerance. Of course Jews do better in an America and a France than in a Spain and a Tsarist Russia. Doesn't everyone? In wanting America to be ever more separationist, which is to say ever more American, we want it to be ever better for all. “Religious freedom,” in the words of the canon, “is most secure where

church and state are separated, and least secure where church and state are united.”

A GOOD, STRONG case—or it would be if not for the vice of faulty enumeration. Where do you put England, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, with their state churches? No one can deny that Great Britain and Scandinavia are free and democratic and that religious freedom is closer to being most secure there than least secure. Nor can any Jew deny that those countries are, as we used to say, good for the Jews. (Proportionately, more than seven times as many Jews are in the House of Commons as in the population of the United Kingdom.) On the other hand, in the Soviet Union church and state are constitutionally separate, but the Soviet Union is neither free nor democratic nor good for the Jews, and so far from making religious freedom secure—let alone most secure—it persecutes religion.

It may be argued that Soviet persecution does not fairly come under the head of separation and that state persecution of religion is a kind of negative mode of state establishment of religion. Without conceding the argument, let us return to the Soviet Union when we consider secularism and for the moment instead compare state-church England with separationist France. In democracy and freedom, the two are alike (or used to be, before de Gaulle's somewhat authoritarian Fifth Republic); in openness and tolerance to Jews, the state-church country is better than the separationist one. Which is not to say that establishment is better than separation, but only that other things—notably democracy as it is inclined by national culture and tradition—make the issue of separation/establishment quite secondary.

Only two years ago the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the nursery of the French intellectual elite, tried to keep out a qualified Jewish student because he observed the Sabbath. Why, he was asked, should he be admitted to an institution that trains *lycée* professors? A *lycée* has Saturday classes, like all state schools in France. Would not his Sabbath observance prevent him from teaching? The Ecole Normale Supérieure has been traditionally on the side of the French Revolution—republican, anti-clerical, anti-anti-Semitic—and since before the university careers of the

Reinach brothers and Léon Blum, it has had Jewish students. But unlike the other Jewish students before him, this one was religious. Keeping in mind the distinction between secularist and religious Jews may help us to understand something about ourselves in the United States.

For a long time the distinction was blurred in the American Jewish community because in this country, church-state issues tend to be school issues. Our separationism goes back to the time when the public school was in many ways a common-denominator or intersecarian Protestant school. In that age of Protestant imperialism, as it has been called, the virtues and standards of America were so widely held to be the same as the virtues and standards of Protestantism that a public school had to be a basically Protestant school. One reason why the founder of American Reform Judaism, Isaac Mayer Wise, was a Copperhead in the Civil War was that he resented the Protestant imperialism of the abolitionists. (Lincoln needed the support of the Know-Nothings and did not condemn them publicly. Elijah Lovejoy, the abolitionist martyr, printed anti-Catholic tracts.) It was Wise who began the unbroken Reform tradition of opposing public-school Protestantism in the name of separation. Whether he would have opposed religion-in-general in the schools is unclear. In Germany his masters and colleagues took it for granted that the state should favor religion.

Sometimes Wise's tradition was a well-kept secret among his disciples and successors, because the laity was in no mood to attract attention by protest; yet while Reform rabbis now disagree about God, Torah, and Israel, they still do not disagree about the separationist article of faith, though Protestant imperialism has gone the way of so many other imperialisms. And just as the Irish taught the rest of the Catholics how to be American, so Reform Judaism taught Orthodoxy and Conservatism. Separation became the common platform of the major varieties of Jewish religion in America. (The Orthodox have begun to go their own way, but that is a long story.) Wise would have been happy with no Lord's Prayer in the schools, but only yesterday we were unhappy even with the Regents' prayer, certified desirable by the Lubavitcher Rebbe himself.

As for the Jewish secularists, they have opposed religion in the schools for a simple reason. They are secularists. For a secularist, religion is infantile and infantilizing, the enemy of enlightenment, science, progress, freedom, and peace. The less religion a society or community has, he says, the better it is.

But religionists and secularists do not live apart in the Jewish community. They have in common ideas and, above all, emotions. Few Jews of Central or East European origin or parentage, whether Orthodox or Reform, religious or secularist, have been able to think well of the church. The

church was Pobedonostsev, with his vision of a third of the Jews of Russia converting, a third emigrating, and a third dying of hunger. The church was the threat of pogroms in the Easter season. The church was the Mortara case, the Dreyfus case, the Beilis case. "Christian" was part of the name an anti-Semitic party would give itself, in Protestant Prussia as in Catholic Austria. To Christians, Theodor Reik wrote when he still lived in Austria, Judaism was uncanny (mostly because of circumcision) and therefore fearsome. To Central and East European Jews, it was the iconic, sacramental, and sacerdotal Christianity they saw about them that was uncanny, and it still is to their children and grandchildren. Until a few years ago, the common memories and emotions and sense of danger tended to obscure the differences between Jewish religionists and secularists. So united was the Jewish front that only occasionally would a mainstream rabbi be bold enough to advise his confreres that they would do well, if only for the sake of public relations, to phrase their separationist statements in rather more religious-sounding language.

In Isaac Mayer Wise's Midwest, the Christian environment was Protestant. For most Jews today, who live in and near the great cities, the Christian environment is apt to be mainly Catholic. Wise's separationism was a defense against what he saw as a Protestant threat; ours is mostly against what we see as a Catholic threat, and especially what we see as the threat of the parochial school.

TRADITIONS DIE hard, even the traditions of the untraditional. A man will say that the United States must rethink its foreign policy from beginning to end because the world has changed. Ask him to rethink his own policy because the world has changed and he will tell you he is no trimmer or opportunist; let the weaklings and conformists veer with the winds of popularity, he will remain loyal to his principles. Everyone thinks he is a dissenter and nonconformist—in good faith, because there are always communities of opinion and fashion in opposition to which he can honestly see himself as one. What he prefers to overlook is that there are also communities of opinion and fashion—or, more honorifically, of thought and style—to which he relates positively, and in that relation his nonconformity can be quite conformist. In our own community, the informal and private one or the organized and public one, separationism is not a bit nonconformist. (It is curious that dissent/dissenter, nonconformity/nonconformist should come to us from the language of English ecclesiastical history.)

As things are today, religionists and moderate secularists have one interest and radical separationists another, and our separationism now serves the radical interest. (Radical is generally not an O.K. word, but I cannot think of anything

better. Extreme is even less O.K., consistent is not what I mean, and fanatical is insulting.) Whether a secularist is moderate or radical depends on whether his secularism is one of several more or less equal goods or whether it is his chief good; whether it is a means as well as an end, to be judged in part by its usefulness in furthering other ends, or whether it is more like an ultimate end. For the moderate, separationism is a strategy more than a philosophy, and if new conditions call for a change in strategy he will be ready to make the change. For the radical, the strategy goes so closely with the philosophy that change can only be betrayal. As integralist Catholics are convinced (notwithstanding Vatican II) that the marriage of Throne and Altar is God's will, so radical secularists are convinced that root-and-branch separationism is Reason's dictate.

What are the considerations that should induce a moderate secularist, and all the more a religionist, to question his inherited separationism? The first of these may by itself not be strictly probative, at least about America, but it points to something. For secularists the example of the Soviet Union should teach skepticism about the secularist faith itself. The Soviet Union is the most secularist society in what used to be Christendom (or Islam, Judaism never having controlled any territory to speak of). In that most secularist society, separationism has gone so far as to become persecution of religion; and in that most secularist society, secularism is not the companion or handmaiden of freedom, intelligence, and all the other good things of man's mind and spirit, as secularists once thought it must be. Rather it is the companion or handmaiden of the jailer of art and literature, science and scholarship and philosophy, honest thought and honest feeling. Not church-state England or Sweden vilifies and imprisons Brodsky, Sinyavsky, and Daniel, but the Soviet Union, which calls itself the guardian of enlightenment and the scourge of obscurantism. For a Jew it should also matter that nowhere else in what used to be Christendom are Jews and Judaism persecuted—alone among the Soviet nationalities, including the Germans, and more than the other Soviet religions.

In America a state church on the English or Swedish model is out of the question, and that is all the more reason why the separation decreed by the Constitution should be defended against mutation into separationism. For separationism can be tyrannical even here. No citizens of this country are more peaceful and inoffensive than the Amish, yet a few months ago agents of the Iowa public schools were photographed pursuing Amish children through the fields to drag them into schools that the parents had rejected for religious reasons. Not long after, in New York, it took a decision by the superintendent of schools himself to allow a high-school boy to cover his head in class. A Board of Education lawyer had ruled that if the boy wore

a *kippah* he would be breaching the wall of separation between church and state! (The superintendent's name is Donovan.)

ALMOST AS alarming is the growing isolation of Jewish separationism from the social liberalism of which it used to be part. On every side, President Johnson's aid-to-education and anti-poverty legislation is recognized as a major advance, and if liberals have a complaint, it is that the legislation does not go far enough. Liberal Protestants, accustomed to suspicion of Catholic designs on the public treasury and critical of Johnson on foreign policy, marvel at his achievement in bypassing the kinds of church-state objections—or rationalizations—that invariably killed similar bills in the past. The congressional opponents of Johnson's legislation, who went down continuing to profess indignation over the breach in the wall, were mostly reactionaries and racists.

Together with these stand the radical separationists, although theirs is a true and not a feigned indignation. They are unreconciled to educational benefits being extended to children in non-public (mostly Catholic parochial) schools, and to churches being included among appropriate neighborhood institutions for conducting anti-poverty programs. As the separationists see it, the child-benefit theory is a mere device for benefiting parochial schools by the back door while evading the (presumed) constitutional prohibition of benefits by the front door, and churches and church-related institutions have no business in anti-poverty programs or anything else that gets public money.

What if the benefits cannot readily be extended to children outside their non-public school? What if excluding a church or a church-related institution in this or that neighborhood weakens the effort to help the poor raise themselves out of poverty? Your singleminded separationist, after first trying to deny that your questions are real questions, can say nothing. Creditably, American liberalism in general does not accept this kind of hard-heartedness. The separationists make the usual defense in such cases: it is not really we who are hard-hearted but the other fellow, to whom we refuse to pay blackmail and who has maneuvered us into a false position. They may believe this, but whenever I hear or read Jewish separationists weighing the claim of the poor against the claim of separationism, their emotion goes to separationism. Yet we are still fond of thinking ourselves *rahamanim bene rahamanim*, the compassionate sons of compassionate fathers.

If not even regard for the poor moves the separationist to condone back-door dealings and aid, it is easy to imagine what he thinks about the front door. But here, too, his singlemindedness is beginning to isolate him. He cannot bring himself to look upon his favorite doctrine as one of many good things, not necessarily compatible in its full-

ness with the other good things in *their* fullness, and subject, like all of them, to compromise and give-and-take.

Of late some remarkable voices have been heard for governmental aid to the non-public school: the *New Republic* and Walter Lippmann, among others. Their purpose is not to help the Catholic schools but to help American education; or better, to help bring about the conditions in which all Americans can have the best possible education. Since the quality of the nation's life will depend so greatly on education, Lippmann and the others say, education has a more urgent claim on the nation than separationism. This means helping the Catholic schools, because so many children are educated there—about one in every seven. The Catholic schools need money, in quantities that can come only from government, to hire more teachers so that classes will be smaller, to get good teachers by paying good salaries, to improve classrooms, to build up libraries.

The First Amendment does not command, "Thou shalt not give governmental aid to parochial schools," it commands that there shall be no establishment of religion and no curtailment of the free exercise of religion. The rabbis said that the gates of interpretation of the Torah are not closed, and the Supreme Court has shown that neither are the gates of interpretation of the Constitution closed. If the justices think the nation needs education more than separationism, they can easily decide that the Constitution permits aid to non-public education. If they think otherwise, then it is the turn of the gates of amendment not to be closed. Having had an amendment prohibiting liquor and another annulling the prohibition, the Constitution can have an amendment allowing aid to religious or church-related schools.

This kind of talk is hardly daring any more, but to most separationists it is novel and perverse wickedness. That is not liberal open-mindedness. It is more like the outrage of a 19th-century, Herbert Spencer liberal confronted with the immoral proposal that the government should take taxes from him to support a school for educating his neighbor's children. There are still such liberals, only for many years now they have been called, by general agreement, reactionaries.

To Jews, Jewish separationists like to say that separationism is necessary for our safety and well-being. I think this argument is a second thought, invoked to justify a decision already taken on another ground. Those who invoke it remind me of a businessman who wants to contribute corporation money to a university or a community chest or the symphony orchestra. Possibly he wants to do it because he is a decent, generous man, but he has to justify his decency, to himself as well as to the other officers and the stockhold-

ers, by giving businesslike reasons for the contribution: it will be good for public relations, or it will help to make the environment so healthy that the corporation will be able to thrive.

There would be nothing wrong about consulting our interest when we are making up our minds whether to support governmental aid to church schools in the name of better education or to oppose it in the name of separation. If we consulted interest, we would estimate advantages and disadvantages by applying the appropriate calculus. That is how a man runs his business, or he is soon out of business. It is how Mr. McNamara chooses between missiles and manned bombers, submarines and aircraft carriers. But though I follow the Jewish discussions, I recall little that resembles a true weighing of alternatives. We prefer incantatory repetition of the dogma that separationism is our interest.

It is time we actually weighed the utility and cost of education against the utility and cost of separationism. All the evidence in America points to education, more than anything else, influencing adherence to democracy and egalitarianism. All the evidence points to Catholic parochial education having the same influence. (And all the evidence points to Catholic anti-Semitism as no greater than Protestant, and possibly less.) Something that nurtures a humane, liberal democracy is rather more important to Jews than 24-karat separationism.

There is another thing related to the Catholic parochial schools that we ought to weigh in the balance of Jewish interest. Consensus has become a dirty word on the Left and among intellectuals. In parts of the world suffering either from despotism or from chaos, they must envy America for this additional sign of affluence, that here people can afford to depreciate consensus. Outside the American consensus stand the far Right and the anti-Semites. (There is anti-Semitism on the outside Left, too, and among some of the young Jews in it.) It is good to broaden the consensus, to bring inside those who are outside. They change when they come inside.

Why are some people outside? Usually because they have a grievance. They feel they are disregarded and treated unfairly. The sociologists call this feeling *ressentiment*; let us call it sullenness. When statesmanship becomes aware that a social group is sullen, it tries to remove the causes, if that can be done without unacceptable cost to the other participants in the competitive cooperation of political society. In part it is because the Negroes have finally been seen to be sullen, in this sense, that the government is trying to make room for them in the game and bring them into the consensus. Sometimes, of course, a group's price for giving up its sullenness is too high for everybody else, and it has to be left outside—like the Birchers, who just for a start want the political and social game to return to the

rules of the 1920's or the 1890's. But it must be conceded that some people, disoriented and bewildered by the passing of the America they were comfortable in, are needlessly being driven into the Radical Right. Some good libertarians are saying that such symbolic victories for separationism as making Bible reading in the schools illegal have been won at too high a real cost—the sullenness of the defeated and the departure of some of them from the consensus.

MANY CATHOLICS are sullen. For a non-Catholic it should not be unreasonably arduous to pretend for a moment that he has children in a parochial school. Call it role-playing. For the average Catholic, affluence is either a figure of speech or what someone else has: he is less affluent than the average Episcopalian, Congregationalist, or Jew. The taxes he pays to the public schools keep rising. So do his parochial-school costs, but the parochial school continues to fall behind the public school—in the size of classes, in salaries to attract good teachers, in equipment and amenities. He can hardly afford to pay once, but he has to pay twice; and in return his children get an education that he fears may not be good enough. This, when the diploma society is already here and meritocracy is on the horizon, and when his children's chances of making it depend more than ever on the education he can give them.

He asks for aid, and a coalition of Protestants and Jews, far from respecting him for having done the hard thing so long, answer coldly that private education must be paid for privately; if he can't afford it, let him not complain, let him use the public schools. At the same time he sees that in the cities many in the coalition, whether pants manufacturers or intellectuals, do indeed pay to send their children to private schools. Apparently they believe non-public education is like a Cadillac: just as it would be ridiculous to subsidize a poor man's purchase of a Cadillac, so it would be to subsidize his purchase of non-public education. He suspects that this uncharacteristic enthusiasm of theirs for the principles of Ayn Rand is due rather to their distaste for Catholic education specifically than for non-public education generally.

Then, in self-defense, or out of resentment, or as a means of exerting pressure, the Catholic votes against higher taxes for the public schools, and the coalition is confirmed in its opinion of him. He is narrow-minded. But, tolerant and understanding, and proud of it, they tell each other that it isn't really his fault. It is the priests who make him send his children to the parochial school, the priests who make him sullen about the inevitable, unalterable consequences. *We* do not need a priest to make us prefer a non-public school, only *he* does. Tell them of the evidence that the average Catholic parent prefers the parochial school of his own accord; they answer: never

heard of it, propaganda. If I were that Catholic parent, I could be pretty sullen.

Catholics, therefore, have a real grievance. To remove the grievance would be just. It would also be statesmanlike, and would help to improve the education of a significant part of the American population. People are coming to see that. In the past few years the public-opinion polls have shown a steady rise in the proportion of respondents favoring governmental aid, until now there are more for it than against it.

WHAT THEN will happen to the public schools? Probably not much more than has already happened. Whoever asks this question must come into court with clean hands. Are his own children in a public school? Are the tax-supported schools of Scarsdale or Highland Park as public as the tax-supported schools of New York and Chicago?

Jews have special reason for being grateful to the public school: it helped make the America of opportunities for newcomers, and it trained us to seize the opportunities. It has also helped to make American culture receptive and inclusive, with everything *that* has meant to us. In return, we are all for the public school. At the same time, we tell each other horror stories about what it has become. If we can, we either send our children to private schools or move to where the public schools are not too public. Meanwhile, out there, some others are less attached than we to the public-school idea and system and are asking rude questions about it, aloud. They are even suggesting that the attachment is a cultural lag, unsuited to the new times.

When this is suggested on behalf of the Catholics, we find it easy to dismiss the suggestion as illiberal. But now it is suggested on behalf of the Negroes, and we cannot so easily dismiss that. Christopher Jencks,* for instance, argues that the public-school systems of the big cities are so diseased with bureaucracy and inertia that they cannot reasonably be expected to recover and do the job they are supposed to do. In their place, he proposes, the government should give parents the money needed for educating their children; and then the parents, having formed suitable associations, can set up their own schools and hire their own teachers.

Whatever the merits of that particular proposal, Catholics might want to use governmental tuition payments for parochial-school education. What objection could there be then?

TO REPEAT: It is not true that freedom is most secure where church and state are separated; separation and separationism are not the same; even in America, separationism is potentially tyrannical; separationism needlessly repels some from the democratic consensus; it is harsh to those

* "Are the Public Schools Obsolete?", *The Public Interest*, Winter 1966.

who prefer non-public schools for conscience' sake; and it stands in the way of a more important good (and a more important safeguard of Jewish security), the best possible education for all.

The final reason for rethinking separationism is connected in some ways with what has been said about tyranny. The reverence of right-thinking people for the Supreme Court and the Constitution is at least twenty years old now, but I still find it a bit strange. When I was coming of age, my elders and betters regarded the Supreme Court as the Nine Old Men and the Constitution as the horse-and-buggy document that Charles Beard had debunked—or so it was thought—in his *Economic Interpretation*. The cause of the change is obvious and to be grateful for: the Court and the Constitution (as the Court reads it) have been more decent and libertarian than government by plebiscite would be, or than a direct democracy of the people at large. But I continue to be put off when modern types speak of the Constitution as a fundamentalist does of Scripture, and when they speak of the Court as Jews once did of the Sanhedrin in Jabneh.

Especially strange is the concentration on (some of) the *ipsissima verba* of Thomas Jefferson, so that an unofficial metaphor about a wall of separation comes to have the sacred character of the specifications for the Tent of Meeting. Jefferson's more important words tend to be ignored: his enmity to the empire of the dead over the living and his caution against excessive deference to ancestral documents and dicta, including his own. It was Jefferson, after all, who advised posterity to water the tree of liberty every now and then with the blood of revolution—at the very least, a more forceful way of saying what Tennyson was to say in those verses I quoted.

It is a truism that the problems of freedom have changed since Jefferson's time. When we worry now about freedom of the press, we do not have in mind primarily censorship by government or intimidation by a mob. Those restraints have grown fewer and weaker, but we are not at all sure we have more freedom of the press. What bothers us is that not very long ago a man with a few thousand dollars could start a newspaper, and there were many papers. Today it takes millions of dollars, and every year we have fewer papers. Neither censorship nor intimidation has caused the multiplication of one-newspaper cities, but only that everything nowadays is more complicated and expensive. For solving that problem the First Amendment, necessary as it is, is not nearly enough.

In Jefferson's time the press was exactly that—the printing press. Except for earshot speech and handwritten letters, there was no other means of communication. Now we have electronic media, and above all radio and television, which influence opinion probably more than print. In our

time unhindered communication of opinion and information depends on a freedom of the press that includes freedom of radio and TV. But the relation of government to radio and TV has to be totally different from its relation to the printing press.

THE libertarian's conception of the ideal relation of government to the press is that there shall be no relation at all: government and press have nothing to do with each other, nobody needs a license to publish. In principle there is no limit to the number of newspapers or presses. With radio and TV, on the other hand, the laws of physics impose a limit. Two stations cannot operate on the same wavelength at the same time in the same place, so someone must determine that A shall operate and B shall not. That is, the government; and it is to government that A and B come to plead for a license. A government that respects freedom of the press finds itself having to license the radio-and-TV part of the press. What would Jefferson have thought?

In deciding whether to license A or B, the government has first to decide which of the two will probably better serve the public interest and the needs of society. But these include religion in its many forms. Consequently, when the government examines the record of a radio or TV licensee it must ask, among other things, how he has served his community's religious interests and needs. If it did not ask this question, if it asked everything else but not this, a licensee could exclude religion entirely from his programs; or give his own sect a monopoly of the time he allowed for religion; or set aside all that time for attacking a religion he disliked, or some religions, or religion in general; or sell all of it to the highest bidders. Yet a friend of mine considers that the government's asking about the religious programming of licensees breaches the wall of separation:*

While the U.S. Supreme Court has been gradually strengthening Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and state," the Federal Communications Commission has been doing its best to persuade people to go to church. . . . The commission has held . . . that the proposed religious programming of one applicant for a television station . . . was superior to another because it afforded "a more positive proposal for providing time to diverse religious faiths." In another case, it gave a comparative—although not a disqualifying—demerit to . . . [a] proposed program schedule [because it] failed to include "any strictly religious programs" and thus left a "void in . . . over-all program structure."

Radio and TV are not the instruments of the state, they are the instruments of society. The state is there, has to be there, only because a technology Jefferson could not dream of has made

* Marcus Cohn, "Religion and the FCC," *Reporter*, January 14, 1965.

rationing the airwaves necessary. If Cohn's principle were followed, the FCC would not be protecting the separation of church and state, as he thinks. It would be promoting the separation of religion and society—something else again.

The late Theodore Leskes, a lamented colleague and an authority on First Amendment questions, was rather more convinced than I of the need for a wall. Nevertheless, when I asked him whether he objected to military chaplains, he answered that he could not object in principle. The army, he said, is a surrogate society. When the army drafts a man it is obligated to make available to him, insofar as possible, what he has had in the civilian life from which it cuts him off—including the opportunity for religious worship and guidance. Otherwise the government's maintenance of a conscript army would mean the government's exclusion of religion from the lives of some millions of young men.

AND so with education. As late as the end of the 19th century President Garfield could say that a college education was a log with Mark Hopkins at one end and a student at the other. If no longer entirely true when he said it, it still had a certain verisimilitude. Now it would be absurd—not only about our colleges, but also about our high, junior-high, and even elementary schools. These demand ever more costly laboratories, closed-circuit TV, equipment for teaching languages, psychological testing, vocational guidance.

When logs were cheap, it was rather widely possible to maintain non-public schools of the same quality as the public schools, even without governmental aid. Not any more. No violation of the First Amendment is needed to reduce freedom of the press substantively, by the disappearance of one paper after another; the only thing needed is for economic law to be allowed free play. Allowed free play, economic law would have the same effect on the non-public schools, but with an even worse effect on society. The space once occupied by non-public education would not be left empty. It would be filled by something we might call uniformitarianism, to coin an ugly word for describing an ugly condition.

In the political and social thought that has least to apologize for, despotism is understood to prevail when state and society are all but identical, when the map of the state can almost be superimposed on the map of society. In contrast, freedom depends on society's having loci of interest, affection, and influence besides the state. It depends on more or less autonomous institutions mediating between the naked, atomized individual and the state—or rather, keeping the individual from nakedness and atomization in the first place. In short, pluralism is necessary.

Given that a shriveling of the non-public must fatally enfeeble pluralism, especially in educa-

tion; and given that the agent of that enfeeblement is the unchecked operation of economic law, the remedy is simple: check it. Let the government see that money finds its way to the non-public schools, so that they may continue to exist side by side with the public schools. That will strengthen pluralism, and so, freedom.

Arguments for non-governmental pluralism have to overcome the obstacle of their popularity with conservative immobilists. From Social Security to Medicare, an unfeeling Right has been quick to warn that the omniscient state is upon us. Nobody listens any more, the boy has cried wolf too often. But in the fable a real wolf finally appeared, and for us the state coextensive with society may yet appear. Technology encourages it. The simple fact that there are now so many people encourages it. The time when the state took little of the room of a man's life is gone. Happily, a man can favor the welfare state and still oppose the omniscient state.

Can government be expected to subsidize the non-public sector, to pay for keeping vigorously alive centers of influence and power whose very existence will limit its own influence and power? If government is democratic, the expectation is altogether realistic. American governments routinely subsidize the non-public sector: the deductibility provision in the federal and state income taxes is nothing but an indirect subsidy to non-public institutions—community chests, universities, theological seminaries, churches and synagogues. And a most reassuring thing about the poverty program is that government actually calls into being and finances civic groupings of the poor in order that they may make trouble for government—reassuring, because it shows democratic government understands that democracy requires government to have cooperators-rivals.

Historically, establishment has gone with monarchy: throne and altar, crown and mitre. Separation has gone with a republic: no king, no bishop. And in fact England, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have established churches and are monarchies. Republicanism was once even more of a fighting creed than separation, but who in Great Britain or Scandinavia is excited by republicanism any longer? It has become an irrelevance, an anachronism. While monarchies have shown that they can be decent and democratic, republics have shown that they can be neither. In America separationism may soon be just as anachronistic, if only because our establishmentarians are not much more numerous than our monarchists.

Even the rhetoric is coming down with mustiness. "Wall of separation" may have sounded good once, but if you say it to a young man now he is as likely as not to think you mean the wall that separates Berlin. Leave it to a poet: "Something there is that doesn't love a wall."

TOM KAHN

THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW LEFT

WHAT MORE is there to say, at this date, about the New Left?*

 It has already received extensive coverage in the mass media; it has emerged as an identifiable entity in the mind of Washington; before the year is out, at least half-a-dozen books will have appeared on, or even by, the subject;† and it has even been recognized as a proper object of formal study—there is a course on it at the New School.

Yet most liberals come away from encounters with the New Left, whether direct or literary, feeling profoundly ambivalent: the problem is not in determining how much weight to assign the good as against the bad elements embraced by this movement, but in deciding whether to take it seriously at all. To take it seriously requires political measurements of the kind few liberals have had to employ in more than a decade; for it has been at least that long since large numbers of people sought consciously to build a mass political movement for social change. How is such a movement to be constructed? From the rich history of failure of similar efforts in the United States, what lessons can be learned?

One can avoid dealing with this question, and win favor on the New Left, by retreating into sociological formulae which “explain” the motives of the students, the social origins of their rhetoric, the institutional context of their revolt—in short, their emergence as a new social type. (One is apt to forget that technology is creating other revolutionary social types—the modern housewife, for example.) As an avowedly political movement, however, the New Left presumably intends not to be studied as sociology but to transform society—in other words, to make history. Yet the widespread reluctance—shared by members and adult partisans of the movement alike—to analyze its evolving political philosophy, and the preference for sociological description instead, suggest to me an implicit conviction that the New Left will not in fact make history, but rather that it will turn out to be a symptom of history, a fleeting moment in which radical “energies” were released into the larger society. In most discussions of the movement one finds an exhilarated note of romantic defeatism: how can this effort possibly succeed in

the face of the corruption of American society, the power of the state, the brainwashing of the people by the mass media, the machinations of the economy?

Now it makes a considerable difference in sizing up the student movement whether one views its “inevitable” defeat as a disaster or as a vindication. My own experience suggests that those who see it as a disaster, or at least as a disappointing setback, are for that reason the least indulgent of the New Left’s errors and conceits. And it is for such people—Michael Harrington, Bayard Rustin, and Irving Howe, for example, all of whom are committed to building a movement for social change and who share a conception of the strategy by which such a movement can be created—that the new radicals have reserved their most vitriolic vocabulary. (Staughton Lynd, an influential New Left spokesman, refers to Rustin, a democratic socialist and pacifist, as a “labor lieutenant of capitalism” who is in “coalition with the marines.” Tom Hayden, one of the founders of SDS and now head of the Newark Community Union Project, speaks of the League for Industrial Democracy and the liberal-labor-civil rights coalition as playing the same role *vis-à-vis* the poor in America as the Pope played *vis-à-vis* the Jews in *The Deputy*.) No comparable volume of

*The term “New Left” is generally used to cover a wide variety of student organizations and youth groups, with an estimated total membership of about 12,000. The two most important are the largely white Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and the largely Negro Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a non-membership organization with a fluctuating staff of between 150 and 250. SDS is best-known for its work in trying to organize the poor in such cities as Newark, Cleveland, and Chicago, and, more recently, for its protests against the Vietnam war. SNCC is best known for its work among rural Negroes in Mississippi and other Southern states.

Often subsumed under “New Left” are groups which Paul Jacobs has more accurately described as “the Ancestral Left,” youth groups identified with “Old Left” views—e.g., the DuBois Clubs (pro-Soviet), the Progressive Labor Movement (pro-Peking), the Young Socialist Alliance (Trotskyist), and the Young People’s Socialist League (democratic socialist)—each with fewer than a thousand members. Even these groups are affected by the action-styles of SDS and SNCC. Finally, various *ad hoc* and local project-centered student organizations are also considered part of the New Left.

†See Phillip Abbot Luce, *The New Left*, McKay, 1966; Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, *The New Radicals*, Random House, 1966.

TOM KAHN is executive director of the League for Industrial Democracy.

criticism is brought to bear by the New Left on a certain school of generalized radicalism composed largely of journalists, commentators, and stray intellectuals (Nat Hentoff, Howard Zinn, Paul Jacobs, and others) who favorably report from the fringes of activity on the stylistic innovations of the New Left. They are fascinated by the New Left as a milieu, an atmosphere, an élan, a mode of life. They do not clarify strategic problems for the New Left nor participate in the making of political decisions. Although not mentors in the strictest sense, they become champions precisely by virtue of the students' hunger to have their own contours delineated, their unique moods articulated.

All this helps to account for the peculiarly surrealistic quality of the New Left's perceptions of American political life and its own relationship to it. For in the 1960's, in the bastion of world capitalism, where only a beginning has been made toward eradicating racism and toward constructing a welfare state still backward by European standards; wherein the poor remain powerless while General Motors racks up unprecedented profits; wherein the labor movement cannot amass sufficient support to win repeal of 14b; and wherein millions of people are prepared to vote for Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater—in such a society one again hears, this time from the disenchanting scions of the middle class, denunciations of “the social democrats”!

II

WHATEVER their differences, every group, without exception, which has called itself Left or radical, has believed that the organized working class, the labor movement, has a unique historical role to play in the creation of the new society. Disagreement as to the precise nature of that role, and as to the political strategy the unions should pursue—such disagreements, however severe, have rested on a common assumption regarding the socially progressive character of the organized working class. The single new ideological feature of the “New Left”—all that seems to me really new about it—is the rejection, implicit or explicit, of this fundamental assumption. The reasoning behind this rejection is not that the labor leadership or bureaucracy represses the workers' instinctive radicalism (the Trotskyist formula) or that the workers have been atomized or culturally degraded by mass society (the ex-radical's formula), but that the organized working class has achieved its goals and has itself consequently become part of the power structure.

If such an attitude is new in the history of radicalism, it is, of course, familiar in the society at large and particularly among ex-radicals. Ironically, it is precisely such ex-radicals who, having bequeathed to the new radicals a legacy of bitter-

ness and cynicism toward the labor movement, and a concomitant intellectual self-centeredness, now wonder why ultra-radicalism pervades the New Left, failing to understand how ultra-radicalism grows out of a sense of alienation from all major institutions.* A classic example is John Fischer's “Letter to a New Leftist from a Tired Liberal,” in the March 1966 issue of *Harper's*. Criticizing the New Left for its naiveté, incoherence, and anarchism, he explains how he himself was brought to political maturity:

Consider the labor unions, for instance. To us it seemed self-evident that the quickest route to universal reform was to muster all the unorganized workers into strong unions. They would then form the backbone of a liberal political movement, something like the Labor party in England. . . . Under the leadership of the intellectuals, organized labor—with its new-found freedom, leisure and money—would rejuvenate the arts and theater, toning up the soul and muscle of the whole American society . . . [But] Instead of becoming the stoic troops of liberation, the unions (with a very few exceptions) quickly petrified into lumps of reaction and special privilege. I don't need to tell you that some of them—notably the construction trades—are the stubbornest opponents of integration; how they have no use for intellectuals, no interest in the arts, no cultural aspirations higher than the bowling alley; that none of their aged leaders, except Walter Reuther, has entertained a fresh political idea in twenty years. At their worst, as in the case of the Transport Workers Union in New York, they have turned pirate, using their monopoly power to torture millions of people (most of them workers) into paying ransom.

Fischer, of course, is wasting his breath, because the New Left already shares his disillusionment with labor. What they have not yet acquired, as a protection against ultra-radical alienation, however, is his comfortable position in the intellectual firmament—or his post-idealistic snobbery. But if we substitute “Negroes” or “poor people” for “the unions,” we can foresee a time about twenty years hence when an ex-New Leftist, musing on his past, may write a piece similar to Fischer's—that is, if the New Left fails to understand the needs and aims of Negroes and poor people as Fischer patently failed to understand the purpose of unions. None of these groups exists to rejuvenate the arts or to provide salvation for intellectuals. (Given Fischer's notions of a union, no wonder he denounces the TWU without mentioning that prior to the strike, transport workers earned considerably less than the “modest but adequate” budget specified by the U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics.)

In any case, the disaffection of intellectuals from the labor movement reached a peak in the

*A corollary is (Irving) “Howe's Law”: where there is no genuine radicalism, there will be ultra-radicalism.

50's, and few students of a liberal or radical persuasion during that time held the labor movement in esteem. It was therefore predictable that when the next wave of radicalism emerged, it would view labor as simply another big institution—and the New Left is very much a revolt against bigness. But it is important to remember that the indifference or hostility to labor grew out of a conservative period, when middle-class prosperity was reshaping the ethos of the university, and the McClelland hearings were convincing millions of Americans that Dave Beck of the Teamsters was the prototype of the labor leader. Thus, while much student criticism of labor comes from the Left, it also contains strands of middle-class prejudice—a lack of appreciation for, or identification with, the historic and *continuing* role of the unions in the day-to-day lives of literally millions of working people. Little interest will be found among most New Leftists, for example, in the campaign for a \$2.00 minimum wage, or for extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act, although such measures would result in a dramatic upgrading in living standards for masses of Negroes and poor whites who are not likely to be reached by white students working in the ghettos.

THE ABANDONMENT of the traditional pro-labor perspective confronts a radical movement with a major problem. If not the labor movement, then what social force can be expected to lead the way in transforming society, and how are the students to relate to that force? The Marxian tradition, after all, had not only nominated the working class for this historic role, but also had an analysis of the middle classes which, at least by implication, outlined the relationship of breakaway radical intellectuals to the working class. That role was the ideological education of the workers, by which the latter, in the words of Lenin—himself a middle-class intellectual—could achieve a socialist consciousness.

SDS answered the question in the first draft of the Port Huron Statement (June 1962), a kind of manifesto for the new generation of radicals: "... the civil rights, peace, and student movements are too poor and socially slighted, and the labor movement too aquiescent, to be counted with enthusiasm. From where else can power and vision be summoned? We believe that the universities are an overlooked seat of influence." Thus, the new radicals, first coming to consciousness of themselves as a force, saw in their own institutional base the main hope for change. And the statistics lent weight to their argument. The mushrooming of higher education had boosted the university population to four-and-a-half million. Many of these, moreover, were highly concentrated, like factory workers in basic industry, in mammoth institutions—among them the University of Michigan (spawning ground for the

early leadership of SDS), the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of Wisconsin, each of which had close to thirty-thousand students. In any one of these institutions, a demonstration by only one per cent of the student body would be impressive.

The strategic importance assigned to the university continues as a strain in radical student thinking, but the emphasis has by now shifted considerably. In part, the intellectual realization grew that students alone, even at maximum strength, had neither sufficient numbers nor enough political power to change American society: the absence of strong institutions and social classes which made student politics a decisive factor in the underdeveloped countries was not characteristic of the United States. (It must also be said that the quest for allies outside the university intensified as the intellectual leadership of SDS was graduated.)

The allies chosen, of course, were the poor. It is interesting to review how this choice was made, since it preceeded the elaborate ideological justification for it. For one thing, many white students had already participated in SNCC projects in the rural South, where they had their first taste of real poverty. Beyond this, it is ironic to note that the two individuals who are perhaps most responsible for the shift in strategy are now frequent targets of attack by the New Left, Michael Harrington and Bayard Rustin. Harrington's *The Other America* came out in 1962 and succeeded during the following year or two in putting poverty on the political map. Then, on Thanksgiving weekend of 1963, at a SNCC Conference at Howard University, Rustin received a standing ovation when he urged that white students who had donned dungarees and gone off to Mississippi should consider taking their dungarees into the poor white communities of the nation. The enthusiastic response was probably due in part to the fact that many of the white students present had returned from the 1963 Mississippi Summer Project with the feeling that for racial reasons their effectiveness had been limited. Within the civil-rights movement generally, the traditional notions of protest were being challenged by advocates of a grass roots community organizing approach. The East River Chapter of CORE had been formed out of a split with the New York Chapter on this issue, and the entire national organization was plunged into a debate on related strategic questions.

The idea that poor people must be organized is one thing; what they should be organized for, and by whom, are other matters. In Rustin's view, the poor should be organized into the coalition that mobilized the 1963 March on Washington, won the civil-rights legislation, and helped to turn back the Goldwater threat.* Just as the or-

*See his "From Protest to Politics," COMMENTARY, February 1965.

ganized participation of the poor in the coalition would help to strengthen and radicalize the latter, so would the strength of the coalition be required to back the poor in winning immediate gains, without which apathy and demoralization would prevail.

As against this perspective, another was developed within SDS—namely, that to bring the poor into the coalition would mean their absorption into the Establishment. The poor, because they have been outcasts, are perhaps the only group in the society not to have been corrupted. Tom Hayden became the leading spokesman for this viewpoint within SDS, contending that American society is quasi-fascist, that the ideology of the coalition is “corporate liberalism,” and that the effect of the social legislation of the New Deal and the Great Society is to enslave the poor to a bureaucratic welfarism that leaves them worse off than they were to start with. In an essay in *The Radical Papers*, Hayden writes that “. . . there is much evidence which suggests that the reforms gained [in the past thirty years] were illusory or token, serving chiefly to sharpen the capacity of the system for manipulation and oppression. . . . Except for temporarily boosting income for a few people, this entire reformist trend has weakened the poor under the pretense of helping them and strengthened elite rule under the slogan of curbing private enterprise. . . . A way has been found to contain and paralyze the disadvantaged and voiceless people.”

Thus the poor and their New Left catalysts, instead of entering into coalition with the liberals, the unions, and the established civil-rights groups, should build counter-institutions, revolutionary enclaves in the garrison state.

It would be unfair to attribute this perspective to the majority of SDS or the New Left generally. In recent months the Hayden-Lynd influence in SDS has waned (no one at the national conference of SDS last December even referred to their trip to Hanoi with Herbert Aptheker). Still, the prolongation of the Vietnam war may win many of them to the Hayden-Lynd *description* of American society, if not to their strategy for changing it. Hayden and Lynd can thus continue to enjoy high reputations among the students for their rhetoric, even while relatively few are following their advice. The SDS December National Council, for example, voted down a series of civil-disobedience proposals advanced by Lynd and the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam; yet Lynd continues to be billed as the “leading intellectual spokesman for the New Left” (by, among others, pacifist A. J. Muste’s *Liberation* magazine).

Among the majority of the SDSers, as represented by President Carl Oglesby and the National Secretary Paul Booth, there is a greater open-mindedness. The slogans “No Coalitions” and “No Compromises,” which filled the air during

and immediately following the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, have given way to questions: “Coalitions with whom and under what circumstances?” and “Compromise what in return for what?”

These practical questions impose themselves even on the most alienated and romantic elements who are serious about community organizing. Thus, the Newark Community Union Project—probably the most successful of the SDS ghetto projects—has found it advantageous to work within the Democratic party. In no area, it must be said, have SDS organizers recruited more than a hundred or so poor people into ongoing organizational structures. Inasmuch as most of their projects are barely two years old, final judgments are premature; but thus far, the major contribution of the New Left has been to counterpose to the paternalistic social-worker approach to the poor a rugged willingness to live and work among them. In the process they have helped make the poor more visible, if not significantly more powerful.

The same judgment would apply to other New-Left activities: largely through use of direct-action techniques borrowed from the civil-rights movement, the students have focused attention on problems and contradictions in American society but lack the political power to resolve them. One exception would be SNCC, which has clearly brought changes to the Deep South; another might be the demonstrations at Berkeley, which have reverberated among policy-makers at other large universities. (In Berkeley, incidentally, the local SDS people played a relatively minor role, though the national organization did seek to articulate the students’ revolt around the country.) Again, with regard to the Vietnam protests, the New Left seems to have been most effective when, as in the teach-ins, it helped mobilize debate among non-New Left students and faculty. While such expressions of dissatisfaction in the academic world would have surely impressed, if not stung, the administration, demonstrations dominated by the style of the New Left—a style which includes an amenability to cooperation with pro-Vietcong elements—have quite possibly hardened public opinion on the side of the administration.

III

ACTIVISTS OF THE New Left most frequently describe themselves as a-Communist, or as anti-anti-Communist. Their writings speak indiscriminately of “the ideology of anti-Communism,” as if the anti-Communism of socialists, trade unionists, liberals, McCarthyites, Birchers, and Klansmen were cut from the same cloth. What actually operates here is a kind of reverse McCarthyism which refuses to differentiate between libertarian and rightist opposition to Communism. The New Left, precisely by adopt-

ing as a cardinal tenet the thesis that the "Communist question" is irrelevant, raises the Communist question to a standard by which it will judge others. In actual practice, the standard works to the advantage of the pro-Communist and the indifferentist, neither of whom has reason to raise the question.

THE RESULT is that an atmosphere strongly reminiscent of the old Popular Front often pervades the New Left. At a recent SNCC teach-in at NYU, for example, a speaker on "red-baiting" warned an audience of eight-hundred that "anti-Communism" was "anti-The Movement." Anne Braden of the Southern Conference Educational Fund argued in a recent pamphlet that anti-Communism, as the weapon that reactionaries have always used to destroy all "progressive" movements in the South, must be resolutely combatted by civil-rights activists.

This atmosphere makes it all too easy to suppose, as some liberals have, that we are witnessing a resurgence of the Popular-Front politics of the 30's and 40's. The crucial difference is that today there is no significant organized Communist movement to which dupes, fellow travelers, or innocents can be attached, or through which large organizations can be manipulated. Popular-front politics in the earlier decades was not, after all, *simply* a matter of atmosphere or milieu; the Communist party, which recruited from this milieu, exercised very real influence and power over intellectuals and activists. The absence of a comparable threat today—the virtual invisibility of the Communist party in this country—means that the New Left can be persuaded of the totalitarian nature of Communism only through ideological education. And this they resist—often with a hostile arrogance that reflects a nervous awareness of their illogical position. The more sophisticated SDS leaders will acknowledge that there is an anti-Communism of the Left and that it is a different phenomenon from anti-Communism of the Right. But, they say, the latter is overwhelmingly dominant and is merely fed by the former. Left anti-Communism should therefore be muted (and anyone gauche enough to violate this implicit understanding can be made to feel quite uncomfortable).

The irrelevance of the "Communist question" was at least a discussable proposition so long as "the movement" confined itself to domestic questions. Anti-Communism, after all, is a position deriving in the first place from an analysis of the social system established and ruled by Communist parties, and in the second place from an evaluation of the role of apologists of this system in countries throughout the world. Thus, the New Left could argue the irrelevance of anti-Communism on the ground that there are no significant numbers of Communist apologists in this country; as for other social systems, "We live here, not in

Russia." Once the movement turned toward the war in Vietnam, however, what began as an admissible (if morally and politically dubious) disinclination to develop an attitude toward Communism, became an indefensible double standard. One need not support administration policies in Vietnam to recognize that the United States may not be playing the *only* reactionary or oppressive role in that tragic land. Yet this is the assumption underlying the SNCC statement on the war of last January 6:

We believe the United States government has been deceptive in its claims of concern for the freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the government has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia and in the United States itself. . . . Our work, particularly in the South, has taught us that *the United States government has never guaranteed* the freedom of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly determined to end the rule of terror and oppression within its own borders. . . . We ourselves have often been victims of violence and confinement executed by United States government officials. . . . Vietnamese are murdered because the United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in violation of international law. . . . We know that for the most part, elections in this country in the North as well as the South, are not free. . . . We maintain that our country's cry of "Preserve freedom in the world" is a hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation movements which are not bound and refuse to be bound, by the expediencies of United State Cold War policies. . . . [Italics mine.]

These lines are not distorted for having been taken out of context; the ellipses do not conceal qualifying statements. The war in Vietnam is viewed solely as an extension of the American system, as defined and understood by SNCC, and there is nowhere to be found an evaluation of "the other side" except as a force for "liberation." One need not look for Communist infiltrators in SNCC to explain its position; the answer lies in the conditions under which SNCC workers must operate in the Deep South. But to acknowledge those conditions should not entail acceptance of the skewed perspective they foster. The U.S. government is not the State of Mississippi, and the Vietcong are not the equivalent of SNCC. "We have seen that the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act have not yet been implemented with full federal power and sincerity," the statement says. That is true, but how can it be used in apparent support of forces which do not rule by free elections? Hanoi has demanded that the NLF be designated (not elected) the *sole* representative of the South Vietnamese. And when is the last time an election was held in North Vietnam, *even* a Mississippi-style election?

The SNCC statement is the most extreme example of a fairly pervasive mode of thought on the New Left. The danger is not that it paves the way for a resurgence of the Communist movement; it is rather that it encourages a stance and a species of reasoning that muddies the democratic vision of the Left. People who would fight for the right to vote in Mississippi, and yet support forces which rationalize the denial of that right, sow great confusion as to the depth of the American Left's commitment to democracy. It is the resurgence of that confusion, which once before took an enormous toll of radicalism, that we have to fear.

IV

IT IS AT this point that the sociology of the New Left becomes important. For the New Left is not merely middle-class; it springs largely from the affluent, professional, liberal middle class. Here I am talking about the composition of predominantly white organizations like SDS. The young Negro militants in SNCC, CORE, and other civil-rights groups come mainly from a lower-middle-class stratum which, since the early 40's, has experienced many dislocations and a high degree of mobility. The young Negroes in the movement who have gone through college are the first in their families to have done so. This is not the case with the white radical students, whose parents, by and large, are well-educated.

The class origins of the New Left lie at the root of two characteristics of the movement: its anti-materialism and its anti-intellectualism. As to the first, only a childhood of relative economic security could account for the student radicals' insouciance with regard to material circumstances, especially in their ghetto work (which involves living in poverty with the poor). People whose early lives were disrupted or menaced by material deprivation are likely to feel some anxiety at the prospect of living in poverty, even if only as a temporary project. Voluntary poverty, precisely because it is voluntary, is never real poverty. Moreover, because these student organizers of the poor are well-educated, the choice of escaping poverty is open to them, which is not the case with the poor themselves. It may well be that the anti-materialism of the New Left is a strength, a protection against the fatalistic despair that victimizes the poor. But it can also distort the students' relations with the poor. The students are in rebellion against middle-class values and ways of living. The poor, on the other hand, want nothing so much as to get into the middle class, and they are interested in tangible activities toward that end. To be sure, to the extent that poor people struggling for material improvement become politically active and conscious, their values are affected; and as the students work with the poor, they may come to appreciate more fully the

urgency of immediate, concrete economic reform. But the point is that between the students and the poor there is no essential identity of interest such as can be assumed to exist between the union organizer and the factory worker.

The anti-intellectualism of the New Left may, in the eyes of the general public, be obscured by the skillful articulateness of the leadership. Still, it is self-admitted:

The December Conference will . . . be the beginning of an analysis and self-criticism which has been lacking in SDS for the last year: . . . We have slogans which take the place of thought: "There's a change gonna come" is our substitute for social theory, "Let the people decide" has been an escape from our own indecision; we scream "no leaders," "no structures" and seem to come up with implicit structures which are far less democratic than the most explicit elitism. . . . What sociology, what psychology, what history do we need to know the answers? How seriously have we treated those not from the "New Left"? [From the call to the SDS December Conference, 1965].

What has been articulated is moral indignation, personal alienation, and populist sentiment. Although the new student movement is better educated in a formal sense than its counterpart of the 30's, it has been less competent—and willfully so—in making political and intellectual distinctions. This attribute is rooted in a revolt against the liberal rhetoric of their class, against the apparent fecklessness and hypocrisy of modernistic parents who always *stood* for progressive ideas but never seemed to act or *sacrifice* for them. No one knows for certain how many of the New Leftists are the children of the hundreds of thousands who at one time or another passed through the Communist party, but everyone recognizes as a type the ex-party member who, while remaining abstractly committed to certain "liberal" ideas, cautiously withdrew from political activity during the McCarthy era, perhaps to save a job or "spare the children." The children, some of whom have grown up to confront terror in Mississippi, now make a judgment, not only on the fuzzy ex-Communist milieu, but on liberals generally, for what was clearly not their finest hour. The judgment is manifest in a weariness with talk; an almost mystical devotion to activism; and, in place of the older generation's apparent failure of nerve, an "existentialism" whose central value is the permanent protest, the continuous personal confrontation with power.

V

ALL THIS has been said before, but it does not by itself constitute a sufficient explanation of the political orientation of the New Left. It does not follow that a new student generation, with a given socio-economic back-

ground and style, must inevitably wind up with a given politics. Many of the student leaders of the socialist movement of the 1930's, for example, also came from the higher socio-economic brackets, yet had vastly different attitudes toward methods and possibilities of radical social change. The difference, fundamentally, lies in the political context of the 60's, which is sharply dissimilar from that of the 30's and 40's.

Much of what the New Left says and does is inexplicable except in terms of the shifting fortunes of the American radical movement. Seymour Martin Lipset has elsewhere sketched out the historical background of student protest since the days of the pre-World War I Intercollegiate Socialist Society (predecessor of the present League for Industrial Democracy).^{*} Some details of more recent history are directly relevant.

The notion of "generational gap" has often been used to cover up or write off very real ideological disagreements between the younger and older radicals. But there is a sense in which the term has a significant application. When Mario Savio, leader of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, uttered his now famous warning that the movement should not trust anyone over thirty, he was in effect placing beyond the pale all those who were in college during the years darkened by McCarthyism. The point is, in other words, that there is a missing "generation" in the recent history of the American Left—a generation of 30- to 35-year-old radicals who should have served as a link between the New Left and the Old (speaking purely chronologically) but who, because of what campus life was like in the days of McCarthy and Eisenhower, never appeared. (It has been estimated that there were fewer than five-hundred members in any socialist youth group during the late 40's and 50's.)

Having begun my own undergraduate career in 1955 (it continued intermittently until 1963), I recall that one of the few exceptions to the non-appearing generation was Michael Harrington, who regularly toured the campuses, a youthful evangelist for socialism. But his labors were Sisyphean, and perhaps no more than two-hundred students were recruited to the democratic socialist movement in those days. Those who were recruited, however, received an intensive political education; and when the possibilities for radical politics opened up again in the late 50's, the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL, the youth section of the Socialist party) was the first of the radical youth groups to expand. The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Southern school-integration struggle stimulated the 1958 and 1959 youth marches on Washington, in which YPSL's played an outstanding role. By the summer of 1962, a year-and-a-half after the Greensboro sit-

ins, YPSL membership had reached eight-hundred, not a large figure to be sure, but the largest since the 40's and, more important, the largest of any radical student group at the time. YPSL had perhaps twice the membership of Students for a Democratic Society, then still known as the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID).

Within two years, however, the situation had changed drastically. The "left wing" of the YPSL captured control of the organization and promptly subdivided into four factions; the result was to cut YPSL membership in half and finally to destroy the organization altogether. SLID, meanwhile, had changed its name to SDS and had succeeded in racking up a membership of a thousand; thereafter, it grew almost geometrically.

This is not the place to analyze all the factors which led to the decline of YPSL. The reader may feel that too much space has already been devoted to what was, after all, a tiny organization. But all the radical student groups were then tiny and even today are small. A different evolution of YPSL, in that context, might have altered the present configuration of forces in the radical student movement. Furthermore, the then leadership of SDS was in its domestic political views closer to the position of the YPSL "right wing" (which favored working within the Democratic party with the aim of realigning the major parties) than to the "independent labor party" line of the "left wing"; it was also more sympathetic to the former group's emphasis on civil-rights work than to the latter's emphasis on peace activity. But the SDS leaders tended to find both YPSL factions too theoretical, insufficiently pragmatic. Above all, SDS was out of tune with the explicit anti-Communism that characterized all YPSL factions. Most of SDS's present membership of five thousand probably is not aware of this history, but the older leadership is. A former national secretary of SDS recently proclaimed at a Turn Toward Peace debate: "You social democrats who keep raising the Communist question are just a bunch of chiefs with no Indians."

VI

IF ANTI-COMMUNISM and the Marxian faith in the working class rendered YPSL obsolete in the eyes of the new student radicals, factionalism was seen as its most deadly characteristic. Not only was rampant factionalism the apparent cause of YPSL's decline; it was the underlying reason for the fragmentation of the entire American Left. If the warfare among Communists, Socialists, and liberals could somehow have been avoided, the radical movement of the last generation would not have gone under. Some of the New Leftists will dig deeper and assign specific responsibility, or guilt, in the ideological disputes of the 30's, but in such a way that the errors of the respective political tendencies cancel

^{*}"Student Opposition in the United States," *Government and Opposition*, April 1966.

each other out. Thus, the Communists were wrong for taking their line from Moscow and especially for behaving like New Deal liberals; the Socialists were wrong for being so virulently anti-Communist. (Liberals, of course, were wrong because they were liberals.)

The techniques used by the New Left to fend off factionalism, however, create as many problems as they resolve. Decision by consensus, borrowed from the Quakers, helps to prevent the expert abuse of parliamentary procedure, but it also discourages the crystallization of opposing viewpoints, seeking the gentle obliteration of differences. A possibly creative by-product of factionalism—ideological education—goes unrealized. Meanwhile, if a minority is unsatisfied with the common denominator, it is permitted to carry out its own program by itself (the inadmissible alternative being to vote it down)—a procedure which discriminates *a priori* against people who believe that an organization ought to pursue an integrated strategy.

The consensus technique is wed to a particular adaptation of "participatory democracy," a term never satisfactorily explained by the New Left but apparently signifying that there should be no "leaders"—"Let the people decide!" One must hope that more serious writing will be done on "participatory democracy," an attractive and important concept, central to radical thought. But is rank-and-file decision-making strengthened by the denigration of leadership *per se*? People who take the lead in formulating problems and proposing solutions are inevitable. Leadership, if not exercised overtly, if made invisible by a distortion of the concept of "participatory democracy," becomes dangerously manipulative. Accountability is obscured rather than democratically distributed.

This is no basis for smugness. If the New Left has not successfully answered the problem of factionalism, who has? There is no formula which does not create new problems; the process is ongoing. And one must respect the fact that the student radicals are immersed in it, and that they have brought to it an energetic idealism which this nation had not seen in many years.

The same must be said in connection with the other problems discussed here. The insistence of the New Left that its own experience be the basis of its ideas is very much in the American pragmatic tradition (just as its style has been richly endowed by the history of American radicalism); and while this insistence can lead to an exasperating provincialism, it may promise a more genuine, indigenous confrontation—one less dependent on the European radical heritage—between American radicalism and social reality.

This new generation of radicals will learn its own truths, puncture its own myths. But if the slate is to be wiped, let it be wiped evenly; if the new radical politics is to be constructed with an eye to present realities, let these realities be objec-

tively analyzed. If we are to recognize the decline of the American Communist movement and the breakup of monolithic world Communism, where does that leave us? How are these facts to be interpreted? Do they justify the view that Communism and anti-Communism are irrelevant? What are the standards by which we can judge whether or not a given political trend in the underdeveloped world is democratic and progressive? (After all, one can defend the right of other people to determine their own destinies without forfeiting one's own right to judge their choice.)

Similarly, the labor movement should be judged in its present reality, shorn of the illusions of yesteryear's radicals, today's tired liberals. If labor has lost much of its old élan and yielded to incredible foreign policies, it nonetheless faces monumental challenges today; no one can afford to be indifferent to its responses, because they will largely determine the shape of the coming political order. The difficulties posed by automation and the changing nature of the work force are enormous. The labor movement may be sluggish in coping with these difficulties, but one cannot be blind to the rapid growth of the American Federation of Teachers, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and other white-collar organizing efforts. One-third of the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, whose leadership is aging, was replaced at the last convention. The point is not only that changes are occurring in the labor movement, but that these very changes relate to a continuing revolution in the socio-economic order in which labor is rooted. The conditions which cause labor to reflect the conservatism of the total society thus compel it also to face up to the problems of change at their most basic level.

VII

THE SDS conference in December gave signs that the shrill and easy sloganeering of the last couple of years may be losing ground to a more concrete and perceptive politics. For the future, however, almost everything will depend on what happens outside the New Left, around it. The New Left can have little direct impact on the administration's policies in Vietnam; yet prolongation or acceleration of the war will have the twofold effect of heightening the alienation and desperation of the movement and simultaneously encouraging right-wing attacks on it. "On the other hand," says Professor Lipset, "should the Vietnamese war end, it is highly probable that the revival of the American New Left in the mid-1960s will turn out to be as ephemeral as the well-publicized growth of campus conservatism in 1960-61." Probably it was awareness of this prospect that caused SDS, at its December conference, to reemphasize grass-roots domestic reform as against pure and simple anti-

war activity. Whether the political passions excited by the war can, upon its end, be rechanneled into the daily grind of community organizing, fighting poverty, and making civil-rights victories economically meaningful, is problematic.

Another important factor, aside from the war, is whether students slightly to the "Right" of SDS—moderates, liberals, religious youths—can be politically activated. The extent to which they have already been moved, mainly by the moral dimensions of the Negro struggle, has been obscured by the publicity given the wilder aspects of the New Left. As individuals, many of these students have participated in Southern projects under the aegis of SNCC and Dr. Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference. They have also been troubled by the Vietnam war. But because they have not organized any coherent or distinctive movement of their own, a gigantic vacuum exists—and this explains why the most conspicuously radical elements in the New Left command such disproportionate attention.

THE organization of relatively moderate students into their own autonomous movement should be welcomed, indeed encouraged, by the New Left in the same way they encourage such organization among the poor. For it seems clear that if this is not done, the great mass of students will remain apathetic, and the campus radicals will remain isolated, with nothing to fall back on. Efforts in this direction are under way (e.g., the Youth Committee Against Poverty in New York), but not by the leadership of the New Left, which is still suspicious of coalitions with liberals, absorption into the Establishment, loss of style and identity, etc.

The suspicion is far from paranoid; historically, American politics has shown itself uniquely capable of making lapdogs of radicals. But there is little evidence that this danger is ever foreclosed by the strenuous and willful assertion of ultra-radicalism. On the contrary, the latter is the surest path to the isolation and impotence which makes cooptation easy. Accommodationism and ultra-radicalism are only superficially at opposite poles; in reality, they find each other.


To steer clear of both is no simple task, and criticisms of the New Left should be tempered

with a humility and a straining toward understanding, recognizing that something valuable and exciting has emerged in American life, and something fragile. But fragility and numerical weakness should not lead to dismissal of its importance. The activists in the New Left do articulate the questioning rebelliousness that pervades, if not a majority, at least a sizable segment of this generation of college youth. This, after all, is the segment from which the adult liberal and radical movements will be recruiting their leadership in the next decade or two. The formative ideological experiences to which that future leadership is now being exposed will clearly affect the political character of American reform in the 70's and 80's. Should today's New Left disintegrate, as a consequence of sectarian or defeatist policies, debris from wrecked hopes would scatter far; and the cynical disillusionment which would follow would darken, not illuminate, the prospects for a Great Society. The importance of the New Left, finally, lies in its relation to these prospects, and no one can deny that the problems it has publicized and grappled with are real—whether in university reform, poverty, civil rights, or foreign policy. A militant and democratic New Left is needed in America.

It will not, however, be strengthened by pampering, but rather by its own experiences and relevant criticism. Among the critics the New Left will encounter several schools, and they need to be distinguished if anyone is to profit from dialogue. There are those who refuse to criticize the New Left because, while they sentimentalize it, they do not take it seriously; they are satisfied that it be *alive* and youthful. There are those who criticize it because they want to destroy it—some because they are reactionaries, others because they have become excessively comfortable in their liberalism. But there are also those, among whom I include myself, who criticize out of a hope growing nearly desperate that this outburst of radical discontent will stick, that it will sink deep roots, that it will energize a new political movement, and transform national institutions—in short, that its legacy to the next generation will be a new beginning, not that tiresome mixture of cynicism and nostalgia that grows out of defeat and hangs over us still.

Three Stories for Children

by Isaac Bashevis Singer



Illustrations by Maurice Sendak



ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER's books include *Satan in Goray*, *The Magician of Lublin*, and, most recently, *In My Father's Court*. The following stories, translated from the Yiddish by the author and Elizabeth Shub, have been taken from *Zlateh the Goat and Other Stories*, to be published by Harper & Row in September. They are Mr. Singer's first stories for children.

MAURICE SENDAK is the widely acclaimed American illustrator who won the Caldecott Medal in 1964 for his picture book, *Where the Wild Things Are*. Other children's books illustrated by Mr. Sendak are *A Hole Is to Dig*, *The Nutshell Library*, and *Hector Protector*.

The Snow In Chelm*

CHELM WAS a village of fools, fools young and old. One night someone spied the moon reflected in a barrel of water. The people of Chelm imagined it had fallen in. They sealed the barrel so that the moon would not escape. When the barrel was opened in the morning and the moon wasn't there, the villagers decided it had been stolen. They sent for the police, and when the thief couldn't be found, the fools of Chelm cried and moaned.

Once, on a Chanukah night, the snow fell all evening. It covered the whole of Chelm like a silver tablecloth. The moon shone, the stars twinkled, the snow shimmered like pearls and diamonds.

Of all the fools of Chelm, the most famous were its seven Elders. Because they were the village's oldest and greatest fools, they ruled in Chelm. They had white beards and high foreheads from too much thinking.

That evening the seven Elders were sitting and pondering, wrinkling their foreheads. The city was in need of money, and they did not know where to get it. Suddenly the oldest of them all, Gronam the Great Fool, exclaimed, "The snow is silver!"

"I see pearls in the snow!" another shouted.

"And I see diamonds!" a third called out.

It became clear to the Elders of Chelm that a treasure had fallen from the sky.

But soon they began to worry. The people of Chelm liked to go walking, and they would most certainly trample the treasure. What was to be done? Silly Tudras had an idea.

"Let's send a messenger to knock on all the windows and let the people know that they must remain in their houses until all the silver, all the pearls, and all the diamonds are safely gathered up."

For a while the Elders were satisfied. They rubbed their hands in approval of the clever idea. But then Dopey Lekisch called out in consternation, "The messenger himself will trample the treasure."

The Elders realized that Lekisch was right,

and again they wrinkled their high foreheads in an effort to solve the problem.

"I've got it!" exclaimed Shmerel the Ox. "Tell us, tell us," pleaded the Elders.

"The messenger must not go on foot. He must be carried on a table so that his feet will not tread on the precious snow."

Everybody was delighted with Shmerel the Ox's solution; and the Elders, clapping their hands, admired their own wisdom.

The Elders immediately sent to the kitchen for Gimpel the errand boy and stood him on a table. Now who was going to carry the table? It was lucky that in the kitchen there were Treitle the cook, Berel the potato peeler, Yukel the salad mixer, and Yontel, who was in charge of the community goat. All four were ordered to lift up the table on which Gimpel stood. Each one took hold of a leg. On top stood Gimpel, grasping a wooden hammer with which to tap on the villagers' windows. Off they went.

At each window Gimpel knocked with the hammer and called out, "No one leave your house tonight. A treasure has fallen from the sky and it is forbidden to step on it."

The people of Chelm obeyed the Elders and remained in their houses all night. Meanwhile the Elders themselves sat up trying to figure out how to make the best use of the treasure once it had been gathered up.

Silly Tudras proposed that they sell it and buy a goose which lays golden eggs. Thus the community would be provided with a steady income.

Dopey Lekisch had another idea. Why not buy eyeglasses that make things look bigger for all the inhabitants of Chelm? Then the houses, the streets, the stores would all look bigger, and of course if Chelm *looked* bigger, then it would *be* bigger. It would no longer be a village but a big city.

There were other, equally clever ideas. But while they were weighing their various plans, morning came and the sun rose. The Elders looked

*Text copyright © 1966 by Isaac Bashevis Singer. Pictures copyright © by Maurice Sendak.



out of the window, and, alas, they saw that the snow had been trampled. The heavy boots of the table carriers had destroyed the treasure.

The Elders of Chelm clutched at their white beards and admitted to one another that they had made a mistake. Perhaps, they reasoned, four others should have carried the four men who had carried the table that held Gimpel the errand boy?

After long deliberations the Elders decided that if next Chanukah a treasure would again fall down from the sky, that is exactly what they would do.

Although the villagers remained without a treasure, they were full of hope for the next year and praised their Elders, who they knew could always be counted on to find a way, no matter how difficult the problem.

The Mixed-Up Feet and the Silly Bridegroom

NEAR THE city of Chelm there was a village called East Chelm, where there lived a tenant farmer called Shmelka and his wife Shmelkicha. They had four daughters, all of whom slept in the same broad bed. Their names were Yenta, Pesha, Trina, Yachna.

As a rule the girls got up early in the morning to milk the cows and help their mother with the household chores. But one winter morning they stayed in bed later than usual. When their mother came to see what was keeping them, she found all four struggling and screaming in the bed. Shmelkicha demanded to know what all the commotion was about and why they were pulling each other's hair? The girls replied that in their sleep they had gotten their feet mixed up, and now they didn't know whose feet belonged to whom, and so of course they couldn't get up.

As soon as she learned about her daughters' mixed-up feet, Shmelkicha, who was from Chelm proper, became exceedingly frightened. She remembered that a similar event had taken place in Chelm many years before and, oh, how much trouble there had been. She ran at once to a neighbor and begged her to milk the cows, and she herself set off for Chelm to ask the town's Elder what to do. Before she left, she said to the girls, "You stay in bed and don't budge until I return. Because if once you get up with the wrong feet, it will be very difficult to set things right."

When Shmelkicha arrived in Chelm and told the Elder about what had happened to her daughters, he clutched his white beard with one hand, placed the other on his forehead and was

immediately lost in thought. As he pondered he hummed a Chelm melody. After a while he said:

"There is no perfect solution for a case of mixed-up feet. But there is something that sometimes helps."

He told Shmelkicha to take a long stick, walk into the girls' room and unexpectedly whack the blanket where their feet were. "It is possible," explained the wise Elder, "that in surprise and pain each girl will grab at her own feet and jump out of bed." A similar remedy had once been used in such a case, and it had worked.

Many townspeople were present when the Elder made his pronouncement, and as always they admired his great wisdom. The Elder stated further that in order to prevent such an accident in the future, it would be advisable to slowly marry off the girls. Once each girl was married and had her own house and her own husband, there would be no danger that they would get their feet mixed up again.

Shmelkicha returned to East Chelm, picked up a stick, walked into her daughters' room and whacked the quilt with all her might. The girls were completely taken aback, but before a moment had passed, they were out of bed, screaming in pain and fright, each jumping on her own feet. Shmelka, the father, and a number of neighbors who had followed Shmelkicha into the house and witnessed what had happened, again came to the conclusion that the wisdom of the Elder of Chelm knew no bounds.

Shmelka and Shmelkicha immediately decided to carry out the rest of the Elder's advice and started looking for a husband for their eldest

daughter. They soon found a young man of Chelm called Lemel. His father was a coachman, and Lemel himself already owned a horse and wagon. It was clear that Yenta's future husband would be a good provider.

When they brought the couple together to sign the marriage agreement, Yenta began to cry bitterly. Asked why she was crying, she replied, "Lemel is a stranger, and I don't want to marry a stranger."

"Didn't I marry a stranger?" her mother asked.

"You married Father," Yenta answered, "and I have to marry a total stranger." And her face became wet with tears.

The match would have come to nothing, but luckily they had invited the Elder of Chelm to be present. And, after some pondering, he again found the way out. He said to Yenta, "Sign the marriage contract. The moment you sign it, Lemel becomes your fiancé. And when you marry you will not be marrying a stranger, you will be marrying your betrothed."

When Yenta heard these words, she was overjoyed. Lemel kissed the Elder three times on his huge forehead, and the rest of the company praised the wisdom of the Elder of Chelm, which was even greater than that of wise King Solomon.

But now a new problem arose. Neither Lemel nor Yenta had learned to sign their names. Again the Elder came to the rescue:

"Let Yenta make three small circles on the paper, and Lemel three dashes. These will serve as their signatures and seal the contract."

Yenta and Lemel did as the Elder ordered, and everybody was gay and happy. Shmelkicha treated all the witnesses to cheese blintzes and borscht and the first plate naturally went to the Elder of Chelm, whose appetite was particularly good that day.

Before Lemel returned to Chelm proper, from where he had driven in his own horse and wagon, Shmelka gave him as a gift a small penknife with a mother-of-pearl handle. It happened to be the first day of Chanukah, and the penknife was both an engagement gift and Chanukah present.

SINCE Lemel often came to East Chelm to buy from the peasants the milk, butter, hay, oats, and flax which he sold to the townspeople of Chelm, he soon came to visit Yenta again. Shmelka asked Lemel whether his friends in Chelm had liked his penknife, and Lemel replied that they had never seen it.

"Why not?" Shmelka asked.

"Because I lost it."

"How did you lose it?"

"I put the penknife into the wagon and it got lost in the hay."

Shmelka was not a native of Chelm but came from another nearby town, and he said to Lemel, "You don't put a penknife into a wagon full of

straw and hay and with cracks and holes in the bottom to boot. A penknife you place in your pocket, and then it does not get lost."

"Future Father-in-law, you are right," Lemel answered. "Next time I will know what to do."

Since the first gift had been lost, Shmelka gave Lemel a jar of freshly fried chicken fat to replace it. Lemel thanked him and returned to Chelm.

Several days later, when business again brought Lemel to East Chelm, Yenta's parents noticed that his coat pocket was torn, and the entire left side of his coat was covered with grease stains.

"What happened to your coat?" Shmelkicha asked.

Lemel replied, "I put the jar of chicken fat in my pocket, but the road is full of holes and ditches and I could not help bumping against the side of the wagon. The jar broke, and it tore my pocket and the fat ran out all over my clothes."

"Why did you put the jar of chicken fat into your pocket?" Shmelka asked.

"Didn't you tell me to?"

"A penknife you put into your pocket. A jar of chicken fat you wrap in paper and place in the hay so that it will not break."

Lemel replied, "Next time I will know what to do."

Since Lemel had had little use out of the first two gifts, Yenta herself gave him a silver gulden, which her father had given her as a Chanukah gift.

When Lemel came to the village again, he was asked how he had spent the money.

"I lost it," he replied.

"How did you lose it?"

"I wrapped it in paper and placed it in the hay. But when I arrived in Chelm and unloaded my merchandise, the gulden was gone."

"A gulden is not a jar of chicken fat," Shmelka informed him. "A gulden you put into your purse."

"Next time I will know what to do."

Before Lemel returned to Chelm, Yenta gave her fiancé some newly laid eggs, still warm from the chickens.

On his next visit he was asked how he had enjoyed the eggs, and he replied that they had all been broken.

"How did they break?"

"I put them into my purse, but when I tried to close it, the eggs broke."

"Nobody puts eggs into a purse," Shmelka said. "Eggs you put into a basket bedded with straw and covered with a rag so that they will not break."

"Next time I will know what to do."

Since Lemel had not been able to enjoy the gifts he had received thus far, Yenta decided to present him with a live duck. When he returned, he was asked how the duck was faring, and he replied that she had died on the way to Chelm.

"How did she die?"

"I placed her in a basket with straw and

covered it well with rags, just as you had told me to. When I arrived home, the duck was dead."

"A duck has to breathe," Shmelkicha said. "If you cover it with rags, it will suffocate. A duck you put in a cage, with some corn to eat, and then she will arrive safely."

"Next time I will know what to do."

Since Lemel had gained neither use nor pleasure from any of his gifts, Yenta decided to give him her goldfish, a pet she had had for several years.

And again on his return, when asked about the goldfish, he replied that it was dead.

"Why is it dead?"

"I placed it in a cage and gave it some corn, but when I arrived it was dead."

Since Lemel was still without a gift, Yenta decided to give him her canary, which she loved dearly. But Shmelka told her that it seemed pointless to give Lemel any more gifts, because whatever you gave him either died or got lost. Instead Shmelka and Shmelkicha decided to get the advice of the Elder of Chelm.

The Elder listened to the whole story, and as usual clutched his long white beard with one

hand and placed the other on his high forehead, and after much pondering, and humming, proclaimed:

"The road between East Chelm and Chelm is fraught with all kinds of dangers and that is why such misfortunes occur. The best thing to do is to have a quick marriage. Then Lemel and Yenta will be together, and Lemel will not have to drag his gifts from one place to another, and no misfortunes will befall them."

This advice pleased everyone and the marriage was soon celebrated. All the peasants of the village of East Chelm and half of the townpeople of Chelm danced and rejoiced at the wedding. Before the year was out, Yenta gave birth to a baby girl and Lemel went to tell the Elder of Chelm the good tidings that a child had been born to them.

"Is the child a boy?" The Elder asked.

"No."

"Is it a girl?"

"How did you guess?" Lemel asked in amazement.

And the Elder of Chelm replied, "For the wise men of Chelm there are no secrets."

The First Shlemiel

THERE ARE many shlemiels in the world, but the very first one came from the city of Chelm. He had a wife, Mrs. Shlemiel, and a child, small Shlemiel, but he could not provide for them. His wife used to get up early in the morning to sell vegetables in the marketplace. Mr. Shlemiel stayed at home and rocked the baby to sleep. He also took care of the rooster who lived in the room with them, feeding him corn and water.

Mrs. Shlemiel knew that her husband was unhandy, lazy, loved to sleep, and in addition had a sweet tooth. It so happened that one night she prepared a pot full of delicious jam. The next day she worried that while she was away at the market, her husband would eat it all up. So before she left, she said to him, "Shlemiel, I'm going to the market and I will be back in the evening. There are three things that I want to tell you. Each one is very important."

"What are they?" asked Shlemiel.

"First, make sure that the baby does not fall out of its crib."

"Good. I will take care of the baby."

"Secondly, don't let the rooster get out of the house."

"Good. The rooster won't get out of the house."

"Thirdly, there is a pot full of poison on the shelf. Be careful not to eat it, or you will die," said Mrs. Shlemiel, pointing to the pot of jam she had placed high up in the cupboard.

She had decided to fool him, because she knew that once he tasted the delicious jam, he would not stop eating until the pot was empty. It was just before Chanukah, and she needed the jam to serve with the holiday pancakes.

As soon as his wife left, Shlemiel began to rock the baby and to sing him a lullaby:

*I am a big Shlemiel.
You are a small Shlemiel.
When you grow up,
You will be a big Shlemiel
And I will be an old Shlemiel.
When you have children,
You will be a papa Shlemiel
And I will be a grandpa Shlemiel.*

The baby soon fell asleep and Shlemiel dozed too, still rocking the cradle with his foot.

Shlemiel dreamed that he had become the richest man in Chelm. He was so rich that he



could eat pancakes with jam not only on Chanukah but every day of the year. He spent all day with the other wealthy men of Chelm playing games with a golden dreidel. Shlemiel knew a trick, and whenever it was his turn to spin the dreidel, it fell on the winning "G." He grew so famous that nobles from distant countries came to him and said, "Shlemiel, we want you to be our king."

Shlemiel told them he did not want to be a king. But the nobles fell on their knees before him and insisted until he had to agree. They placed a crown on his head and led him to a golden throne. Mrs. Shlemiel, now a queen, no longer needed to sell vegetables in the market. She sat next to him, and they shared a huge pancake spread with jam between them. He ate from one side and she from the other until their mouths met.

As Shlemiel sat and dreamed his sweet dream the rooster suddenly started crowing. He had a very strong voice. When it came out with a cock-a-doodle-doo, it rang like a bell. Now when a bell rang in Chelm, it usually meant there was a fire. Shlemiel awakened from his dream and jumped up in fright, overturning the crib. The baby fell out and hurt its head. In his confusion, Shlemiel ran to the window and opened it to see where the fire was. The moment he opened the window, the excited rooster flew out and hopped away. Shlemiel called after him:

"Rooster, you come back. If Mrs. Shlemiel finds you gone, she will rave and rant and I will never hear the end of it."

But the rooster paid no attention to Shlemiel. It didn't even look back, and soon it had disappeared from sight.

When Shlemiel realized that there was no fire, he closed the window and went back to the crying baby, who by this time had a big bump on its forehead from the fall. With great effort Shlemiel comforted the baby, righted the crib, and put him back into it. Again he began to rock the crib and sing a song:

*In my dream I was a rich Shlemiel
But awake I am a poor Shlemiel.
In my dream I ate pancakes with jam,
Awake I chew bread and onion.
In my dream I was Shlemiel the King
But awake I'm just Shlemiel.*

Having finally sung the baby to sleep, Shlemiel began to worry about his troubles. He knew that when his wife returned and found the rooster gone and the baby with a bump on its head, she would be beside herself with anger. Mrs. Shlemiel had a very loud voice, and when she scolded and screamed, poor Shlemiel trembled with fear. Shlemiel could foresee that tonight, when she got home, his wife would be angrier than ever before and would berate him and call him names.

Suddenly Shlemiel said to himself, "What is the sense of such a life? I'd rather be dead." And he decided to end his life. But how to do it? He then remembered what his wife had told him in the morning about the pot of poison that stood on the shelf. "That's what I will do. I will poison myself. When I'm dead she can revile me as much as she likes. A dead Shlemiel does not hear when he is screamed at."

Shlemiel was a short man and he could not reach the shelf. He got a stool, climbed up on it, took down the pot, and began to eat.

"Oh, the poison tastes sweet," he said to himself. He had heard that some poisons have a bitter taste and others are sweet. "But," he reasoned, "sweet poison is better than bitter," and proceeded to finish up the jam. It tasted so good, he licked the pot clean.

AFTER Shlemiel had finished the pot of poison, he lay down on the bed. He was sure that the poison would soon begin to burn his insides and that he would die. But half an hour passed and then an hour, and Shlemiel lay without a single pain in his belly.

"This poison works very slowly," Shlemiel decided. He was thirsty and wanted a drink of water, but there was no water in the house. In Chelm, water had to be fetched from an outside well, and Shlemiel was too lazy to go and get it. He remembered that his wife was saving a bottle of apple cider for the holidays. Apple cider was expensive, but when a man is about to die, what is the point in saving money? Shlemiel got out the bottle of cider and drank it down to the last drop.

Now Shlemiel began to have an ache in his stomach, and he was sure that the poison had begun to work. Convinced that he was about to die, he said to himself, "It's not really so bad to die. With such poison I wouldn't mind dying every day." And he dozed off.

He dreamed again that he was a king. He wore three crowns on his head, one on top of the other. Before him stood three golden pots: one filled with pancakes, one with jam, and one with apple cider. Whenever he soiled his beard with eating, a servant wiped it for him with a napkin.

Mrs. Shlemiel, the queen, sat next to him on her separate throne and said, "Of all the kings who ever ruled in Chelm, you are the greatest. The whole of Chelm pays homage to your wisdom. Fortunate is the queen of such a king. Happy is the prince who has you as a father."

Shlemiel was awakened by the sound of the door creaking open. The room was dark and he heard his wife's screechy voice: "Shlemiel, why didn't you light the lamp?"

"It sounds like my wife, Mrs. Shlemiel," Shlemiel said to himself. "But how is it possible that I hear her voice? I happen to be dead. Or can it be that the poison hasn't worked yet and

"I am still alive?" He got up, his legs shaking, and saw his wife lighting the lamp.

Suddenly she began to scream at the top of her lungs: "Just look at the baby! It has a bump on its head. Shlemiel, where is the rooster, and who drank the apple cider? Woe is me! He drank up the cider! He lost the rooster and let the baby get a bump on its head. Shlemiel, what have you done?"

"Don't scream, dear wife. I'm about to die. You will soon be a widow."

"Die? Widow? What are you talking about? You look healthy as a horse."

"I've poisoned myself," Shlemiel replied.

"Poisoned? What do you mean?" asked Mrs. Shlemiel.

"I've eaten your pot full of poison."

And Shlemiel pointed to the empty pot of jam.

"Poison?" said Mrs. Shlemiel, "That's my pot of jam for Chanukah."

"But you told me it was poison," Shlemiel insisted.

"You fool," she said. "I did that to keep you from eating it before the holiday. Now you've swallowed the whole potful."

And Mrs. Shlemiel burst out crying.

Shlemiel too began to cry, but not from sorrow. He wept tears of joy that he would remain alive. The wailing of the parents woke the baby and it too began to yowl. When the neighbors heard all the crying, they came running and soon all of Chelm knew the story. The good neighbors took pity on the Shlemiels and brought them a fresh pot of jam and another bottle of apple cider. The rooster, who had gotten cold and hungry from wandering around outside, returned by himself, and the Shlemiels had a happy holiday after all.

AS ALWAYS in Chelm when an unusual event occurred, the Elders came together to ponder over what had happened. Seven days and seven nights they sat wrinkling their foreheads and tugging at their beards, searching for the true meaning of the incident. At the end the sages all came to the same conclusion: A wife who has a child in the cradle and a rooster to take care of should never lie to her husband and tell him that a pot of jam is a pot of poison, or that a pot of poison is a pot of jam, even if he is lazy, has a sweet tooth, and is a shlemiel in addition.

The View from Europe

GEORGE LICHTHEIM

CROSSING THE Atlantic in either direction has become a familiar experience for millions of people—tourists, businessmen, immigrants. We are habituated to regarding North America and Western Europe as two halves of the same “world,” or at any rate of the same civilization, and of course we are right. Geography aside, they do have quite a lot in common. But then the British also have quite a lot in common with their continental European neighbors and yet find it difficult to come to terms with them, let alone with the “Six” of the Common Market. In the circumstances, no surprise attaches to the discovery that the world scene looks different from London than it did to me during the past eighteen months from New York and San Francisco. It looks even more different from Paris, Bonn, or Rome. The British at least still have a few vestiges of their former imperial interest in and around the Indian Ocean—from Aden to Australia by way of Singapore—and thus share some of America’s emotional concern over China. To the remainder of Europe, however, this is now strictly an American issue, or at most a matter in which (ideally) Americans and Russians should take a joint interest. No one in continental Europe cares about Vietnam, except insofar as it may affect NATO and therefore Europe. In this respect, the attitude of the Italians and, say, the Rumanians—as the Russians have recently found to their annoyance—is much the same.

One knows all this, and yet rediscovers it with a slight sense of surprise, after living in a climate in which Asia is beginning to outrank Europe as a theme of political and moral engagement. For West Europeans, interest in non-European affairs is now largely confined to the integration of the former British and French colonial territories in Africa into the bulging economic sphere represented by the Common Market of the Six. There is a lengthening queue in Brussels, with Nigeria (50 million inhabitants) in the lead. Odd to think that the late Hugh Gaitskell in October 1962 recovered his hold over the Labour party with an impassioned declaration of loyalty to the Commonwealth of colored peoples. Now the Commonwealth states are lining up in Brussels, while Britain is left at the door, waiting for a suitable moment to renew its application for membership.

But while economic links between Western Europe and Africa grow strong, emotional ties are weakening—at least on the European side. French intellectuals are disconcerted by reports of police torture under the newly independent Algerian regime (practiced by Algerians upon dissident Algerians, but using the same methods as the French before them). Readers of the British press are exposed to circumstantial accounts of the manner in which Dr. Nkrumah accumulated a personal bank account estimated at £15 million (roughly 40 million dollars), while denouncing Western corruption and exploitation. The bloom is off. The newly independent states turn out to be what on past form they might have been expected to become: caricatures of 19th-century Latin American regimes, or at best (as in Algeria) new varieties of the Kemalist dictatorship in Turkey. And Europeans (including, this time, the British) discover an additional reason for turning inward and cultivating their gardens.

Against this background, the question (apparently taken seriously by some people in Washington) why the West Europeans cannot be conscripted into a crusade to help an Oriental cardboard Mussolini in Saigon maintain his comic-opera regime a week or a month longer, has ceased even to be funny. There was a time when thinking people in London or Paris made an earnest attempt to decipher the mental processes of President Johnson and his advisers. That time is past. No one bothers any more to try to understand why the Americans are behaving as they do: it is accepted that they must, and will, learn from bitter experience, as others have done before them. Meanwhile the British Foreign Office—with an eye on the state of Britain’s gold reserve—goes through the motions of lending moral support to Mr. Rusk, and some of the sillier British correspondents in Washington send Kiplingesque dispatches home.

But not the correspondent of the *London Times*. That paper is no longer what it was (its downhill slide started about a decade ago, when it began to popularize its style, and to this end hired some boozy Fleet Street characters to serve as editorial writers), but it still conserves a solid fund of political sense. No moral support for poor Mr. Rusk and his chief has come from the *Times*

in many a long month. How can it, when the paper's principal Far Eastern expert is known to regard the war as lost, and a united Communist Vietnam as not only the probable, but the desirable, outcome? Paris is not the only place, nor *Le Monde* the only journal of opinion, which these days looks and sounds remarkably Gaullist.

In a sense, all this is trivial. The real problems are now beginning to emerge. Seen from London, they can be grouped under three heads: the future of the European Common Market (with or without Britain); the future of NATO (with or without France); the shrinkage of Britain's residual Indian Ocean empire, and the coming "confrontation" between China and its neighbors (India, Japan, Australia), once the British connection has faded into history. Only the last of these three topics evokes an immediate response from Americans, nervous as they are at the prospect of being left alone to face the Asian upheavals of the coming decade. But seen from London, all three themes hang together. The British must, during the coming five or ten years, make up their minds as to whether they want to throw in their lot with Europe; continue to play a role, albeit a reduced one, within the global Anglo-American system; or try to combine both parts, if that is possible (which it is not). The debate has begun, and is certain to climax before 1970, which coincidentally is pretty certain to be the date of the next general election. There are those who believe that Mr. Harold Wilson will try to steal his opponents' clothes and "get into Europe" before the Conservatives have a chance to do so. There are others who predict that the Tory party will follow the lead of its principal defense spokesman, Enoch Powell, and "turn Gaullist." These speculations—the daily bread of the political columnist—need not concern us here. Within limits, almost anything is possible in politics. But the limits matter, and they are imposed by the facts of geography, military power, economic resources, and national morale. These items are worth considering here in some detail.

FIRST, THEN, what of Europe? And what of Britain's chance of gate-crashing its way into the club? For it is going to be that or nothing. The Six are in no mood to issue a formal invitation to join. The door is not locked and bolted against new entrants, but forcing it open will call for some pressure and a blatant disregard of the diplomatic niceties. The United Kingdom *can* become a member if it is ready to pay the price—above all, the price of meeting its future partners on a footing of complete equality.

This should be easier now that the senile megalomania associated with the Macmillan regime has given way to the stark pragmatism of the Wilson era. Whitehall is no longer disposed to condescend to the continentals, though the Foreign Office, from sheer force of habit, goes on

playing the Germans off against the French and vice versa. And with the Labour party in office, and safely installed for another four or five years, Wilson & Co. can afford to forget the isolationist pose which temporarily made Gaitskell a hero to his countrymen ("Entering Europe means renouncing a thousand years of history"). No more such talk. The Wilsonian language is crudely economic: will it pay the United Kingdom to join, or will the entrance fee—in terms of higher food prices and lowered tariffs on industrial goods—be too stiff? Will the sterling area have to be dismantled, and London cease to be banker for its members? (Some British economists would regard this as a blessing in disguise, making possible at long last the overdue devaluation of the pound.) Or can the continentals perhaps be induced to underwrite sterling by shouldering some of Britain's burdens (mainly the obligation to convert sterling into gold and dollars)?

If Europe's financial reserves were pooled, the British Treasury's lot would certainly become easier. The thought of all those convertible sterling balances (far outweighing the slender British gold reserve) would cease to be a nightmare. As matters stand, the British government cannot repudiate the sterling zone (i.e., the obligation to convert pounds owned by Malaya into dollars), any more than it can suddenly devalue. Entry into Europe would make it possible to get rid of these commitments in a graceful manner. To the professional economist in Mr. Wilson, this must seem attractive, though the patriot lurking in him may quail at the thought. A "partnership" with Europe, leaving sterling autonomous (and linked to the dollar) would certainly be preferred in London to a common European reserve pool, let alone a common European currency. But would the Brussels Commission accept such an arrangement? Would the French? On the last occasion, Britain's membership application was wrecked by the Macmillan government's insistence on nuclear "partnership" (however limited in size) with the United States. Next time the prime obstacle might be the sterling area—which incidentally does *not* include Canada, but *does* include oil-rich sheikhdoms like Kuwait, which keep their financial balances in London.

These are the problems of tomorrow. No one in London really believes that Britain can join before 1970 (or hold out much beyond that date). For the moment the question is simpler and starker: can the British balance of payments be righted—i.e., can exports be made to pay for imports—so that the country can stop being dependent on foreign loans or on the U.S. Treasury? The answer seems to be: certainly not this year, probably not next year, but possibly thereafter—at the cost of some deflation and unemployment or alternatively, if productivity should suddenly and magically leap upward. But belief in magic is not widespread in Westminster or in the finan-

cial district. On the whole, the betting is on deflation, which unfortunately means a slow rate of growth and the scrapping of the (not very ambitious) National Plan forecasting a 25 per cent increase between 1965 and 1970. Few people outside Mr. Brown's Ministry of Economic Affairs now affect to take this forecast seriously.

With or without the British, Western Europe is now solidly established as one of the world's economic giants. The combined domestic output of the continental Six is still less than half that of the United States (with Britain, it would be almost 60 per cent), and the biggest European industrial firms are still not quite big enough to sustain an open competition with such U.S. colossi as General Motors. But the trend is in the direction of "partnership," even though there is some worry—notably in France—over the growing American ascendancy in those modern industries that depend heavily on new scientific techniques. Computers are a case in point. So is the inadequate size of the European (not to mention the French) space program. Still, given a readiness to pool their resources, the Europeans—again, with or without Britain—can probably hold their own even in these domains. This, by the way, accounts for the recent willingness of Paris to promote both American investments in French industry (provided they do not encroach too heavily on certain key sectors, as in the case of General Electric's much resented takeover of the only sizable French computer firm), and intra-European mergers designed to create industrial structures of a size adequate to sustain competition with transatlantic rivals. It is the British, not the French, who are coy about this form of Europeanism; and it is the continued British reluctance to come down on the European side of the balance which causes even Britain's well-wishers in Bonn, Brussels, and The Hague to view Whitehall's recent moves with a certain skepticism. It is not only that the Labour government has exhibited a quite unnecessary degree of subservience in regard to Washington's Vietnamese adventure. What worries the European federalists even more is the continued evidence that Whitehall has not really abandoned the dream of an "Atlantic" system with Britain as the linchpin. So long as such notions continue to haunt Churchill's successors, one can safely predict that the door leading to entry into the Common Market will remain tightly shut—and not just because the General is leaning against it. (In point of fact, de Gaulle has been telling everyone for years that by 1970 the British will be inside Europe—because they have no alternative.)

THIS is one side of the coin. The obverse was disclosed to the public in a special survey of Europe published by the *Economist* on May 14, which dealt, among other things, with the political and military implications of British membership. Readers of the *Economist*, a period-

ical which for years has carried on a pro-European campaign combined with relentless criticism of French policy, must have been surprised to find that in at least one respect Britain and France are lined up on the same side: namely, on the side of those who do not want West Germany to have access to nuclear arms. "In many ways, the European community involves a clash between the conceptions of the nuclear powers, Britain and France, and the non-nuclear ones, notably West Germany. To all the non-nuclear powers, in varying degrees, the European community means the parity of esteem which neither Britain nor France at present concede." And again: "... Anglo-French industrial cooperation is in many ways a form of the effort of the two countries to keep ahead of the non-nuclear rank-and-file in Europe. Yet this tends to be self-defeating, as the costs of advanced industries mount up and multiply. For the main problem is to find a large enough market. It exists in America. It cannot exist in Europe, unless Germany and Italy are given a stake in joint research, development, and production. Short of that, they will remain neutral between an American industrial colossus and a struggling Anglo-French partnership, and the advantages of possible European cooperation will be lost." In plain language: unless Western Europe unites, there is no way of escaping from U.S. control. But that is the federalist view. As against it, the "struggling Anglo-French partnership" still has its advocates, notably among the leadership of the British Conservative party, which since its electoral defeat in 1964 has been gradually moving in a "Gaullist" direction.

One sees here how closely political, military, economic, and scientific considerations (along, of course, with tradition and ideology), have become intertwined. To work out an acceptable position on an issue such as Europeanism, or Anglo-French cooperation, one must hold in one's head an entire range of information relating to technological change and the prospects of certain new "growth industries." Traditional economics of the currency-managing sort is no longer enough. The contemporary politician must have an inkling of what the uprush of scientific developments (and costs) has meant for the fabric of the nation-state. Hence the new prominence of political leaders conversant with at least the rudiments of industrial technology: the Wilsons, the Heaths, and across the Channel the new breed of French technocrats (in and out of government). Meantime, the old-fashioned lawyer-politicians are losing ground, even though they may don new rhetorical clothes. Few things in recent months have been more pathetic than the effort of M. François Mitterand to galvanize the French Left—with the help of moss-covered veterans of the Third and Fourth Republics whose reappearance in public evoked mirth and indignation from the intelligentsia, if not from shopkeepers and farmers, the

mainstay of the Old Left. Compared with these antics, the Gaullist regime, for all its traditionalist camouflage, is positively surrealist in its modernity, as its more perceptive critics have at long last begun to recognize.

None of this means that political problems such as the future merger of Britain with the Six can be treated in purely technological terms. The notion that this could be done underlay the Kennedy administration's luckless attempt in 1962-3 to push Britain into Europe: an experiment which recoiled upon its originators. It currently underlies the equally unfortunate, and probably even more costly, Johnson-McNamara drive to reconstitute NATO on a military basis—as though the departure of France were not primarily a political problem. Whatever the Washington “pragmatists” may believe, politics is not an epiphenomenon of industrial or military technology. Political decisions are the stuff of what historians write books about (when they find the time—i.e., after the event) and political decisions stem from passions which need to be guided and controlled by statesmen aware of those imponderables which no computer can detect.

Washington could have saved itself some bother—and not only in Vietnam—by bearing this in mind. Specifically, it could have saved itself years of aimless thrashing about in connection with the grotesque plan for equipping Germany and Europe with a “multilateral” fleet of surface ships armed with nuclear weapons: a fleet it never intended to build save for political purposes, as a sop to the West Germans, and possibly as a trump to pass to the Russians in exchange for concessions on their part. This is not statesmanship, but mere gamesmanship, its opposite. The unlamented sinking of this phantom fleet is only the latest manifestation of the principle that, in major affairs of state, cleverness is not enough.

Which brings one to NATO, and beyond NATO to the shift of attention from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the prospects of building a defense system that will contain the expansion of China, keep the peace (not counting minor conflagrations like Vietnam), and enable the new nations to find their feet.

WHEN ONE talks about NATO, one talks about what the *Economist* survey mentioned earlier called “the *entente cordiale* of North America and Western Europe”: a partnership transcending diplomacy and military alliances. This is so obvious that one may wonder at the fashionable worry over France's leaving NATO—as though the French government could alter the facts of geography which have decreed, once and for all, that France is a West European country bordering on the Atlantic. But of course there is another side to it. France is also a continental European country; moreover, it has Germany for a neighbor, and while Franco-German

relations have now been drained of their ancient poison, the same cannot be said of German relations with Poland and other members of the Slav world. Hence, when Paris reaffirms its ancient cultural ties with Catholic Poland, and its somewhat less ancient and solid links with Russia, it sets up a counterweight to the pressures coming from across the Atlantic. All this is part of the game, as traditionally played by European diplomacy. However inconvenient to the policy-makers in Washington, its limitations are obvious: France may have the will, but does not have the power, to pull Russia away from China, or the remainder of Eastern Europe away from its Soviet protector. The United States has the power, but lacks the will. But assume that next week, or next year, or five years from now, Washington were to become a convert to the French thesis that NATO in its present form is no longer needed. Why then, the Euro-American partnership would still remain in all essentials what it is today.

For suppose the United States and the USSR finally came to an agreement over the territorial and political boundaries in Central Europe. Such an agreement could only work if (a) Germany were somehow reunited on the basis of its present frontiers, notably the new border with Poland; and (b) if this new Germany possessed no nuclear arms and were not regarded as a menace by its Eastern neighbors. But in that case the United States would be all the more required as a counterpoise to the continuing weight of Russia in the European system. For the only alternative to a unified Germany armed with nuclear weapons—a prospect intolerable to the East Europeans, and not to them alone—is a continued American “presence” in Europe. This “presence” need not be physical, and there is perhaps something to be said for considering even now what could take the place of the U.S. garrisons in Western Europe. But all concerned would have to be made aware that, just as England from 1815 to 1914 guaranteed the West European “balance of power,” so now the U.S. stands ready to guarantee the entire continental balance.

It is only in the shadow of such a guarantee (and a corresponding Russian undertaking to maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe) that the European nations could resume a measure of their former independence. There is nothing unprecedented about all this: it is simply a large-scale edition of the post-Napoleonic settlement, with the United States substituted for Britain, and the USSR for Tsarist Russia. That system worked fairly well for a century, until it was disrupted by the rise of an ambitious and aggressive Germany. Since no continental European power, or combination of powers, can hope (or wish) to follow in Germany's footsteps, a Soviet-American “deal,” once accomplished, would be stable and permanent enough.

The trouble, as everyone knows, is that the

Soviet-American conflict transcends Europe. It is a global conflict and must be settled in a global framework. Once it is settled, the European problem will fall into place, and so will the present quarrel over NATO. For consider the implications of Gaullist, or European federalist, policy for the future of Euro-American relations. It is true that a European settlement with Russia would transform the United States into a somewhat distant guarantor of the status quo, and correspondingly give the West Europeans more freedom, if they so wished, to elude their military obligations under NATO, and to set up tariff walls against American imports. But it would also get the Russian troops out of Eastern Europe and enable all the former satellites to follow the example of Yugoslavia (and more recently, Rumania). Political and commercial walls between the Eastern and Western halves of the continent would diminish or dissolve: already Fiat and Renault are contracting to build giant automobile plants in Eastern Europe, and tourist agencies are working on the assumption that in 1975 it will be a normal thing for Italian holiday-makers to drive their cars from Milan to Moscow and beyond. And as for a United Europe setting up barriers against American intrusion, a certain measure of protection against U.S. "takeovers" can be absorbed, so long as it is understood that Europe needs to have access to American technology, and that the United States will increasingly need the rich European market. It is quite true that no European country, let alone a federal or confederal Europe, will want to become another Canada—in other words, a colony of the United States. But then there is no reason why it should. NATO or no NATO, the two halves of the North Atlantic world will continue to work together.

WHY THEN the current disintegration of NATO? At bottom, it is happening because the continentals (though not the British—at any rate not yet) are determined to stay out of America's present and future wars in Asia. In this respect France is simply giving a lead to the rest of the continent, for whatever the Germans or the Italians may pretend, they have no desire to be pulled into a conflict with Russia just because it looks as though the U.S. is drifting into a prolonged test of nerves with China. If the British attitude is different, the reason is that the vestigial Indian Ocean empire supplies Britain with an international role, and a corresponding degree of influence in Washington, which neither France nor Germany can match.

It is well understood in Whitehall that Washington does not want to be left alone in Asia, and is willing to pay a price to keep the British in the game. The price is moderate by U.S. standards, and probably sufficient for another few years to make up for the cost of Britain's Far Eastern involvement, though there are politicians and economists

in London who take a different view. (What they are worried about, however, is mainly the growing expense of ordering American equipment to replace outmoded British weapons.) In any event, the Labour government has staked its foreign and financial policy on the gamble of being able to defend the pound and the sterling area, so long as Washington is ready to underwrite part of the cost of the joint American-British defense effort in Asia. While this arrangement lasts, Britain remains America's favorite ally (and correspondingly fails to get into Europe, since the French are determined not to admit another Trojan Horse—having the West Germans inside is bad enough, as they see it). When is the balance going to tilt in the direction of Europeanism or Little-Englandism? Probably not before 1970; but also, in all probability, not long afterward. For the fact has to be faced that Britain's commitment to the American effort in Asia is becoming increasingly unpopular and—what is worse—irrational.

As to the unpopularity—outside Whitehall and the military services, with their obvious hankering for a world role—there can be no doubt. The irrationality is another matter. For the moment it is evident only to a minority of policy-makers and experts, but the weight of criticism is growing. When one speaks of irrationality one must not, indeed, think of something that lacks any kind of justification. That a line of action is irrational may simply mean that a price is being paid for what is held important for emotional reasons. There are people on the Right who would feel mortally wounded in their self-esteem if the Union Jack ceased to fly over Singapore. There are others on the Left who hold that Britain is honor-bound to defend India against the potential menace of China. Such sentiments are not necessarily absurd, though they may become increasingly divorced from military reality. It is an open question whether this divorce has already taken place, or is about to take place in the near future. If the answer is in the affirmative, the weight of opinion will slowly but surely come down on the side of withdrawal. As of now, all one can say is that the decision remains in the balance.

Meanwhile, it is worth bearing in mind that, from a purely strategic standpoint, Britain's Far Eastern commitment is largely a residue of the inherited link with Malaya. This is unlikely to outlast the end of the so-called "confrontation" with Indonesia: a piece of nonsense with which Sukarno burdened his countrymen and from which the reigning Indonesian army clique is now trying to edge away. Thereafter, it is going to be a case of deciding whether the prestige to be gained from being America's only surviving European ally in Asia is worth the cost—including the psychological cost, for this position involves both continued attendance in the role of psychoanalyst to whatever administration happens to be functioning in Washington, and being the

avored scapegoat of Asian and Middle Eastern nationalists in search of something to talk about and someone to get angry with. Neither role is likely, in the long run, to make much of an appeal to the British public.

Official British policy operates on the assumption that total defense costs, from British resources, can be held down to £2 billion (about \$5½ billion) at 1964 prices, taking account of all forward plans until 1970. This is contested by the government's critics—who include its former Navy Minister and various military experts—on the grounds that costs are likely to go up. Most Labour backbenchers (and some Tory frontbenchers) would like to see an almost total retreat from the Far East, with the exception of token forces in Hong Kong and Australia (see the *Times*, May 27, 1966). In private, Ministers tend to agree with their critics, who accuse them of spending either too much or too little (too much in economic terms, too little if the true military position is considered). Some Ministers even hint that the only disagreement concerns the pace at which Britain's remaining commitments can be run down. This plainly conflicts with what the Defense Minister, Mr. Denis Healey, told his American and Australian interlocutors when he visited Washington and Canberra last February. At that time he gave the impression that Britain would keep considerable forces in Southeast Asia, mainly for the defense of Australia, but also as part of the joint Anglo-American dispositions in the Indian Ocean. What is now popularly called the "east of Suez" policy of the present government is really a plan for setting up a string of island bases in the Indian Ocean, in collaboration with the United States and Australia. Although the details are shrouded in secrecy, enough has leaked out to make it clear that the Indian government was not consulted about this decision before it was taken. The irritable noises now coming out of Delhi may be merely for the record, or they may indicate some genuine hostility to the project. In any case, those Labour leftwingers who genuinely believe that Britain has an obligation to defend India can draw no moral sustenance from this particular operation.

In view of this predictable reaction, it is unfortunate that a comic-opera touch was lent to the project last November, when Whitehall suddenly announced that a new British colony was to be established under the title of the British Indian Ocean Territories, or B.I.O.T. This turned out to be merely a grandiose name for the Farquhar, Aldabra, and Desroches islands in the western part of the Indian Ocean, and the Chagos archipelago, which includes Diego Garcia. "It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defense facilities by the British and U.S. governments," said the official statement. The population of the islands varies from about one hundred in Farquhar to about one thousand

in the Chagos archipelago. In addition there is Cocos Island, which happens to be the personal property of Mr. John Clunies Ross (a descendant of the original Clunies Ross who landed at Cocos in 1827), but is "administered" by the Australian government. The latter has repeatedly refused to inform Mr. Ross of what is being done on "his" island. The natural assumption among readers of James Bond (and who isn't these days?) is that something sinister is going on. This suspicion is helped by the official rule that any native who leaves Cocos (so far as anyone knows, there are about four-hundred of them—all engaged in growing coconuts) can *never* be allowed to return. Indeed, there is a suspicion that official policy aims at depopulating the island, with the help of birth pills, financial inducements to move elsewhere, and if necessary by more direct means. All this has set tongues wagging, and has clearly assisted the Indian Communists. It has also succeeded in making the British and Australian governments look slightly silly.

FURTHER puzzles emerge as one goes into some of the technical details, so far as they are comprehensible to the layman. The most publicized (because of the internecine warfare between the naval and air services, each with its supporters in Parliament and in the press) concerns the relative role of Polaris submarines and F111A rocket-firing aircraft (obtained at vast expense from the United States, and of course payable in dollars, though part of the price is offset against U.S. purchases of British equipment). The F111A needs a series of what are called "dispersal points"—either aircraft carriers (of which Britain is short) or islands—if its employment is to do any good in the Indian Ocean area. As the defense correspondent of the *Times* put it (on May 25): "Africa could only be covered from Aldabra. If Singapore were to go, Indonesia and Malaysia could not be covered without the Cocos. Gan, though politically sensitive, would be necessary if British air power were to be deployed over India. These situations may sound hypothetical, but because of the comprehensive nature of Britain's east of Suez policy, they automatically become contingencies."

In point of fact, it now looks as though the safest "forward base" for the F111A is going to be in northwest Australia. The snag is that the base still has to be built (at someone's expense—so far the Australians have not been very forthcoming about stepping up their defense budget). Meanwhile, India has to be "covered" from "sensitive" places like Gan (not far from Ceylon) and the tropical haunts still peopled by the surviving Cocos islanders. And while all this planning is going on, the coming withdrawal of Britain from Aden and Southern Arabia (now provisionally fixed for 1968) means that the Russians—with Egyptian help—will find it easier to establish themselves on the Red Sea. Indeed, if both Aden and

Singapore were to go, the Indonesian and Egyptian navies (both predominantly equipped with Soviet vessels) would become useful auxiliaries to the growing Soviet navy: now second in size only to that of the United States.

WHAT THEN of Britain's naval role, so far as it still has some importance? This is where Polaris comes in. Polaris was originally acquired (by the Macmillan government in 1962) to form part of Britain's forces within NATO. Since those dim days, the idea of an Atlantic Nuclear Force put forward in 1964 by the Wilson government has become something of an embarrassment to its British inventors, and it is now thought that so long as Britain is obliged to pay for these expensive nuclear-armed submarines, they could just as well be shifted to the Indian Ocean, where they might conceivably do some good. Their addition to the NATO fleet would anyhow be insignificant, the more so since by the 1970's, America's submarines will probably be fitted with the Poseidon missile, a great improvement over Polaris. Then why not send Britain's four Polaris submarines to a station "east of Suez," where (as the defense correspondent of the *Times* said on May 19) they are likely to be "a viable weapon against any known Asian enemy for at least 20 years"? From all one gathers, the Pentagon would be pleased to see Britain carry its nuclear candle to that distant part of the world; so, of course, would the Royal Navy, currently in a fit of depression over its loss of suitable carriers. The probable enemy would, one assumes, be China, but a Polaris force would also be useful in impressing Indonesia, and in lending India what Harold Wilson, in one of his sub-Churchillian moods, once described as a "nuclear umbrella." The trouble is that India has expressed no desire to let the West provide such

an implement. What the Indian government would *really* like, it seems, is a joint Soviet-American guarantee against Chinese attack. This may come (it probably will). In the meantime, there is a chance for Britain to fill the gap.

None of this answers the overriding question: Why should England go on semi-bankrupting itself for the sake of an Asian role it is increasingly ill-equipped to play? Historically, the British Empire in and around India was a function of the Royal Navy's dominance of the seas. Now that this position is gone, and the ability to maintain control over farflung territories with a mere handful of men has likewise disappeared, it is by no means obvious that Britain has an interest in providing even a base in northern Australia and a naval task-force in the Indian Ocean. The outlay can be justified only in terms of a continuing American-British partnership. It is true that Britain owns one-third of the capital invested in oil in the Persian Gulf area, and that the safety of this investment depends in part upon a British military "presence" in the region. But since Aden is to be given up in 1968, when the South Arabian Federation becomes independent, the residual British commitments in the Gulf area will come increasingly under (Egyptian and Russian) fire, while at the other end of the Indian Ocean, around Singapore and Malaysia, a corresponding process of attrition is at work, with China and Indonesia playing the role played by Russia and Egypt in the Arabian and Persian Gulf zones. What it all amounts to is that, in order to hold these encroaching forces at bay, Britain has to cling to the United States, thereby drawing upon itself the dangers inherent in America's seemingly inevitable "confrontation" with China. All things considered, it is unlikely that this state of affairs will survive for more than another decade.

AMOCO GASOLINE PROTECTS VITAL ENGINE PARTS

Bruce R. Jennings, Insurance Agent, Baltimore, Md.



“I race cars and I know engines. I can get all the gasoline I need for free at most tracks. Instead I use AMOCO® and pay for it myself.

I’ve used Lead-Free AMOCO Gasoline in my personal car since I got my driver’s license. It’s the best.”

You expect more from American and you get it!*

AMOCO

SUPER-PREMIUM GASOLINE • CERTIFIED LEAD-FREE, THE ONLY ONE!



© 1966, THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, CHICAGO, ILL. *Trademark

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IS THERE A JEWISH ART?

Harold Rosenberg

Is THERE a Jewish art? First they build a Jewish Museum,* then they ask, Is there a Jewish art? Jews! As to the question itself, there is a Gentile answer and a Jewish answer. The Gentile answer is: Yes, there is a Jewish art, and No, there is no Jewish art. The Jewish answer is: What do you mean by Jewish art?

Needless to say, the Gentile answer, either way, is anti-Semitic. Consider first that there is a Jewish art. A German art historian named Haftmann has written a two-volume history of 20th-century painting in which he divides art into a Mediterranean mode and a Northern or Germanic mode. French, Italian, and Spanish art—including Cubism, Fauvism, Futurism, post-Impressionism—is Mediterranean in feeling and is characterized by rationality, harmony, sensibility. In contrast, Germanic art, with its Expressionism, Bauhaus, Blue Rider group, is profoundly subjective, metaphysical, speculative. Where do the Jews come in?

In a small section by themselves. It turns out that Chagall, who came from Russia; Modigliani, who came from Italy; Soutine, who came from Poland, do not belong either with the Mediterraneans or the Nordics (though the Russian, Kandinsky, is treated as strictly Germanic). They are grouped together as Jewish artists. They lived in the same neighborhood in pre-war Paris, and Haftmann conceives that little street as a kind of ghetto where Chagall, Modigliani, and Soutine produced a Jewish art.

Now in fact there is very little resemblance between the art of Chagall, the art of Soutine, and the art of Modigliani. But Haftmann finds a principle of identity, and answers: Yes, there is a Jewish art. By the same principle,

Haftmann could have included Lipschitz, Epstein, and Max Weber. He could have come to America and gathered up Gottlieb and Rothko, Newman, Guston, Saul Steinberg, and dozens more and placed them in his small off-track confine called Jewish art, without in any way being able to explain what it was in their art that made it Jewish.

Here, then, is an example of a Gentile saying that there is a Jewish art, and for saying so, deserving to be regarded with suspicion—one reviewer flatly accused Haftmann of anti-Semitism.

Now take the other view: No, there is no Jewish art. What does that mean? Shortly after the war, a book appeared by Jean-Paul Sartre entitled *Anti-Semite and Jew*. In it Sartre argued bitterly against the anti-Semites, and indeed he has always been a friend of the Jews. But in attacking the notion that the Jews were not really a destructive force in history, Sartre maintained that, actually, the Jews had no history and existed only because anti-Semitism prevented them from disappearing. They were not themselves a nation with a feeling for a common soil, and they did not participate in the national feeling of the Germans, Frenchmen, or Russians among whom they sojourned. They were a people of big cities, also of logic and argument—in a word, intellectuals. They were involved with abstract ideas (coming from a man like Sartre, this is not necessarily insulting), and while they were capable of building mathematical and metaphysical theories, they lacked the dimension of sensibility and that continuity with things necessary for the creation of art.

I repeat, Sartre abhors anti-Semitism. But accept his premise of the Jewish mind with its incapacity for art and you have the raw material out of which anti-Semitism can be formed. From the image of the man limited to abstract ideas, it is but a step to that of the man dedicated to cash, since the chief abstraction in the mod-

ern world is, of course, money. The explanation of why the Jews don't have art and the conception that they are devoted to money fit together and provide a description of the kind of people they are.

IN SHORT, whether one says that the Jews have art or that the Jews have no art, one tends to wind up with notions not very flattering to Jews.

As to the facts of the matter, they are not much help. In the last fifty years, Jews have become quite prominent in painting and sculpture, and if Jews produce art, it would seem that there must be Jewish art. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that there is no such thing as a Jewish style in art. The upshot is that while Jews produce art, they don't produce Jewish art.

Assigning national identities is a very tricky affair, and final conclusions as to them ought to be delayed as long as possible. For example, most of us believe that there is such a thing as a Jew (and Sartre should be praised for taking a positive stand on this). Yet many people have tried to get rid of the anti-Semitic caricature by arguing that only individuals exist; that there are no qualities that can properly be attributed to Germans or Americans or Frenchmen. Thus, if one says that there was something about the Nazis that wasn't entirely produced by ideology, that there was something German in Nazism, one will be accused by liberals of race prejudice, chauvinism, bigotry. "What?" they demand, "are you going to hold a whole people responsible?" Similarly, many people deny the reality of Jewishness. They say, for instance, that there is no such thing as looking like a Jew; we know perfectly well, they say, that there are people who look like Jews who are not Jews. But if there are non-Jews who look like Jews, there must be such a thing as looking like a Jew. And if there is such a thing as looking like a Jew, does it not follow that the art Jews produce must also have a look of its

*This piece was adapted from a talk Mr. Rosenberg gave some months ago at the Jewish Museum in New York—~~ed.~~

own—that this art must look like Jewish art? In that case, there is a Jewish style—for in art the look is the thing.

The same problem exists with regard to American art. I have been attacked in Europe (in England, really) for saying that there is an American art. American art, according to some critics, is simply a development of European art. American painting in the past twenty years has been Surrealist, Expressionist, Pop—it has no specifically American quality. And indeed, a young professor at the University of Pennsylvania who tried to isolate what is visually American in American painting failed dismally.

Yet in a mysterious way we know that there is such a thing as American art, though it is difficult to say precisely when it became more than a mere offshoot, and what characteristics make it American. Jewish art is in an even more ambiguous situation.

I have thought of at least six possible meanings that the term might have. First and most obviously, Jewish art might mean art produced by Jews. This is the practical definition usually applied by Jewish historical societies. The sixth annual American Jewish History Week taking place this year has been planned around the theme, "The Jew in American Art." No doubt, biographies of American artists will be examined to determine which among them were Jews, and then their accomplishments will be discussed, as well as whether or not they went to the synagogue and the possible connection, if any, between their work and Judaism. In this manner, an account of the Jew in American art becomes an account of Jewish art. It is a way of establishing Jewish cultural identity in the United States without being compelled to lay claim to any particular characteristics. One looks through American history and points to the Jew in American literature, the Jew as an officer in the armed forces, the Jew as a scientist. All national minorities use this type of research as the basis for prestige campaigns designed to establish the fact that they are an asset to America and have a right

to be respected. Having artists and generals proves that they are almost as good as people who have done nothing special, but do have the proper background. In sum, they present their achievements as credentials entitling them to the status of ordinary Anglo-Saxons.

The idea of Jewish achievement in American—or French or British—art might be one definition of Jewish art and perhaps not altogether an empty one. Imagine that some Jewish gentleman whose ancestors arrived in America at the time of Peter Stuyvesant moved to the South, bought slaves, became a member of North Carolina society, and then decided to paint. (Very likely, such a gentleman would have gone to the synagogue.) Would there not have been some Jewish ingredient in the portrait this Southern Jew might have painted of his neighbor? Very likely, though no one would have been able to say exactly what it was; perhaps it would not have been an aesthetic quality in any sense. Yet we might assume that if this hypothetical artist had been endowed with a fair amount of talent, something of his personality would have entered into his art and to that degree it would have been Jewish art. The "Jew in American Art" thus actually turns out to be creating Jewish art, or at least Jewish-American art. This might have some significance. I, however, cannot say what its meaning is.

WE NOW come to a more serious conception of Jewish art, which is art depicting Jews or containing Jewish subject matter. In this century, a substantial body of such work has been produced. Beginning in the 1920's, an extraordinary development in art took place on the Lower East Side of New York. Under the influence of the American Ash Can School, this art (which might be called East Side realism) dedicated itself to studying the artist's environment—the prevailing idea was for the artist to paint what he saw and what he was deeply familiar with—and the environment happened to contain a multitude of Jews. Quantities of paintings and sculptures were done by Jews of old men with

beards, grandmothers sitting in front of tenements on Essex Street, people going to synagogue, street ceremonies of dedicating a Torah—subjects that tended to branch out and include other Jewish themes in the artist's memory or imagination (Wailing Walls, etc.).

If one were to judge by subject matter, this is as legitimately Jewish art as the painting of Christian subjects is Christian art. But though art may be characterized in terms of subject matter, subject matter does not characterize it as art. Crucifixions and Annunciations have been painted on every level of skill and in every Western style from Andrea del Sarto to the Polish primitive on Second Avenue. To grasp the feeling of a work, one must look beyond its subject to the style in which it is painted. Style, not subject matter or theme, will determine whether or not paintings should be considered "Jewish" or placed in some other category.

For example, I recall a very sensitive picture painted, I believe, by one of the Soyers in the 30's of the artist's parents seated at the table after a Friday night supper. The candles are beginning to melt, and the middle-aged couple are also melting into half sleep. They look as if they had eaten a good deal—a golden glow as of chicken soup permeates the picture. With the droopy, worn quality of the parents in the midst of the Sabbath haze, the scene is thoroughly authentic, and it is beautifully painted. Yet, essentially, this was a French and not a Jewish painting. As a translation of a Jewish situation into French art, it had a sensitivity all its own. But its style had no relation to the Jews or to the Lower East Side.

This brings me to a less disputable area of Jewish art, that with which the Jewish Museum is involved—I mean the art of Jewish ceremonial objects: silver menorahs and drinking goblets, embroidered Torah coverings, wood carvings. Over the centuries, Jewish craftsmen produced these treasures, which have served Jewish ritual purposes and displayed the symbols of Judaism. In the old days, the symbolism was most strictly regulated. Today, many of the old crafts are being

revived with sophisticated modernist variations.

In short, a Jewish handicraft exists and a handicraft tradition. This is what scholars usually accept as Jewish art. Without troubling themselves as to whether Chagall bears any relation to Modigliani through the fact of their both being Jews, the scholars give their attention to the stream of carvings, silver castings, and embroideries with a Jewish iconography and biblical references. I doubt, however, that this priestly work is art in the sense in which the word is used in the 20th century. My own interest in it is extremely limited. And this seems to be generally the case. Otherwise, why would the Jewish Museum feel compelled to supplement its exhibition of Jewish crafts with showings of contemporary paintings and sculptures, to make imposing events of retrospectives of Rauschenberg, Johns, and Rivers?

There is, in addition, an underground of Jewish handicraft which is largely lost, a kind of ceremonial and semi-ceremonial folk art of an ephemeral nature, emanating from the daily life of the Jewish communities. (M. Sartre was unaware of Jewish folk artists living on the land and in the village like any Norman peasant.) I know about this art only because my grandfather was a *shochet* and a *mohel* who was extremely skillful with tools. He used to cast for us Chanukah *dreidlach* made of lead in his own design; and out of some kind of leaden-colored pastry he modeled miniature tables, chairs, and beds which you could eat when you got through playing with them. Nobody ever thought of my grandfather as an artist; his art was cutting the throats of steers and executing his sculpture on the male babies of Brooklyn. To match him, my grandmother on the other side of the family used to bake *chaleh* in the shape of birds with folded tails and whole peppers for eyes. She also had terrific prestige for the thinness of her noodles and the lightning speed with which she chopped the rolled-up dough.

I haven't seen any home-made *dreidlach*, bird breads, and noodles like blond hairs for a long time,

but I assume that Jewish men and women are still doing these things, which might be considered art—that is, if you wish to consider chopping noodles a Jewish art form.

Ceremonial and folk art lead to another possible category of Jewish art, one that we might call metaphysical Judaica. Perhaps this is the Jewish art of the future. Perhaps a genuine Jewish style will come out of Jewish philosophy. Ben Shahn has experimented with the Hebrew alphabet and has done reading in Jewish mysticism. Yacov Agam, a well-known Israeli painter who lives in Paris, expresses a passionate interest in the subject of Jewish art. Agam's position, as I understand it from a letter and some published statements he recently sent me, is that up to now there has not been a Jewish art, but that the time has come to create one. He desires, he says, "to give plastic and artistic expression to the ancient Hebrew concept of reality, which differs in its essence from that of all other civilizations."

I shall not attempt to summarize here the reasoning which carries Agam from the uniqueness of the Hebrew conception of reality, through the Commandment against graven images, to the description of his own non-figurative paintings (he was included in the "Responsive Eye" exhibition of the Museum of Modern Art last year) as "more reality than abstraction." In practice, Agam is a painter of optical effects whose abstractions are closer to the paintings of Vasarely than to the Tables of the Law. Jewish metaphysics may be a way of lending an aura of difference to Agam's work, but there is nothing in it to convince me that it stands at the dawn of a unique Hebrew conception of reality in art.

SPEAKING OF the Second Commandment, whenever anything is said about Jewish art, someone is bound to bring up the ban against graven images in the Old Testament. There are, of course, many explanations of this anti-image complex: apart from the connection between figurative art and idol worship, the Jews were literally crushed by art while they

were in Egypt and the notion of sculpture must have induced tribal nightmares.

I have, however, my own fanciful "modernist" theory of why the Old Testament excluded carvings and paintings. It is that in a world of miracles, the fabrications of the human hand are a distraction. In the landscape of the Old Testament, anything (a garment, a slingshot, the jawbone of an ass) or anybody (a shepherd boy, a concubine) may start to glisten with meaning and become memorable. (One finds a trace of something similar in Whitman: instead of constructing images, he catalogues objects of the American scene, the idea being that art is anything that appears in the aura of the wonderful.) Thus, the Old Testament is filled with a peculiar kind of "art," which we have begun to appreciate in this century: Joseph's coat, Balaam's ass, the burning bush, Aaron's rod. If there were a Jewish museum with those items in it, would anyone miss madonnas? I am not suggesting that the ancient Hebrews were the inventors of Surrealism. But the idea that if you inhabit a sacred world you *find* art rather than *make* it, is clearly present in the Old Testament. When the mind of the people is loaded with magical objects and events, which unfortunately cannot be assembled physically, what is there for artists to do but make cups for ceremonial drinking and ornaments for the Torah?

Jewish art, then, may exist in the negative sense of creating objects in the mind and banning physical works of art. In this sense, the Second Commandment was the manifesto of Jewish art. In our day, an anti-art tradition has been developing, within which it could be asserted that Jewish art has always existed in not existing. At least I prefer that idea to Agam's.

Returning to the real world, I believe we are obliged to conclude that there is no Jewish art in the sense of a Jewish style in painting and sculpture. Whether there ever will be such a style is a matter of speculation—a speculation that ought to take into account the progressive fading of national styles in modern art generally.

Still, Jewish creation in art has been very vital in this century, and the important thing is that while Jewish artists have not been creating as Jews, they have not been working as non-Jews either. Their art has been the closest expression of themselves as they are, including the fact that they are Jews, each in his individual degree.

The most serious theme in Jewish life is the problem of identity. The Jew, of course, has no monopoly on this problem. But the Jewish artist has felt it in an especially deep and immediate way. It has been a tremendously passionate concern of his thought. It's not a Jewish problem; it is a situation of the 20th century, a century of displaced persons, of people moving from one class into another, from one national context into another.

In the chaos of the 20th century, the metaphysical theme of identity has entered into art, and most strongly since the war. It is from this point that the activity of Jewish artists has risen to a new level. Instead of continuing in the masquerade of conforming to the model of the American painter by acquiring the mannerisms of European art, American Jewish artists, together with artists of other immigrant backgrounds—Dutchmen, Armenians, Italians, Greeks—began to assert their individual relation to art in an independent and personal way. Artists like Rothko, Newman, Gottlieb, Nevelson, Guston, Lassaw, Rivers, Steinberg, and many others helped to inaugurate a genuine American art by creating as individuals.

This work inspired by the will to identity has constituted a new art by Jews which, though not a Jewish art, is a profound Jewish expression, at the same time that it is loaded with meaning for all people of this era. To be engaged with the aesthetics of self has liberated the Jew as artist by eliminating his need to ask himself whether a Jewish art exists or can exist.

HAROLD ROSENBERG, the distinguished art critic, is the author of The Tradition of the New, The Anxious Object, and other works.

POP MUSIC ON CAMERA

Neil Compton

ALONG WITH other dyspeptic observers, I have been predicting the decline of American popular music for over twenty-five years. Not without reason. Surely no art form has ever before been so cynically and systematically raped and perverted in the pursuit of profit. Like the dons of Cosa Nostra, those who perpetrate the crime are becoming increasingly rich and respectable. What used to be merely Tin Pan Alley has become a boulevard leading from Madison Avenue through the heart of American culture.

Nevertheless, we pessimists seem to have been proven wrong. To borrow a phrase from one TV program I shall be discussing, the U.S.A. is undergoing a musical explosion. A cacophonous cloud of popular song mushrooms over the entire continent, and fall-out is penetrating every cultural and political barrier in the world except (so far) the bamboo curtain. Stephen Fleischman, a writer-producer at ABC, goes so far as to claim that popular music is America's greatest single contribution to world culture.

I am not suggesting that this is any kind of golden age. Most people would agree that such an age occurred during the 20's and 30's, when a fruitful complex of stimulating circumstances (of which the northward movement of Southern Negro musicians and the pioneer development of radio and recordings were probably the most important) sparked a creative euphoria similar, though of course inferior in achievement, to that which nourished the Elizabethan drama. The hundred-odd songs of that era which have outlived thousands of banal and tasteless ditties to become "standards" now constitute the foundation of any pop singer's repertoire. As melodies or lyrics, they have few rivals among the productions of contemporary songwriters. But to say this is not to imply that the present scene is in every way inferior to the past.

Intellectuals have always tended to regard popular music with disapproval, comparing it unfavorably with such folk genres as the hill

ballad or the blues. They dislike its manufactured, hybrid quality, and see it as a kind of parasite which feeds upon the folk tradition, but perverts its values. Whereas folk songs or blues are alleged to confront life with a narrow but tragic realism, popular songs are accused of unhealthy idealism, wishful thinking, and sentimentality. There is some truth to all these charges, but to dismiss everything from Irving Berlin to Bob Dylan as some monstrous musical aberration is surely to practice a kind of pedantic critical purism.

Perhaps the intellectuals' hostility derives from their distrust of the modern city, because popular music is above all the expression of an urban culture. One of its main functions perhaps is, like the other mass media, to compensate for the secularized anomie of city life. It tends to reassure rather than disturb, to accept rather than reject, and to celebrate dreams rather than acts. Its nearest analogue in high culture is that most urban of all artistic forms, the pastoral (as defined by William Empson: a rendering of the complex in terms of the simple or primitive). Though by definition enjoyed by the majority, popular music has always been produced by members of a relatively disadvantaged and incompletely socialized minority.

Looking over the past couple of generations, it is easy to recognize successive shifts in the style and ambience of the popular tradition. Fifty years ago, it was largely the instrument of the Anglo-Irish proletariat in the great cities of the Northeast. Then it passed into the hands of Jewish and (to a lesser extent) Negro songwriters in the old "good" slums of cities like New York, Chicago, and Washington. (This was the golden era.) Today, it seems to belong to a variety of still less favored groups—Appalachian immigrants to Midwestern cities, Negroes from the new "bad" slums of Detroit and New York, displaced rural blues- and gospel singers from the Deep South, Mexicans, and even youths from the industrial towns of northern England (mobilized for the American pop industry by records, movies, and TV). Above all, as the United States

begins to run out of non-urbanized ethnic or regional minorities, the pop tradition is passing inexorably into the hands of one of the last and most universal of all minority groups, the adolescents. Where it will go from there is anyone's guess.

As THE creative focus of popular music sinks lower in the social scale or moves farther from the heart of the great metropolitan centers, its intellectual content seems also to be subsiding. The lyrics of thirty or forty years ago hardly rivaled T. S. Eliot or Wallace Stevens in subtlety, but Ira Gershwin, Andy Razaf, or Johnny Mercer now seem like towering geniuses compared with the anonymous perpetrators of most hit lyrics today. Even Bob Dylan, the Robert Burns of folk-rock, displays a surly indifference to both coherence and communication, using words as though they were brickbats or rotten eggs. (At this point, I should like to have quoted and analyzed a few lines from a typical Dylan song, but modern "folk" artists have learned to copyright their least effusions, and Dylan is not just now in a mood to have his work criticized.)

Dylan's dark mood is emulated by lesser fry. Sentimentalists who remember Frank Sinatra's tender ballads of the 1940's, particularly the one about his infant daughter Nancy, may be startled to find that same young lady in 1966 at the top of the hit parade with a very brutal and unambiguous song:

*These boots are made for
walking
And that's what they will do.
One of these days these boots
are gonna
Walk all over you.**

Melody, also, is now drastically curtailed and simplified. Dylan's songs, especially when rendered by the author in his flat, nasal chant, seem to hover around a single note varied only by occasional excursions up and down the basic triads. What compensates for verbal and melodic poverty is the hypnotic big electronic beat, the acoustical gimmickry, and the artistry (if any) of the performance. Pop music is

essentially a performer's medium; even a bad song can be transformed by a great singer (Billie Holiday used to do it all the time, and Ella Fitzgerald still occasionally does).

Oddly enough, at the same time as pop music is becoming more rudimentary in structure and elementary in appeal, it is also reaching an audience more socially and intellectually diverse than ever before. Levels of culture which were once separate and stratified are now regularly confused and juxtaposed. Rock'n'roll blares out in jet-set discothèques, at the openings of fashionable artists, from the sound track of underground movies, and at peace demonstrations. Movies such as the Beatles' *A Hard Day's Night*, ostensibly aimed at sub-teenagers, attract large numbers of serious adult film buffs. The future looks ominous for those who believe in the polarization of high and low culture.

As the most universal and ubiquitous of all the media, television ought to benefit most from this new confusion of levels and genres. However, it doesn't. TV consumes music and musicians at an alarming rate, but popular artists seldom do their best work before the cameras. The essential media of the pop-music industry are recordings and radio. This is partly because many song hits are the result of a collaboration between artist and recording engineer that cannot be duplicated in the view of an audience (on TV appearances, singers often have to "mouth" the words silently while the record spins in the control room); but chiefly because the aural media are able to cater to minorities which, though large, are apparently not large enough to be gratified during the sacred hours of prime television time. In their obsession with the need to maximize the audience during every precious evening minute, most TV producers have learned to steer a tricky course past every disturbing possibility of authenticity or sincerity. If you have a favorite popular artist, you have probably learned to avoid his appearances on television.

Like all generalizations, this is an imperfect one. There are some regular network shows which cultivate special audiences, and this

year there have been several musical specials which attempted to achieve something more valuable and enduring than a high Nielsen rating. None of them was an unqualified success, but even a glance in the direction of integrity was enough to make a program memorable in this most dismal of all seasons.

Regularly scheduled programs catering to specialized musical tastes tend to cluster at either end of the popular spectrum. At one extreme is the sort of thing represented by the *Lawrence Welk Show* (ABC). Since I have never felt able to endure more than sixty seconds of Welk's carefully calculated *Gemütlichkeit*, I shall have to pass on quickly to the other end of the scale, the teenage rock'n'roll shows. Few observers above the age of eighteen would be able to stand up for long to the shattering aural and visual pounding of *these* shows, but once you get used to the bizarre appearance of some of the participants, it is possible to admire the imaginative camerawork and the bold treatment of dance sequences. A deaf viewer might even find some moments of beauty.

During the past year there were three main contenders for the teenage musical audience. *Shindig!* (ABC; produced by Dean Whitmore), was for a while the pace-setter, with two half-hour segments per week, but apparently it did not succeed in building and holding an audience, for it disappeared from the schedule in mid-season. *Where the Action Is* (ABC) had the original idea of filming sequences on location in various cities on the continent, but has so far failed to develop the full imaginative possibilities of its format. The most firmly established of such programs is *Hullabaloo* (NBC; produced by Gary Smith), which avowedly seeks to attract a wider audience by inviting show business personalities with adult appeal to serve as guest m.c.'s, usually with disastrous consequences. All the rock'n'roll shows seem to have low budgets, which means that the regular performers tend to be second- or third-raters. None of the American productions even tries to rival the wit and stylishness of some of the better British shows

* Copyright 1966 by Criterion Music Corporation.

that have occasionally been aired on this continent.

PRIDE OF place among special musical programs aimed at general viewers belongs to last February's "Anatomy of Pop: The Music Explosion" (ABC News; written and produced by Stephen Fleischman). This was a brave but foolhardy attempt to survey in one hour the whole field of popular music, from ragtime, square dances, and the blues, to gospel, rock'n'roll, the Nashville and Motown Sounds, and modern jazz. There were some interesting vignettes—a New Orleans marching band going to and returning from a funeral, the pained, sensitive faces of middle-aged violinists backing up the Supremes at a recording session, the veteran banjoist Earl Scruggs at the Grand Old Opry, and the Preservation Hall Jazz Band—but there was far too much material to allow more than a few tantalizing glimpses of anything. Only for two or three minutes, during Billy Taylor's brief lecture at the piano on the changing rhythms of jazz, was there a break in the relentless superficiality. The program did have a shape, though it may not have been the one intended. It was painful to see the rough and awkward but moving performances of the semi-folk artists who opened the program gradually give way to the kind of pretentious, homogenized professionalism of a Tony Bennett, on whose syrupy rendition of a ballad it closed.

Harry Belafonte's "The Strollin' 20's" (CBS; produced by Phil Stein; February 21) might have been the outstanding musical program of the season. This attempt to recapture the mood and tempo of life in Harlem before the Depression had a script by Langston Hughes, and a cast that included not only the unavoidable Sammy Davis and Diahann Carroll, but also more imaginative choices such as Gloria Lynne, Joe Williams, and Brownie McGhee. Perhaps it is ungrateful to complain about a program that revived such neglected classics as "You've Been a Good Old Wagon" (beautifully sung and played by Gloria Lynne, with Hank Jones at the piano) and "Nobody Wants You When You're

Down and Out" (Diahann Carroll). Nevertheless, it has to be said that the production as a whole lacked spontaneity. It had the mark of Belafonte's fatally slick perfectionism—everything right except the details which count most. This was not remotely like the real Harlem of the 20's (which can be heard in all its raucous vitality on Columbia's series of albums, "The Sounds of Harlem"), but a kind of Uncle Tom's Harlem in which the mean streets have become picturesque, the poverty is sentimentalized, and the segregation enforced by its famous nightclubs mentioned only in an aside. It was an hour of good entertainment, but it could easily have been something much more exciting and important.

Forty-eight hours later there was an example of what Belafonte might have achieved had he wished. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation presented "The Blues" (produced by Paddy Sampson), in which a number of musicians including Brownie McGhee (again), Sonny Terry, Big Joe Williams, Muddy Waters, and others were allowed to play together and talk informally for an hour without paying any apparent attention to either microphone or camera. The music was intensely moving both to the artists themselves (if one can judge by appearances) and to the audience. Juxtaposed with the lavish stylishness of "The Strollin' 20's," the cheap clothes, and worn, much-repaired instruments of these musicians seemed like images of incorruptible integrity. But this is not to suggest that the blues artists represent a world remote from the popular fashions we have been examining. On the contrary, there was plenty of evidence on this program—in words, music, and instrumental technique—that pop music can fruitfully influence even the most traditional performers. Of course, the entire budget of "The Blues" was probably less than Sammy Davis's fee for "The Strollin' 20's."

Unfortunately, I missed Juanita Hall's recital of blues on *Camera Three* (CBS; May 8). Sunday morning seems an inappropriate time for this sort of music, but the program looked as though it might have been worth getting (or staying) up to watch.

All the other popular musical programs I have to talk about were built around individual show-business celebrities. On television, every aspect of a performance—words, music, arrangement, accompaniment—tends to become subordinate to the personality of the singer. Just as the other mass media (particularly magazines like *Time*, the *New Yorker*, or *Playboy*) seem unable to deal with art, science, or politics except as aspects of the life-styles of approved (or disapproved) practitioners, so many popular television shows create little universes in which all values seem to radiate from the star performers' sense of their own being. Such programs are judged not according to the usual canons of good or bad, but in terms of how successful they are in transmitting the charismatic personality.

ONE OF the most notorious examples of this process is the television success of Frank Sinatra—a man who is now chiefly famous for being so well-known. His voice has lost both the light tenor quality of his youth, and the rougher more dramatic timbre of his maturity; the thin "interesting" face that once made him an effective actor has gone puffy; and what used to be spontaneous gestures have become compulsive mannerisms. In spite of all this, he apparently continues to communicate something to his audience. "Frank Sinatra: A Man and His Music" (NBC; produced by Dwight Hemion; May 15) presented the singer alone before the cameras (except for *two* orchestras!) singing the inferior songs of his later career. This sad program was successful enough with the public not only to warrant a rerun but also to win a Peabody award and an Emmy.

Sinatra's friend Dean Martin has a more engaging way of demonstrating his similar ascendancy over the musical raw material of his weekly show (NBC). He seldom sings a song through from beginning to end, and usually punctuates the tenderer sentiments with such amiable winks and leers that we cannot help responding to the invitation to see it all—the songs, the show, and the star himself—as part of a gigantic joke.

No one has capitalized more effectively on television's capacity to indulge an artist's most solipsistic whims than Barbra Streisand. "My Name is Barbra" was at once so clearly the outstanding variety special of 1964-65 and so claustrophobically personal a performance that the odds seemed overwhelming against a repetition of the triumph during the current season. However, "Color Me Barbra" (CBS; produced by Joe Layton and Dwight Hemion; March 30) almost managed to bring it off.

The opening sequence, taped in the Philadelphia Museum of Art, involved some superb camerawork around the museum's galleries and a series of songs keyed in mood and theme to various paintings in the collection. The production, as before, was faultless and Miss Streisand's performance (apart from a certain stridency on the high notes), impeccable. And yet . . .

And yet there was something rather repellent about the way in which art, architecture, and music were all so singlemindedly exploited in the interests of adding color to Barbra. When Streisand sings, the result is less a revelation of the music than an assertion of the singer's idiosyncrasy. She offers us not the song but the spectacle of herself singing it. This was particularly true of the second section of "Color Me Barbra"—an anthology of song snippets, imaginatively set in a miniature zoo, in which she switched effortlessly from style to style, breaking off as soon as she had demonstrated mastery of each. All this makes for what is called "good television," but it also illustrates why the development of the medium has done little for American popular music.

* * *

In my last column (COMMENTARY, April, 1966), I mentioned without enthusiasm a forthcoming presentation of *Death of a Salesman*. This David Susskind production which was aired on May 8 (CBS), did not, in fact, deserve the unqualified superlatives heaped on it by critics, but it was so triumphantly superior to anything else seen on network TV this season that I ought not to allow the initial comment to stand. Uncompromising

productions of serious drama can still move large audiences if someone has the guts to schedule them.

NEIL COMPTON, who is our regular TV critic, teaches English at Sir George Williams University in Montreal.

* * *

WHEN REFORM WAS YOUNG

Lucy S. Dawidowicz

As the founder of American Reform Judaism and all its institutions—the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Hebrew Union College, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis—Isaac Mayer Wise has been apotheosized in a prodigious number of works. Bibliographically, indeed, he outranks every historic figure of American Jewry. The latest addition to the sacred writings on Wise is James G. Heller's voluminous *Isaac M. Wise: His Life, Work and Thought*.*

Rabbi Heller's biography describes in tedious detail Wise's European origins and American accomplishments and also makes available for the first time extensive selections of Wise's writings, classified by subject. But its scholarly apparatus notwithstanding, Heller's book, like those of his predecessors, reads like hasidic hagiography. Wise is *rabbenu, morenu*: our rabbi, our teacher, sainted scholar, prince of Torah, one in a generation. Small wonder, perhaps, for the author is the son of one of Wise's first disciples and rabbi of the congregation Wise himself served for nearly half a century.

It is not that partiality as such is objectionable; nothing can be more deadening than the passivity that poses as objectivity. But Heller's adulation of his subject has resulted in a disservice to it, leading him to gloss over the embarrassments and minimize the excesses of Wise's personality and activities. Instead of a real man, peppery and vitriolic, combative and vituperative, we are left with a rabbinic Pollyanna embalmed in

* The Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 819 pp., \$10.00.

universal esteem. Nor is Heller much more illuminating about the Reform movement itself. Among other lapses, he does not explain why the mid-19th-century Reform movement enjoyed so phenomenal a success in America—so much beyond anything it had achieved in Europe. Yet this question is, I believe, by far the most interesting and important of the many questions raised by Wise's career. It can be answered only by viewing Wise and his movement in the context of American religious life as a whole during the period of his greatest activity—something Rabbi Heller is insufficiently detached to do.

WHEN Isaac Mayer Wise came to the United States from Bohemia in 1846 there were between forty- and fifty-thousand Jews here, who formed compact communities in most of the large and some of the smaller cities of the Atlantic seaboard, the Middle West, and the South. These Jews were organized into about forty congregations, but they had only four rabbis among them, for Jewish learning was at the time in rather short supply in America. Even among the German and Polish immigrants, knowledge of the Talmud was not very extensive, while among the earlier Sephardic settlers, it was nearly extinct. Isaac Leiser, for example, the pioneer preacher and founder of the Jewish press in America, whom we think of as a pillar of traditional Judaism and learning in his time, had not yet completed his study of the Talmud when he arrived on these shores at the age of seventeen. And the same held true for many other, lesser, Jewish leaders.

Given the shortage of rabbis, the conduct of Jewish religious affairs was largely in the hands of laymen. Most of these were *baale-tesfilla*—readers, cantors—while the more ambitious among them became "preachers," bestowing upon themselves the honorific title of "reverend." Two decades later, the writer Israel Joseph Benjamin (whose chronicles of life in farflung Jewish communities earned him the sobriquet, Benjamin II) attributed the sorry state of Judaism in the United States partly to "rabbis and teachers who have knowledge

neither of the Talmud nor of the literature of Judaism." "Not infrequently," he wrote in *Three Years in America*, "he, who at home enjoyed not even the benefits of a superficial education, in this country holds his head high and proud and makes a lot of noise, like an empty ear of grain."

Under these circumstances, responsible laymen tended to be suspicious of anyone who claimed rabbinical competence. Thus, in 1845, when three leading German congregations in New York agreed to employ Max Lilienthal as their rabbi, their contract stipulated that he must produce documentary evidence of his ordination, and once submitted, the document, particularly the ordaining rabbi's signature, was scrutinized by a committee for authenticity.

If Judaism in those days was in a somewhat indecisive state, Protestant America was in the throes of religious upheaval. An indigenous American religion was coming into being, whose primary impulse was a repudiation of the orthodoxies of European Christianity and the institutional authority of established churches. Despite basic theological differences, pietists and rationalists alike concurred in the view that Christianity had been corrupted by the churches and their priests, and that the true meaning of Christianity could be restored only by a return to the original religious source—the words of Jesus. The liberals regarded the New Testament as a non-doctrinal source of faith and morality that yielded readily to latitudinarian interpretation, while for their part the host of competing right-wing Protestant sects, which were beginning to flourish on the American frontier, considered the New Testament the chief symbol of their Christian authority and legitimacy; and all sects claimed the right of "private judgment" in matters of faith and doctrine, validating their private judgments by their own reading of the scriptures.

Into these surging currents of religious reformism, Reform Judaism flowed quite naturally. It, too, was in revolt against its European origins, standing in much the same relation to European Jewish Orthodoxy as the burgeoning Pro-

testant frontier sects like the Baptists, Methodists, and Disciples, did to their European forebears. In its attempt to decommunalize Judaism and make it a private matter, Reform was, like these frontier sects, in revolt against centuries-old tradition and institutionalized clerical authority. The fact that Reform discarded the Talmud and rabbinic tradition and recognized only the Bible as authoritative made it even more consonant, in style no less than in doctrine, with developments within American Protestantism: its service was frequently in the charge of men who had little more than the Bible in their hands, and who, like the frontier Protestant preachers, rejected traditions and practices which they had never even succeeded in mastering.

WHEN ONE examines the origins of Reform Judaism in America, nothing strikes one more forcibly than the marginal relation to traditional Judaism of its earliest mentors.

The first rabbi to settle permanently in the United States was Abraham Reiss (or Rice, as he later called himself), who arrived in 1840, at the age of forty; but Rice—reared and trained in Bavaria, and a finished product of European Orthodoxy—was distinctly an exception during this period in the development of American Judaism. In the next decade some half-dozen or so young rabbis were to arrive, all in their late twenties or early thirties, and all scantily qualified by traditional standards. Notwithstanding Jacob Schiff's dictum that no one could be a good Reform Jew unless he had once been Orthodox, it was these fledgling rabbis who were to lay the groundwork for Reform Judaism in America.

The European rabbinical experience of that same Max Lilienthal, the only one among the early Reform rabbis who could satisfactorily document his ordination, is a good illustration of this marginality. Lilienthal's first post had been with a prosperous, status-striving congregation in Riga which allowed him free rein for the anti-traditionalism that would soon bring him to the attention of

Count Serge Uvarov, Tsarist Minister of Education. Uvarov enlisted Lilienthal in his plan to eliminate the *hedarim* and *yeshivot* and to establish in their stead secular schools for Jewish children. These schools became the target of an extraordinary boycott by the traditionalist Jews, who believed their ultimate purpose to be conversion—as indeed it was. When Lilienthal suddenly learned what the Russian Jews had known all along, he fled Russia and came to America, where, at the age of thirty, unchastened by past experience, he once again set about reforming the Jews.

Isaac Mayer Wise arrived the following year. At twenty-seven, he was already a full-fledged modernist, and a disciple of Moses Mendelssohn and Gabriel Riesser, having come under the sway of the Enlightenment as a youth of eighteen. Wise's rabbinic experience was limited to a few years as the green and unseasoned young rabbi in a Bohemian *shtetl*, where he early came into conflict with the traditionalist district rabbi. The rabbinical conferences of 1844 and 1845 at Brunswick and Frankfort, convoked by the modernists for the purpose of reforming Judaism, strengthened him in his rebelliousness, but it was left for America to provide him with the richest possible opportunity to revise the tradition without having to face the intractable opposition of established and prestigious rabbis.

The Jewish learning that Wise brought with him to these shores was not very extensive (indeed, his Orthodox critics charged he was better qualified for the stage than for the pulpit), and his secular education was hardly less meager and random. What Wise did bring in ample supply, however, were the visions and hopes of the Berlin *Haskala* of a half century earlier. He was, as Jacob Rader Marcus put it in the shortest and best study of Wise yet published, "an 18th-century European liberal on 19th-century American soil."*

NEITHER theologian nor philosopher, at heart a man of action, Wise energetically promoted in the United States the reforms he had

* *The Americanization of Isaac Mayer Wise*, Cincinnati, 1931, 23 pp.

admired in Germany. There, as in other European countries with absolutist regimes, the Jews thought their political emancipation was conditional on the "modernization" of Judaism. Zealous to demonstrate their fealty to the state, to repudiate charges that they preferred the Kingdom of Heaven to (for instance) the Margraviate of Baden, German Jewish reformers favored such measures as eliminating from the liturgy the prayers for the return to Palestine, for the restoration of the Temple sacrifices, and for the coming of the Messiah. This super-patriotism of the German Jews, Wise transported to America along with the whole package of German reforms, so that in his first year as rabbi at the Beth El synagogue in Albany he introduced a choir and a violin into the service, abbreviated the liturgy, and excised the "objectionable" prayers concerning the Messiah, Palestine, and the sacrifices. He also eliminated the sale of *mitzvot* and *aliyot*, had the women's gallery moved down to the ground floor of the synagogue, and introduced the practice of confirmation. These "reforms" embroiled the congregation in ceaseless turmoil, lawsuits, and even physical violence. Finally, in 1850, Wise was ousted, but not before taking with him a seceding faction of the congregation, which, reorganized as Anshe Emet, provided him with his next post. Here he augmented his previous innovations, by the addition of pews and an organ for Sabbath and Yom Kippur services.

In his private life Rabbi Wise took even greater liberties. In 1849, after the death of his two-year-old daughter, he disregarded traditional mourning customs, and a year later, in Charleston, he publicly proclaimed his skepticism about the Messiah's coming and about bodily resurrection and, for that matter, about the doctrinal authority of the Talmud. Returning in triumph from his Charleston visit, Wise was tendered a banquet by his Christian friends, where the guests, as he boasted in his *Reminiscences*, consumed "oysters, champagne, and bananas in as great quantities as possible decently." (Heller, with discretionary delicacy, glosses over the menu at this affair, presumably

a trial run of the notorious *trefa* banquet of 1883.)*

In 1854, Wise bettered his position by becoming rabbi of B'nai Yeshurun in Cincinnati, where he remained until his death in 1900. The congregation had undergone the traditionalist-modernist struggle some years earlier, with victory going to the modernists. Even so, Wise found much that was still in need of "reform." He abolished observance of the second days of festivals, introduced a hymn book, initiated a late Friday evening service, and permitted uncovered heads in the synagogue; at last, in 1873, he dropped the observance of the second day of Rosh ha-Shana as well. (Many years before, after B'nai Yeshurun had adopted Wise's abbreviated and modernized prayer-book, *Minhag America*, Benjamin II noted that the second section of the prayer-book containing the service for Rosh ha-Shana and Yom Kippur had not yet appeared, and that on those days the congregation adhered to the old ritual. "Perhaps," he commented, "they were afraid that God was awake on those days and they might be the worse for it in God's judgment.")

WHEN Wise, following the German Radical-Reform belief that all Judaism was reducible to the Ten Commandments, declared that the only "external laws" were "those based on the principles expressed in the Decalogue," he became the first influential rabbi to permit, even to recommend, adapting Jewish law to the American way of life. There is no doubt that the uninhibited spread of Reform during this period in America was in large measure due to its do-it-yourself aspect. Wise provided a Jewish equivalent to the free-wheeling Protestant sects of the frontier, a religion which Jewish peddlers could easily shoulder in their travels through the roaring West, and which Main Street merchants could readily follow without undue detriment to their fledgling businesses.

Conservative Judaism had its origins, as Marshall Sklare has shown us, in the struggle between

a traditionalist rabbinate on the one hand, and a largely non-observant, status-striving laity on the other. Making all manner of concessions to the laity and to the times, the rabbis nevertheless held fast to the *Halakhah*, so that eventually, Conservative Jews came to expect their rabbis to observe the Law which they themselves disregarded; through their rabbis, therefore, they remained linked, however tenuously, to the normative Jewish tradition. But the pioneer Reform rabbis broke the chain of tradition, releasing themselves as well as the laity from the *Halakhah*, and setting their rabbinic stamp of approval on non-observance. The consequence was that the zealous young Reform rabbis—and Wise was among the most zealous—goaded part-observant Jews into non-observance, and liberated the non-observant from their guilt over abandoning the Law. (Some Reform rabbis, however, nurturing a private sense of guilt, later testily denied, in heavily documented studies, that the rabbis had fathered the Reform movement, insisting that the laity had done it all by themselves!)

Not only did the original Reform rabbis approve modifications and changes in the tradition, but eventually—in the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885—they went on to elevate non-observance into a doctrinal antinomianism. The most radical Reform document ever issued, the Pittsburgh Platform declared obsolete all Mosaic and rabbinic laws governing diet, dress, and priestly purity. A leading Reform rabbi once described the document as "the Jewish Declaration of Independence," which led Orthodox opponents to ask the question, "Independence from what?", and to answer it, "Independence from Judaism." Fifty years later, in 1937, when Reform rabbis convened in Columbus, Ohio, to adopt a new statement of principles, it was clear that nothing had dated as rapidly as the "modernism" which the Pittsburgh Platform had promulgated. And since then, the thrust of the Reform movement, especially among its younger rabbis, has been in the direction of restoring part of the discarded tradition.

So far as his own theological

* See John J. Appel, "The *Trefa* Banquet," COMMENTARY, February 1966.

views went, Wise was a man hard to pin down; to him, inconsistency was no hobgoblin. One thing was clear, however: he disliked Orthodoxy, whether Jewish or Christian, and never ceased attacking it for its "irrationalism," "supernaturalism," and "superstition." Probably, he could best be described as a "liberal" in religion, without dogmas and constricting practices. On one occasion, according to his *Reminiscences*, he as much as identified himself as a Unitarian (another embarrassing incident which Rabbi Heller sidesteps), describing a conversation he had with Daniel Webster in Washington in 1850:

I referred to Theodore Parker's conception of Unitarianism, and set over against this my conception of Judaism. This forced me to the conclusion that there was no essential difference in the matter of doctrine, but in historical development, which, however, did not enter into the question of doctrine. "It is well," said Webster, extending his hand to me; "you are indeed my co-religionist."

But five years later, when Wise called David Einhorn, leader of the Atlantic seaboard-German Radical Reformers, "a Deist, a Unitarian and a Sadducee and an Apostle of deistical rationalism," he was being abusive, not admiring. Einhorn, who was challenging Wise's hegemony in the Reform movement, had declared that only the Ten Commandments were immutable laws of the Covenant, a view that Wise was himself insistently to proclaim only a few years later.

Wise disliked intensely the Germans (apparently both Jews and non-Jews) in and around Cincinnati who, he claimed, affected atheism because it was fashionable. In his *Reminiscences*, he accused "some wounded apostles of the atheistical stripe" for the failure of Zion College, a precursor of Hebrew Union College, and further charged them with having driven him out of the Republican party, then being founded. One must, I think, treat this accusation with reserve, for on other occasions Wise charged these same "atheists" with being in sympathy with his Eastern opponents, the advocates of German Radical Reform, whose

theology he nevertheless supported whenever it seemed politic to him.

In later years, Wise became more conservative in his attitude toward certain Jewish practices and more radical toward others, but he certainly did not become a *baal-teshuvah* in his old age, nor did he return to Orthodoxy. From reading his views on Judaism and on religion in general, I am convinced that he was stirred most of all by a vision of a universal religion (he once called it "Israelism"), along the lines of the Hebrew theism of the Danish Jew, Meir Aaron Goldschmidt, the Bible Brotherhood of the Russian Jew, Jacob Gordin, and the Hillelism of the Polish Jew, Ludwig Zamenhof. All these men had attempted to create a non-dogmatic religion that would unite mankind in brotherhood on the basis of the ethical principles underlying Judaism. However, Wise's messianism was, I think, somewhat more worldly than that of the others. (The American Constitution, he once said, is "Mosaism in action.") Moreover, he seemed to think that the messianic age would arrive momentarily in America.

Yet this ardent advocate of universalism, this apostle of liberty, equality, and justice, who looked forward to a universal republic, when "soon, very soon, all mankind will celebrate one Passover before the Lord," was not sufficiently compassionate or generous to include in his vision Negroes as free men, or Russian Jewish immigrants as his equals. Such was his vehemence against the Abolitionists that it inhibited his outrage against the conditions of Negro slavery. He blamed Abolitionist "Protestant priests" for causing the Civil War. They would rather, he claimed, "see this country crushed and crippled than discard their fanaticism or give up their political influence." As for immigrants, Wise demanded of American consulates in Europe that they send only "useful" ones, instead of the "cripples, beggars, work-and-light shunning loafers who crowd together, particularly in the dirtiest streets of New York and Chicago." In his paper, the *American Israelite*, he editorialized that it was "next to an impossibility to associate or identify ourselves with that half-civilized ortho-

doxy which . . . gnaws the dead bones of past centuries." The only time he approved of the Zionist idea of restoring Palestine as the Jewish homeland was when it offered the possibility of diverting the Russian Jewish immigration from the United States.

Wise's favorite expression, Rabbi Heller tells us, was "the spirit of the age." But he mistook both spirit and age, thinking they were still those of the short-lived Enlightenment in France and Prussia. In the United States, Christian theological liberalism was rapidly losing ground in its struggle with the resurgent Protestant orthodoxies: it was the heyday of revivalists, evangelists, Bible-quoting enthusiasts, and sectarians. But though this spirit permeated most of American society, Wise ceaselessly and vigorously denied its existence. All his life he fulminated against the notion that the United States was a "Christian nation" and that Americans were a "Christian people." (Alexis de Toqueville showed himself more perceptive when he wrote two decades earlier that Americans "combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive of one without the other.")

Arguing on constitutional grounds against the incorporation into law of the sentiment that America was a Christian nation, Wise arrived at the position that because the United States was not a Christian nation *de jure*, it was not, nor could it be, a Christian nation *de facto*. On that failure to distinguish the legal from the social reality, he based his ideas about the separation of church and state in America, ideas which became the sanctified heritage, preserved intact for a century, of Reform Jews, Conservative Jews, and even some Orthodox ones. In recent decades many of Wise's synagogal reforms have been abandoned and his theological views discarded in favor of a return to Jewish traditionalism and a restoration of the distinctively Jewish elements in prayer and ritual. By contrast, however, his ideas about church and state are now more accepted than ever, and have become as ossified and resis-

tant to change as the most inflexible Orthodoxy.

We often think that the more traditionalist Jews are in matters of religion, the more conservative they are in politics. In European countries, the Orthodox community usually followed a policy of accommodation toward the state, avoiding open opposition. Reform Jews, whose philosophy of Jewish existence was almost always identified with liberal political philosophies, nevertheless frequently pursued a policy not of accommodation, but rather of submission, to the modern state. Modernist Jews often bought political emancipation at the price of religious emancipation, but in the end paid also with slavish patriotism. No Germans were as patriotic as the Reform Jews. Similarly, American nationalism and American patriotism flourished among Reform Jews. Thus, Wise was prepared to discard from Judaism whatever he thought inappropriate to Americanism: "Whatever custom, law, doctrine or practice can be justified before the tribunal of reason, if it collides with American sentiment, is doomed to perish; and what is left, that is American Judaism, or Judaism transformed to correspond to American sentiments, feelings and thoughts."

This passion to assimilate Judaism into Americanism provides yet another instance of the conformity of Wise's sentiments to the prevailing Protestant trend. It was during Wise's lifetime that the Protestant denominations added the finishing touches to a Christianity whose God was manifestly directing America's destiny, and who had set a providential course for America.

Among Jews, the effect of this Americanization of Judaism was to reinforce assimilatory trends and to provincialize Jewish religious culture. Here, then, was yet another way in which American Reform Judaism came to resemble American Protestantism, sharing its optimism and its identification of America as the chosen land.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ is the author of *The Golden Tradition, a study of Jewish life and thought in Eastern Europe, which will be published in the fall by Holt, Rinehart & Winston.*

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NOAH GREENBERG

George P. Elliott

NOAH GREENBERG died suddenly this January of a heart attack at the age of forty-six. In my experience, everyone who knew him liked him: he was short on malice, and he stood in no one's way. Everyone who knew his work with the New York Pro Musica admired it: he did not do it in order to gain fame and all that, but, being a man of large appetite, he enjoyed the fame and all that when they came along because of the work he did—he did more than any other American to propagate a taste for Renaissance and medieval music. As an artist he was full of that confidence which comes from work well done and more good work yet to do, and he strove for excellence.

He was a good-sized, substantial man with a husky voice and open laugh; he was warm, given to praise rather than blame, patient in the long haul but irritable now and then, delicate of understanding, respectful of you and obliging your respect of him, which is to say that he practiced courtesy; and occasionally, in a slight pulling back of the head or a coolness in the voice, he was capable, this former able-bodied seaman and union organizer, of a touch of that aristocratic hauteur which one sometimes glimpses, in our bourgeois democracy, among the *grands seigneurs* of art and mind.

For such reasons, and because I too am about that age and have no history of heart trouble, but especially because I loved him, his death has set me thinking again about some last things.

TWENTY-TWO centuries ago, a Hebrew in an age of oppression wrote the miraculous story of a prophet named Daniel as though it were the history of events that had taken place three centuries earlier when the Jews were in Babylonian bondage. What actually happened to Daniel, if there was a Daniel, cannot now be known, just as it cannot be known how much of the story the man who wrote it invented and how much he retold.

Not that either of these matters: the actual is real only when it is imagined. All of the actual can be imagined only by God, but men can imagine some of it. The ancient Jews, being moral in bent rather than aesthetic or scientific or metaphysical, thought there was no better way to understand God's mind than by imagining what had happened to them: their holy book is mostly stories told as histories. Who told the story of Daniel never did matter except to the teller himself, only that it was told well. Likewise, neither believing Jews nor their principal heretics, Christians, care that the story is beautiful as much as that it is told in such a way as to afford a true glimpse into God's mind.

In the middle of the 12th century, some young people in Beauvais made a play out of the story of Daniel and put it on at Christmas time in one of the churches. It was so well liked that it was put on every Christmas season for the next century. Who had the idea in the first place, who wrote the words, who composed or chose the music, who designed the costumes and banners, who told the performers what to do and where and when to do it, whether they were used to seeing plays like this one and if so how they modified what they were used to seeing, how the production changed over the century it endured, how much they invented and how much borrowed and adapted—all this we know little or nothing about because they did not think such matters important enough to chronicle. In good part they put on the play for much the same reason the first storyteller told the story, that their people might, knowing what happened to Daniel, know God's will; but also in part they did it for the greater glory of God.

In the mid-1950's, it occurred to Noah Greenberg, as apparently it had occurred to no one for seven centuries, that he and the Pro Musica group he had brought together a few years earlier, might put on *The Play of Daniel* again. He did not do it in order to bring the people of New York into a better connection with the God of Jews and Christians. He had been born and raised a Jew, but in his

youth had accepted the rationalistic Jewish-Christian heresy, socialism, and especially Trotsky's faction of the schism. He lived by this belief till he was thirty or so. (He was perhaps never an exclusive True Believer. Once at a summer retreat for radicals, a friend found Noah halfway to one of the endless lectures and discussion meetings. He was swinging a gate. "Come on! We're late! What are you doing? Hurry!" "Listen," said Noah giving the gate another swing, "listen to that C sharp." Then he went along.) But if he did not put on the play for a religious reason, everyone who knew him is sure that neither did he think of doing it for money or for his own aggrandisement. What mattered most was for the job to be done well, whoever did it; he had to do it, for his own satisfaction, to be sure, but also because if he didn't nobody else would. His name will be attached to this event for as long as the event is known, which will be, at least latently, for as long as our libraries last. (Oxford University Press published his performing edition of *The Play of Daniel* in 1959.) But this is less his doing than because we venerate facts and record them.

As we accelerate change and subvert tradition, thereby stripping ourselves of strong protection against time; as we threaten ourselves with extinction, thereby providing time a whip of fear to lash us with—our fear that we may put an end not just to ourselves who shall die in any case, but to time, which we did not make and must have, which we cannot imagine unmaking but may unmake nonetheless; as we cease to do things in order to connect with God, thereby insulting the timeless in time; as we set ourselves deadlines which to meet is to survive—little false deaths, little false immortalities: we tend to make facts of things and then to preserve them. But we do more than preserve; we recover too, and more than facts.

WHAT WAS left of *The Play of Daniel*, guarded by scholars, was one manuscript: a text of medieval Latin words and a simple musical notation, one note for each syllable. From various sources, a

modern producer could glean odds and ends of information which would permit him to guess intelligently at how to go about putting the play on—to guess which instruments to use, how, where, how many; how the singing was to be done, to what tempo, at what pitch, in what rhythm, how loud; from some illustrations in paintings and drawings, the costume designs; from a few words of description here and there and especially from the rubrics on the manuscript of *Daniel*, the mode of staging; how the original congregation, who did not understand Latin, could know what was supposed to be going on in each scene; how many actor-singers to use, what kind of voices. Not all the tunes and texts of *Daniel* were completely written out, for the scribe assumed his reader's knowledge of the most familiar; scholars helped Noah piece these out as best they could.

In other words, the given from which Noah Greenberg set about to re-create the play was less in quantity, and no more essential in kind, than Milton's given (a story and an old form) when he set about writing *Paradise Lost*. Picasso in the Trocadéro museum looking at African masks for the first time; the group of Florentines gathered in the house of Count Bardi, in the last years of the 16th century, inventing grand opera by trying to imagine Greek tragedy; Michelangelo in the Belvidere gardens studying Apollo, recently hoisted into the light of day after having been buried at Anzio for many many centuries: why should an artist give a thought to expressing the spirit of his age? It's hard enough to make something beautiful, even with a great old model to go by, without taking on the spirit of the age too.

A few years ago Noah played host one day to the musicians of the Japanese Imperial Court, who were in New York giving concerts of ancient music, *gagaku*, the performance of which survives solely in this one institution. After the politenesses had been exchanged, the Japanese begged permission to ask one question. A bit dismayed at the thought of what these total musicians might ask (they could

play jazz and Beethoven quartets with equal expertness), Noah of course granted permission. Through the interpreter they asked, with great intensity, leaning forward for the answer, "Do you feel decadent?" As Noah recounted this anecdote, he obviously thought it both silly and too damned bad that such a question should be gnawing at people whose lives were devoted, under whatever auspices, no matter what the age might be up to, to making superb beauty, most especially since, if they did not continue to make and remake it, it would vanish, never to be reconstructed.

It was the music that first drew Noah to the play. He had been rummaging around for medieval music for his Pro Musica group to perform, and he came on the bare notes of this play. By then, he had developed a way for his singers to realize such notation in sound, to make it into music; but these notes for these words made a music which he knew, from performing excerpts from the play in concert form, to be insufficient by itself. Just how insufficient, you can hear by listening to the Pro Musica record of the play, reading the text along with it. Good as it is, you need more. He needed more. There was no one for him to turn to, to give him much more, as there would have been for *Otello* or the Gregorian Mass for Easter Sunday. He had to make it himself, without knowing ahead of time what it was he was going to make.

The music. When I hear it isolated from the rest of the play, I know it is the most important part of the whole, but when I am there as the play is in being, all the other parts seem essential too, the costumes, the performers' motions, the processions, the contrasts. Besides, one thing is not more essential than another; an essential is absolute, however big, however small. I saw the play four times (each time slightly altered, in most respects for the better), and I went to some rehearsals. Even so, I cannot now, listening to the record, really imagine what I remember of the performances. The company intends to continue putting on the play as Noah directed it, but the thought that it might

never be again except in copies makes me feel, when I listen to the recording, as a Greek might have felt looking at the fallen torso of a god he had known alive in a temple—a beautiful torso, to be sure, and the biggest, most important part of the whole statue, but armless, legless, castrated, the paint washed off, the great head noseless and lying to one side.

NOAH WENT to the scholars: American, French, British; art historians, medievalists, musicologists, theater historians. Only from them and from their books and manuscripts could he learn what was to be known about medieval music-drama. It was from talking with Meyer Schapiro, for example, that he got two ideas about staging *Daniel*: first, the actors' costumes should be bold and full of strong contrasts and their movements should sweep from pose to pose; and second, a text in English should be recited before each scene so that the audience might understand what was being represented. He executed the first of these with the assistance of the stage director, Nikos Psacharopoulos, and he got W. H. Auden to write the narrative: of all living poets the most competent for such a job, Auden wrote alliterative staves suggesting Middle English poetry. He found in Lincoln Kirstein, who had had long experience with the New York City Ballet, an artistic director to whom he gave quite a free hand in finding and overseeing costume designs and designers. He arranged the music himself, under advisement from scholars, and directed who should sing what and who play what on which instruments and when.

The other directors and artists had ideas he would not have had and of course they were necessary to execute his and their own ideas. Nevertheless, to the limits of the possible and the courteous—and perhaps a time or two beyond these limits—he was the final arbiter of every idea and of the realization of every idea proposed for the making of the play, whoever first advanced it, himself included.

He went to work in the knowledge that his production could not

be the same as the original one. For example, the boys in the boys' choir he used, from the Episcopalian Church of the Transfiguration, sing like 19th-century British angels; but he speculated that the boys in 12th-century France might have sung less in the Anglican style than in controlled shrill cries, as he had heard Spanish boys sing. Even if full records existed of the original performance, it could not be duplicated: Balanchine has said he is unable to re-create one of his old ballets from studying a movie of it. Moreover, Noah knew that, even if the production were a duplication of the original, it would have to have a profoundly different effect on its audience. Our kings do not rule; our belief in miracles is tenuous at best; no American who reads the Bible as historically literal would be likely to go to a performance of a play in Catholic Latin; the music, the costumes, the processions, the props, the instruments, heraldic emblems, Latin spoken nowhere but in the liturgy and not much there, the bold simple contrasts—all these, which were more or less familiar to the original audience, are to us strange enough to run the risk of being quaint and therefore irrelevantly charming or so peculiar as to distance us too far from the play. Noah compromised. He used electric lighting, but also candles. In some respects, his use of instruments is perhaps less medieval than baroque. We expect little more than mortarboards and black gowns from a procession, and the Pro Musica *Daniel* seems gorgeous to us; whereas familiarity with banners, bright robes, and emblems had heightened the medieval expectations of a procession, and the original *Daniel* was, conceivably, far more gorgeous than his. Compromise well-employed is a matter of proportion.

Going to the scholars, making and buying costumes, props, and stage equipment, renting a place to rehearse in, paying the performers at union scale during rehearsals, meeting his own family expenses, all cost. He went to the foundations and to the rich, especially to Lincoln Kirstein, the most important patron of living art in our national history. (After eight

years of continuously successful performance, with costumes and props made and paid for, charging standard off-Broadway admission prices, the company broke even only if all the tickets were sold for all the performances.)

Obviously the suitable place to put on a medieval religious play is in a medieval church. In Manhattan, the Metropolitan Museum's synthetic building, The Cloisters, consists of chapels and rooms transplanted from medieval churches and monasteries. Those stone rooms are right for the small sounds of the instruments—such as psalter, minstrel's harp, straight trumpet, vielle, recorder, rebec—and the singers' not large voices.

There, in the Romanesque Hall, on January 2, 1958, *The Play of Daniel* was performed for the first time since the 13th century; eight performances were given that week. Who but musical and scholarly amateurs, and some friends, would care about such an event? Excellence, not popularity, was what Noah was after. But it turned out that those who attended these performances spread the word fast and hot. Success came anyway—that success which often comes yapping on the heels of excellence but which Noah never allowed close enough to trip him up.

In 1960, the State Department sent the company to Europe, where *Daniel* was performed thirty-seven times, in churches and shrines in England, Italy, and France. It was everywhere acclaimed—although a Communist newspaper in Italy reproved the singers for mispronouncing some Medieval Church Latin, especially for not rolling initial R's hard enough.

For a while after *Daniel's* success, Noah thought of staging the 16th-century morality play, *Magnificence*, by John Skelton. But he could not find enough responsive enthusiasm in others to go ahead. He could have brought together and arranged contemporaneous music suitable for the play, and he probably could have bulled a production through. But, resolved to work only with people who genuinely wanted to make what he wanted to make, he dropped the project. He turned to two short 12th-century church plays which

survived only in a manuscript in the Orléans municipal library, and he put them together, along with some other 13th-century music, especially the song for the opening procession, to form *The Play of Herod*. This was first put on in the Fuentidueña Chapel of The Cloisters in December 1963. *Herod* is less dramatic than *Daniel* but more lyrical, and even more beautiful. Rachel's lament over the slain innocents is surely one of the great dramatic arias; yet, broken off from the performance and played on a record, this lament sounds diminished, less moving; it is part of a whole essential to the part.

For next January, he had planned an evening of Italian Renaissance court drama, two musical entertainments to be performed with jugglers, acrobats, and actors as well as singers, in the *commedia dell'arte* manner as he imagined it. He was alive with questions of where and who and how, when he dropped dead.

SOMEHOW, the notion has got around that a work of art which is highly time-resistant is for that reason superior to one which perishes instantly—"Not marble, nor the gilded monuments of princes, shall outlive this powerful rhyme." But if anything of Shakespeare's outlives the pyramids, the Taj Mahal, and the English language, it is less likely to be the poems whose publication he attended to, than the plays, which he did not so much as proofread. *Lear* is only as it is performed and experienced, but its words, so long as they exist physically, will probably see to it that it will be reincarnated, even in translation, again and again and again in time to come. For beauty is only as it is known and felt. During the score upon score of centuries when nobody was in the Lascaux caves looking, those paintings were not works of beauty but pigment on rock.

Not only have we mixed up durability with excellence, we have also split the performing arts off from the creative, which in some fuzzy way we think of as immortal; and though the performers are the ones we applaud loudest and pay highest, we have assigned a lower

status to them and even to those who create solely for performance. But when you think of Noah Greenberg or George Balanchine or Marcel Marceau, this practical, sensible separation and ranking seems false, or falsely labeled. To attempt to assess how much of the production of *Daniel* was creative and how much was performance is as profitless as to attempt to assess how much Noah contributed to the whole performance, how much A contributed, how much B, C, D, and so on, or to assess the play's relation to the spirit of its age and of our own. Such games have no application to the play, but they do have the power, if allowed, to interfere with experiencing it.

Timing is of the essence of good performance; musicians are said to keep time; and there is no dodging the fact that a performed work of art must be made fresh each time, and that it must have a responsive audience, in order to be. But, just because what live performers do is so risky and fragile, because their mistakes cannot be recalled, our joy when they come through is enormous: time has been used against itself, and the Now is so filled that what was and what is to be have fallen away for a while. In our gratitude to performers who have done this, we forget notions about how the best art should be time-impervious, "creative," and give them a warm, special love. They have filled Now for us, we were essential to the doing, we did it too. Because a performance is about to die, we are quick to its life with an intensity we do not commonly feel for a temple, a poem, or a mask; these, because they were made once, we do not think of as needing to be made again and again—as though beauty were in the thing, not in the thing known.

Is the gold and ivory *Athena Parthenos* which Phidias made superior to Aeschylus's original production of *The Oresteia*, which could exist only once? But the statue was destroyed, and at least the words of the play survive. . . . What a lot of nonsense such speculations dwindle into. In the kingdom of true art, to paraphrase Blake, there is no competition.


NOAH WAS, as one who makes through performance must be, lucky, above all lucky in those he worked with. There was a patron for him to go to, as there almost certainly would not have been thirty years earlier. There were scholars he could find to tell him what he had to know, as there would not have been a century earlier (the text of *Daniel* was first published in 1861 in a French collection of medieval liturgical plays). There were good designers. There were the Pro Musica musicians, who had a special loyalty to him; for example, the counter-tenor Russell Oberlin, who has since become the most celebrated singer to have worked with the group, had studied at Juilliard but did not know, till Noah found him and took him to it, that this ancient music existed which especially needed a voice of his timbre and range.

And in his capacity as theatrical producer, Noah was lucky that he had to use singers without training as actors rather than, as a musical comedy producer often must, actors ill-trained to sing. He was gifted and dedicated, he worked well with others—he could not work without them—and he produced two superb dramatic performances, the two best I know of by Americans. But I doubt that he could have done it with nearly any of the actors available to him here and now: for *Daniel* and *Herod*, his singers acted better than most American actors would have. Our actors have been trained in an inward, psychological style. They do not, most of them, put their trust in gestures as a mime must, or in the body's motions as a dancer must, or in sounds as composers and musicians must, or in words as the playwright must do and as he wants the actors to. They put their trust each primarily in himself, his own feelings, his own sincerity. They are not much inclined to ask the external questions, "What do these words mean?" and "What does this character mean by these words on this occasion?" They prefer the internal question, "What do I mean?" It is an acting style that has proved itself adequate within the narrow confines of psychological realistic drama

dealing with alienation, perversion, and the lusts. Not even Noah could have got these actors, as he got his singers, to put much of their trust in things totally outside themselves, and especially in one another, each in all the others.

Socialists are moved to political action by a dream of community, but by 1950 or so, when Noah dropped out of the movement, it was difficult for Americans to trust that way to the dream, to trust any political way to it. Art offers a dream of communion—which is not the same as community but like it, near it, and realizable—and people working together to make a performance also make a small, fragile community. I would guess that a dream of community was what united the disparate halves of Noah's professional life. Moreover, among 12th-century Frenchmen the dream of community was vivid, and though their way to it was religious, their religion included art: of all those who knew that the words and notes of *Daniel* survived, it was Noah Greenberg, lover of beauty, who seized the great good luck of remaking it for the first time. He was as faithful to what was known of the original performance as he could be, not out of antiquarian zeal, not out of a museum-keeper's scrupulosity, not only, though in large part, because he thought that style was the best, the most beautiful. He did it also, perhaps, because he felt something like what those medieval French-Catholic young people were aspiring to when they first made the play, and he wanted to share the feeling, the aspiration. Like them, in making this performance he put his trust in others: in them to begin with, in their notes primarily but also in what he imagined of their performance; then in his assistants to help him imagine; finally in his performers to realize what he had imagined. And I imagine that he put his trust in all those others, and especially in those notes, in the faith that by so doing he would release their power to make the present beautiful.

GEORGE P. ELLIOTT's most recent novel is *In the World*, which was published last year by Random House.



"A quietly told
but impressive
story..."

—PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY

By John Selby

Beyond Civil Rights is the inspiring account of the birth and development of a simple, but revolutionary concept in race relations far beyond the

scope of the immediate struggle for civil rights. It is the story of Karamu House, founded 50 years ago on the belief that the bridge to racial understanding lay most immediately in active fellowship in the arts. A world-famed center of interracial dance, theatre, painting, writing, social endeavor, and community influence, Cleveland's Karamu House is a testament to racial understanding and brotherhood.

224 pages / 16 pages of illustrations / \$6.95 at bookstores

THE WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY
Cleveland and New York



harper torchbooks

Just published

MARTIN BUBER on *Hasidism*:

HASIDISM AND MODERN MAN

Edited and translated by Maurice Friedman.

TB/839 \$1.75

THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF HASIDISM

Edited and translated by Maurice Friedman.

TB/835 \$1.75

"Buber was deeply influenced by mystical tradition outside and inside Judaism, and he himself has in many ways contributed to the interpretation of mystical ideas and movements. His discovery of the significance of genuine Hasidism was decisive for his development and greatly influenced the general religious and theological atmosphere in the first quarter of this century. . . . Buber's reinterpretation of Hasidism is extremely valuable. It shows the possibility of a mysticism which does not contradict but which intensifies prophetic religion."

—PAUL TILlich, in *Theology of Culture*

Recently published

LEO BAECK: Judaism and Christianity.
Trans. with an Intro. by Walter Kaufmann. TB/823 \$2.45

MARTIN BUBER: For the Sake of Heaven. TB/801 \$2.45

LOUIS FINKELSTEIN: Akiba: Scholar, Saint and Martyr. JP/26 \$1.95

SOLOMON GRAYZEL: A History of the Contemporary Jews. TB/816 \$1.45

WILL HERBERG: Judaism and Modern Man. TB/810 \$1.95

ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL: The Earth is the Lord's; & The Sabbath. TB/828 \$1.95

ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL: God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism. TB/807 \$2.95

ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL: Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion. TB/838 \$2.95

ISAAC HUSIK: A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy. TB/803 \$3.45

T. J. MEEK: Hebrew Origins. TB/69 \$1.35

JAMES PARKES: The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: The Jews and Early Christianity. JP/21 \$2.25

CECIL ROTH: A History of the Marranos. TB/812 \$2.75

CECIL ROTH: The Jews in the Renaissance. *Illus.* TB/834 \$2.45

HERMAN L. STRACK: Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash. TB/808 \$1.95

JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG: The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jews and its Relation to Modern Anti-Semitism. 8B/822 \$2.45

JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG: Jewish Magic and Superstition. JP/33 \$2.25

■ Complete catalog of Harper Torchbooks [590 volumes now in print] available on request from Dept. 51, HARPER & ROW, Publishers, 49 E. 33rd St., New York, N.Y. 10016

WELL-TEMPERED CRITIC

STANDARDS: A CHRONICLE OF BOOKS FOR OUR TIME. By STANLEY EDGAR HYMAN. *Horizon Press*. 288 pp. \$6.75.

Reviewed by JOHN W. ALDRIDGE

ONE OF THE genuine excitements of these years has been the quite sudden rise in the amount and quality of the periodical criticism produced in this country. We have not had since the 30's—if indeed we had then—anything like the present proliferation of commentary that is at once serious and lucid, that treats literature and ideas with the proper sobriety, yet is almost wholly free of the stylistic quirkiness and obscurantism that have so often flawed even the best quarterly criticism.

That, in fact, would seem to be at the heart of the development. The defensive tensions of critical language have relaxed as critical authority has shifted from the quarterlies to the high quality, mass circulation review media, a shift brought about not only by the appearance of a large new audience of educated readers, but by the recognition that the great work of modern formalist criticism—the perfection of theory and the explication of classic texts—has been completed and can no longer engage our most adventurous critical minds. Hence, a great deal of the best talent which in the past found expression in the *Kenyon*, *Hudson*, and *Sewanee Reviews*, is now finding expression, along with an opportunity for a much broader communication of ideas, in the liberal weeklies and monthlies and in such new periodicals as the *New York Review of Books* and *Book Week*. There it is helping restore to favor the kind of literary journalism done so well by Edmund Wilson, Malcolm Cowley, and others in the 20's and 30's, and the long essay-review is fast becoming the most influen-

tial critical form of the present time.

It is probably inevitable that these liberating changes have been accompanied by a change in the pitch and intensity of the critical voice. One should not be surprised to discover, for example, that the innovating zeal, the eccentricity and flamboyance, which Wilson in particular brought to the form of the essay-review are largely absent from the work of his successors. If the bulk of that work is free of obscurantism and written with a new confidence in the public's capacity for intelligent response, it is also lacking in what one normally thinks of as style, the impress upon language of a strongly individual point of view. There are, to be sure, a few dissidents among the new reviewers, a few roaring boys and hatchet men, but they have not appreciably affected the temper of a criticism distinguished at its best by judiciousness, great practical sanity, and a modesty of tone behind which one seems to sense an ego quite happily reconciled to its inhibitions. Wilson's fight for acceptance of the rebellious and original, and for more militant discriminations of taste has clearly been won, but won at the price of a certain loss of character, a certain failure of force in the crucial act of judgment. The critic's voice is seldom raised in either condemnation or praise, anger or ecstasy. Nothing appears to offend outrageously or to excite really profoundly. In short, the prevailing note seems to be one of moderation and quiet good sense, in which neither perversity of opinion, meanness of spirit, nor the felicitous stroke of brilliance appears likely to disturb the calm elucidation of the work at hand.

Of course no really good critic can be adequately defined by a generalization as sweeping as this one, and Stanley Edgar Hyman happens to be a very good critic indeed. His work has many of the

characteristics I have described, but it also possesses others which place it outside all portraits of tendency and give it the uniqueness of an important and vital body of commentary.

MR. HYMAN HAS here brought together a selection of fifty-four of the reviews he has written in recent years for the *New Leader*, and in them he ranges learnedly and at moments with great impressiveness over a very wide area of contemporary American, British, and continental literature as well as anthropology, mythology, and biblical translation. His writing is consistently flexible and lucid, unpretentious and urbane, often witty, and quite without distinctive style. Yet it is in no sense careless or colorless or lacking in variations of emphasis or mood. Mr. Hyman is capable on occasion, although rare occasion, of the lethal phrase, even of the first-rate demolition job, but his tendency is to seek always for a way of putting the pieces back together, to nullify the effect of his occasional strictures in some often seemingly forced affirmation of positive value. His weakness, in other words, is a benevolence not always justified by the circumstances or by the apparent drift of his own argument. He seems persistently to feel more negative than he allows himself to admit, with the result that his conclusions about a particular work are often at variance with the tonalities of the language with which he has arrived at them.

Mr. Hyman's benevolence causes him to be overly indulgent with the poor work of writers whom he believes to be serious, and to make claims for the excellence of others which seem wholly unjustified by the evidence of their artistic record. He appears to feel obliged, for example, to praise Philip Roth for his incredibly bad novel, *Letting Go*, even though he himself observes that it is unfettered hom-

age of just this kind which may be at least partly to blame for the artistic mistakes Roth has made. Mr. Hyman describes these mistakes with great clarity, but by the end of his review he has managed to bury them beneath his many complimentary remarks on Roth's excellence as a novelist.

Mr. Hyman also seems to admire James Baldwin so extravagantly for his polemical writings that he never quite gets around to saying that *Another Country* is an even more incredibly bad novel. In his discussion of Capote he again reveals his tendency to censor his negative feelings by first attacking Capote for his style and the poverty of his artistic imagination and then seeming to take it all back in a laudatory review of *Breakfast at Tiffany's*. On Pynchon's *V*, he reveals a more disturbing tendency to assent too eagerly to fashionable opinion. He solemnly describes as effective satirical portraiture of our time what can only be regarded as an abdication of satirical portraiture in favor of the easy mockery of the sick joke. But he is also able to speak of Ralph Ellison as "the profoundest cultural critic that we have," of Daniel Curley as "one of the most gifted writers of my generation," and of Janet Frame's *Scented Gardens for the Blind* as "the most remarkable novel that I have read in many years"—opinions which, if odd, are at least all resolutely unfashionable.

Mr. Hyman seems to me best and wittiest on bad books by third-rate or chronically overrated writers such as Herman Wouk, Steinbeck, and Henry Miller, where no question of the possible seriousness of the subject intrudes to inhibit his purely destructive impulses. On Steinbeck and the Nobel Prize he is devastatingly and accurately funny. He refers to *The Winter of Our Discontent* as "this ludicrous marshmallow," and says of Herman Wouk that "he can compete with the worst of television because he is the worst of television, without the commercials, a \$7.95 Pay-TV." It is my impression, however, that on only two occasions does Mr. Hyman function with complete success as what he calls a "corrector of opinion" of writers who have merited serious attention but who,

for one reason or another, have been taken too seriously. These are his essays on Purdy's *Cabot Wright Begins* and Robbe-Grillet's *The Erasers*, about both of which he asks (and answers) the nasty and necessary questions which snobbery and the fear of authoritative contradiction have prevented others from asking.

It seems to me a pity that Mr. Hyman asks such questions only occasionally, for his reticence prevents him from being the deeply influential critic which his talents ought certainly to equip him to be. But it may well be that his reticence is the unavoidable defect of his very considerable virtues, his breadth of mind, his wide range of literary interests, his clear understanding of the difficulties confronting the gifted writer at the present time. These are the virtues which have made him one of the most intelligent and humane critics that we have, and I doubt that we would care to trade any of them for anger or eccentricity.

THE FATAL FLAW

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF THE SLAVE SOUTH. By EUGENE D. GENOVESE. Random House. 304 pp. \$6.95.

Reviewed by STANLEY ELKINS

THERE WAS a time when Charles Beard's "Second American Revolution" chapter in *The Rise of American Civilization* passed for a "Marxist" interpretation of the Civil War, even with Marxists who ought to have known better. Beard argued that the "so-called Civil War" was no mere clash over constitutional principles or the morality of holding slaves. It was a revolutionary upheaval

ending in the unquestioned establishment of a new power in the government, making vast changes in the arrangement of classes, in the accumulation and distribution of wealth, in the course of industrial development, and in the Constitution inherited from the Fathers. . . . Viewed under the light of universal history,

the fighting was a fleeting incident; the social revolution was the essential portentous outcome.

But such language, which seemed to imply a line of interpretation suggested a half-century earlier by Marx and Engels themselves—that the American Civil War might best be understood as a struggle between an expanding, bourgeois North and a static, semi-feudal South—was misleading. For all his talk about underlying economic forces and social revolution, Beard found the classic Benthamite pleasure-pain calculus far more congenial to his own habits of mind than any Marxian dialectic. He could never grasp the subtle relationship between class interest, ideological conviction, and political action which Marx and Engels insisted upon. That a man living in a society wherein wealth, status, and self-esteem all rested on the possession of slaves might come to believe that slavery was a just and humane institution, and that such a man could be prepared on moral grounds to fight for its preservation, was a view of human psychology which Beard found incomprehensible. For Beard to see the connection between economic interest and political action, something more had to be at stake than "mere" ideological conviction, or even conviction rooted in the primary economic interests of a ruling class. He would finally conclude that the real key was not slavery at all (for all the bitter polemics, men never say what they really mean), but rather the tariffs, ship subsidies, bounties, and banking legislation (all "hard" things) that an industrializing North demanded and that an agrarian South, still in control of the federal government, could not afford to grant.

EUGENE GENOVESE's *The Political Economy of Slavery* is an effort, by one far better versed in Marxist theory than Beard ever was, to put the argument back on the track and to reconsider the problem of meaningful connections between fundamental economic forces and the coming of the Civil War. Genovese is much too intelligent to pose the matter in terms of spe-

cific clashes of interest between North and South. Such clashes, in the light of the broader context, certainly created irritation but they were hardly central. What *was* central was the position of slave labor in the Southern economy. Bound up with this was, on the one hand, the slaveholder's power to impose himself and his values on Southern society, and, on the other, the inherent weakness of slavery as a labor system. "Slavery," according to Genovese, "gave the South a social system and a civilization with a distinct class structure, political community, economy, ideology, and set of psychological patterns [that set the South increasingly apart] from the rest of the nation and from the rapidly developing sections of the world." This happened because slavery was more than a system of labor. It was

the foundation on which rose a powerful and remarkable social class: a class constituting only a tiny portion of the white population and yet so powerful and remarkable as to try, with more success than our neo-abolitionists care to see, to build a new, or rather to rebuild an old, civilization.

And yet that system upon which their economy, indeed their entire civilization, rested was woefully inefficient.

This fatal weakness, the full implication of which was the last thing the Southern elite was prepared to face, occupies most of the essays in Genovese's sharply and often brilliantly argued book. The slave was a careless and slovenly worker who needed constant supervision and could be trusted with only the most primitive of tools. He was especially hopeless at such work as animal husbandry, which required close attention and some sense of personal initiative. Southern agriculture had already completely adjusted to its labor force. It discouraged innovation, since the slave could barely cope with existing technology; it largely ignored crop rotation, which made economic sense only in conjunction with a thriving livestock industry; and it concentrated its energies on a few staples, mainly cotton, finding it cheaper to im-

port food from the West. The result was a steady decline, which the planters were helpless to remedy, in the fertility of Southern soils.

SERIOUS agricultural reform would have required skilled labor and commercial fertilizer, neither of which the South could afford; and a shift from cotton to truck would have required urban markets and proper transportation, neither of which the South had developed nor, with its existing economy, could hope to develop. The South's economic impasse, in short, was fundamental. It could only be remedied by measures which would have undermined the power and influence of the slaveholding elite. Such measures—emancipation, urban development, the systematic use of slaves in industry—would destroy the very thing the dominant class in the South had committed itself to building, an aristocratic, semi-feudal plantation society.

The one alternative that did not directly challenge the existing social arrangements was territorial expansion. If slave labor could be used on fresh lands in Cuba or Central America, or possibly in Western mines where it could be rigidly supervised and guarded, the South's most pressing problems might at least be postponed, if not solved. But when the Republican party moved to block even this distant hope, the stage was set for insurrection. The planters "could never agree to renounce the foundations of their power and moral sensibility and to undergo a metamorphosis into a class the nature and values of which were the inversion of their own." Given the choice of slipping into the bourgeoisie or fighting, they fought.

I am thoroughly persuaded by Genovese's analysis of the South's agricultural economy. He spells out the weakness of Southern farming in such specific terms as hogs that weighed from forty- to fifty per cent less than those in the Midwest, a pitifully low production of butter and milk throughout the lower South, and a livestock industry so poorly managed that the South had to import sub-

stantial amounts of meat even though more than half of the country's cattle were located within its borders. He shows at every point the direct connection between such problems and slavery, and how the entire region was trapped by its commitment to a labor system both inefficient and economically stultifying—a dilemma doubly painful in view of the dynamic, expanding economies of the North and Midwest. Moreover, Genovese's discussion of the importance of territorial expansion in Southern thinking makes sense out of the South's seemingly irrational response to the free-soil movement and the Republican party.

Though his tone is frequently polemical, Genovese is always open-minded and flexible, and quite above squabbling with his many predecessors and contemporaries who have written on this same subject. His scholarship, indeed, is so thoroughly scrupulous that I believe it can be depended upon to reinforce conclusions quite different from his. He argues, in effect, that the plantation society of the ante-bellum South reflected a flawed form of latter-day feudalism, and that the flaw was slavery. A very slight change of definition would not in the least disturb the edifice of Genovese's scholarship, though I suppose it would threaten all his most basic theoretical convictions. Still, it seems to me just as plausible—indeed, more so—to say instead that the South reflected a flawed form of capitalism, and that the flaw was race.

Genovese's thesis that a dominant class can by an act of will "rebuild an old civilization" strikes me as gravely unhistorical. He argues that once a class becomes dominant in an economic order it is then in a position not only to impose its recently acquired values, standards, and beliefs on the entire society but also to shed its own past values with relatively little strain. The Southern planters had inherited a republican, bourgeois, contractual society many of whose intellectuals, such as Jefferson and Madison, continued to receive the deference of the ante-bellum South. To believe that

these planters could in a single generation impose a set of quasi-feudal values and social arrangements on themselves and on the rest of society—that they could reverse the tide of history—is in itself almost an act of faith.

There were certainly Southerners who did think in such terms. George Fitzhugh was one, though I suspect Fitzhugh's relationship to the planter class was not unlike that between Barry Goldwater and today's business corporations—of a man who may be acceptable as a ceremonial spokesman but whose intellectual prescriptions are almost worthless as a basis for predicting actual behavior and policies. I am reluctant to take the Fitzhughs with a fully straight face, and in any case I question the depth of the South's commitment to an organic, semi-feudal society in which both status and social responsibility would be fixed by law and custom.

Genovese is of the opinion that the South's basic values were "pre-capitalistic," and that even the aggressive "cotton snobs" of Alabama and Mississippi only needed a little time to wear down their rough edges before slipping naturally into the ranks of the aristocracy. But planting was a speculative business, and few planters were ever free from the shadow of crop failure and bankruptcy. What sort of aristocratic ethos is it possible to construct in a community where one or two bad crops can change a man from a rural magnate into just another farmer? How much mobility, in either direction or both, can a society absorb and still be described as semi-feudal?

GENOVESE explains the planters' desperate fear of emancipation by their determination to maintain the particular labor system on which depended their class position and their dreams of an organic feudal order. But the special quality of their desperation strikes me as very unfeudal. Their values were not those of a human organic community at all; they were far too bourgeois. Nobody could really see the Negro as an organic member, because every systematic effort had been made to define him

as outside that community—as property. The underlying egalitarianism in Southern values was such, and the South's faith in barriers between classes was so limited, that once the Negro's bonds of chattel slavery were removed and once he was redefined as human, the first thing he was likely to do, for all anyone knew, was to marry somebody's daughter.

A true sense of stratified social hierarchy—as in Latin America, where the historical background was genuinely "feudal"—would have protected the Southerners from any such nightmare. They had no real faith in the justice or stability of their community, or any willingness to offer adequate human compensations for all of its members; no one could imagine the Negroes as a "loyal peasantry." An axiom of slave law was that if the master's power were relaxed in any way whatever, the whole system would collapse.

The Southern slaveholders, Genovese says, were a vital and dynamic class determined to create—or recreate—a society, and when it appeared that they were not to succeed, they fought rather than give up a cherished way of life. I should say they were a pathetic class, trapped by history, their minds frozen by the dilemma of race in a bourgeois culture. Their status, power, and pride, says Genovese, depended on their ownership of slaves, whose labor, as he shows so well, was under existing conditions very inefficient and less and less profitable. I should say that the irrational role of race in a contractual society, which defined the black slave as property, created such a narrow view of the Negro that the slaveholder could no longer be inventive. He could only develop a rigid and unimaginative system of labor and then try to justify it as a "way of life," even though it may be doubted whether in his heart he ever really believed it.

Otherwise, why the unwillingness to manipulate, to experiment? Why not some alternative arrangement short of full emancipation? A program of placing slaves and their families on individual plots of land? With some independence and adequate incentives, could

they not have proven as efficient at growing cotton or caring for animals as they were in raising chickens or tending their gardens? Since this would in fact be done after emancipation, we know there was no inherent reason why it should not have worked. Indeed, all the precedents of feudalism pointed straight in that direction.

Instead, the South created for the slave the role of a helpless, pathetic dependent, insisted that he live up to it, and then justified the system to itself and to the world by claiming that the helpless Negro could survive under no other. But with slavery under attack from literally everywhere—destructive to retain, destructive to get rid of—it became an intolerable burden, and many a planter said so. This was the kind of tension that produced the Fitzhughs and the paranoia of the 1850's.

I AGREE with Genovese that the South's decision to fight represented the planters' final, superhuman effort in defense of slavery. I have followed his argument with admiration, and hold his skill and learning in the very highest respect. But I should think the test of the argument would be what happened after they lost their cherished institution. The reaction, if I read my postwar history right, was one of universal relief. For all the exasperating lost-cause sentimentalism of the New South, there was hardly a trace of an *ancien régime* mentality regarding slavery. "I am rejoiced," declared Robert E. Lee (along with many another aristocrat), "that slavery is abolished." George Fitzhugh was quickly forgotten. Slavery was gone; the South did not want to get it back; and no Southern leader, not the most passionate of the ante-bellum defenders, seriously proposed trying.

But they did set to work all over again, being just as implacably determined as they ever were, to avert what they had been convinced all along would be the real disaster, a mingling of two racial communities under a single set of standards. In this, as we know, they succeeded. Race was always the flaw in Southern capitalism, as it is still.

THE ARTIST AS PROPHET

NOTEBOOKS, 1942-1951. BY ALBERT CAMUS. Translated from the French and annotated by JUSTIN O'BRIEN. *Alfred A. Knopf*. 270 pp. \$5.00.

Reviewed by ROBERT A. NISBET

THE LITERARY interest and philosophical importance of this, the second volume of Camus's notebooks, are bound up with the period covered. It is the period in which Camus published *The Stranger*, his first novel, and the powerful essay, "The Myth of Sisyphus," both of which appeared in 1942. It is also the period during which he wrote and published *The Plague* and *The Rebel*, as well as some of his most notable plays, among them *The Misunderstanding*. It is, in short, a period of intense creativity in the life of quite possibly the most profoundly prophetic artist of the 20th century.

The first volume of the *Notebooks*, for all its interest as a collection of Camus's guiding themes and commentaries, culled from two decades of reading, and of tentative drafts of works to come, cannot really compete with this volume in importance; not, at least, to those who are more concerned with Camus's self-revelations for the light they throw upon the philosophical and prophetic qualities of his mind than upon the literary sources and directions of his work. And for all the undoubted literary importance of Camus, it is likely that his profoundest impression will prove, a century hence, to have been made upon the post-Christian prophetic tradition rather than upon literature as such.

What Philip Rieff, in his important book, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, has recently written of Camus is relevant here: "That he [Camus] tried seriously and with high artistry to clarify a post-Christian symbolic that could combat the emergent culture, measures the great contemporary importance of Albert Camus as a writer. Camus accepted the possibility that spiritual preceptorship in modern culture has fallen to the literary intellectual. Without a

language of faith, Camus wrote in a mood far more 'conservative' than that of many advanced and enlightened Christians."

It is irresistibly to the religious and the prophetic elements in Camus that we keep coming back in the mosaic of nihilism and affirmation, of homely parable and sophisticated vision, of skepticism and militancy in Camus's works. His rejection of all existing religion, of even the terminology of religion, has no more to do with the matter than does his preoccupation with the absurd in modern society. The great prophets—Moses, Jesus, Buddha among them—would not have passed muster as "religious" thinkers in their day. To write "religiously," indeed, is probably as sure a sign of early mortality in the prophetic tradition as consciously writing "poetically" is of one's early extinction in the poetic tradition. There is surely no more reason for wonderment that the seeds of prophecy may today lie in the works of a profoundly literate French novelist than that they once lay in the utterances of an uneducated Jewish carpenter.

Most of the familiar checkpoints in the lives of the ascetic and saintly are to be found in the *Notebooks*. We may start with *chastity*. "Sexual life was given to man to distract him perhaps from his true path. It's his opium. With it everything falls asleep. Outside it, things resume life. At the same time chastity kills the species, which is perhaps the truth." And, six entries farther, we are told: "Sex leads to nothing. It is not immoral but it is unproductive. One can indulge in it so long as one does not want to produce. But only chastity is linked to personal progress." Chastity is a recurrent reflection in Camus, reaching its peak in the Augustinian declaration that sex leads to a philosophy of the non-significance of the world: "Chastity, on the other hand, gives the world a meaning."

THERE is the familiar preoccupation with *solitude*, its restorative virtues and its cankering doubts: "Four months of ascetic and solitary life. The will, the mind, profit from it. But the heart?" And

the motivations of *withdrawal*: "I withdrew from the world not because I had enemies, but because I had friends. Not because they did me an ill turn as is customary, but because they thought me better than I am. I was a lie I could not endure." The *renunciation of the rational*: "Everything worthwhile today in the contemporary spirit is located in the irrational. And yet everything that prevails in politics professes, kills, and dominates in the name of Reason." The consecration of *poverty*: "What can a man better desire than poverty? I have not said misery nor the hopeless toil of the modern proletariat. But I do not see what more can be desired than poverty linked with active leisure." The poor in heart, the *humble*: "French workmen—the only ones among whom I feel at home, whom I want to know and to 'live' among. They are like me." The *hierarchy of being*: "Dishonesty of the artist when he pretends to believe in the democracy of principles. For then he negates the most basic thing in his experience, which is the great lesson of art: hierarchy and order. The fact that such dishonesty is sentimental doesn't help. It leads to the slavery of the factories and concentration camps." And if we look for *parables*, where better than to *The Plague* and to *The Rebel*?

Revolt is perhaps the single most recurrent subject of Camus's entries during this period. Repeatedly, we find him reflecting on its implications, its necessary character, and its consequences, given the kind of world we live in. There are references to the aesthetics of revolt, to both the morality and the immorality of revolt. The following three passages are sequential in thought, though widely separated in the *Notebooks*. "Revolt. Chap. I. Ethics exists. The immoral thing is Christianity. Definition of an ethics against intellectual rationalism and divine irrationalism." This is followed twenty pages later by: "Revolt. The human effort toward liberty and its habitual contradiction: discipline and liberty die at their own hands. Revolution must accept its own violence or be denied. . . . My effort: show that the

logic of revolt rejects blood and selfish motives. And that the dialogue carried to the absurd gives a chance to purity." The third passage is headed by the words, "Relation of the absurd to revolt," and it marks Camus's equal concern with the problems of individuality and responsibility. I cite here only the first three sentences of the passage (which, as a whole, is a sketch, we are told by the editor, for the first chapter of *The Rebel*). "If the final decision is to reject suicide in order to maintain the confrontation, this amounts implicitly to admitting life as the only factual value, the one that allows the confrontation, 'the value without which nothing.' Whence it is clear that to obey that absolute value, whoever rejects suicide likewise rejects murder. Ours is the era which, having carried nihilism to its extreme conclusions, has accepted suicide."

Closely paralleling revolt in thematic importance in the *Notebooks* is responsibility. The latter is, in fact, the almost invariable context of the former, for it is another mark of the prophetic ambience of Camus's writing that responsibility is his most insistent and pervading question: responsibility to whom, when, why, and how. Almost everything flows eventually through this channel in Camus. And it is here that he comes to Sartre. Camus could easily have written or at least entered the following passage which I have taken from Sartre's *Existentialism and Humanism*: "We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does."

No one goes farther than Camus in the effort to resolve the paradox implicit in the existentialist's premise of "metaphysical abandonment," that is, a world in which "everything is indeed permitted" (Sartre's words) and, at the same time, a morality so powerful that everything, far from being permitted, must in fact be relentlessly examined with the view of opposi-

tion as well as affirmation. Perhaps no one exceeds Sartre, at his greatest, in the metaphysics of this resolution, but in Camus the resolution of the paradox is more prophetically aflame. Camus writes of man: "Once he has reached the absurd and tries to live *accordingly*, a man always perceives that consciousness is the hardest thing in the world to maintain. . . . So he perceives that the real problem, *even without God*, is the problem of psychological unity (the only problem really raised by the operation of the absurd is that of the metaphysical unity of the world and the mind) and inner peace. He also perceives that such peace is not possible without a discipline difficult to reconcile with the world. *That's where the problem lies*. It must indeed be reconciled with the world. It is a matter of achieving a rule of conduct in *secular life*."

Elsewhere he writes: "One cannot be capable of commitment on all planes. At least one can choose to live on the plane on which commitment is possible. Live according to what is honorable in oneself and only that. In certain cases this may lead to turning away from human beings even (and above all) when one has a passion for human beings."

Does such an adjuration amount only to an exalted moral solipsism? Neither in principle nor in life so far as Camus is concerned. I could quote entries from the *Notebooks* but it is better to recall another aspect of the period in which Camus wrote his *Notebooks*. The years 1942-46 marked—do we already begin to forget?—the Occupation, the Liberation, the horror of the first disclosures of Dachau and Belsen, and the beginnings of the metamorphosis of Allied victory into the Cold War. If Camus had not written a single novel or play, these *Notebooks* would be of interest, for no one was more deeply engaged than he in the war against Nazism. As Justin O'Brien writes in his valuable biographical note: "From late 1943 until the Germans were driven out of France, Albert Camus played an evermore important and increasingly dangerous role as a

highly articulate spokesman for the intellectual underground and as a member of an intelligence network. Even though many of his friends and associates were arrested, often tortured and executed, he carried on with his stirring editorials and his day-to-day clandestine activities."

It is well that this aspect of Camus's life be emphasized, for as the years pass it will be less and less easy for those approaching Camus for the first time simply through his novels or plays—or even, for that matter, through the entries in such a volume as this, entries made, many of them, in the shadow of Nazi terror—to remember that somehow there was united in one mind an intelligence so dispassionate that even Nazism could be seen *sub specie aeternitatis* but, with it, a passion that made for incessant and unyielding resistance to Nazism; not simply philosophical or tractarian resistance from his native Algeria, where he might easily have stayed with his wife and children instead of returning to the mainland in 1941, but resistance that was never far from physical torture and death at the hands of Germans in Paris.

Cardinal Newman once wrote that men will die for a dogma who will not even stir for a conclusion. This may be true, though the cognitive line between dogma and conclusion is not an easy one to trace. Of Camus, however, it is sufficient to say that he is proof of the reconcilability of a metaphysics and a logic of the absurd and of a moral commitment to justice that not the most ardent Christian or Jew or nationalist or socialist or democrat exceeded.

SURVEYING THE JEWS

Jews in America: A Short History.
By RUTH GAY. Basic Books. 198
pp. \$4.95.

Reviewed by JOHN J. APPEL

THIS BOOK is one of a series of octavo-sized volumes of less than two-hundred pages on various topics in the humanities and social sciences; it is addressed to young adults and other readers with only

a minimum of specialized knowledge. It is not easy to write a short history of the Jews in America for such a series, for it would require a sizable volume to give a systematic account and analysis of their arrival, settlement, and geographical dispersion over a period of three-hundred years; their relations among themselves and with other immigrants; their institutions; and their adjustment to American society. Moreover, a reasonably complete chronicle would relate the experience of the Jews in the New World both to their situation in the "Old World" and to American history as a whole.

In view of these difficulties, Mrs. Gay has wisely chosen to pay little attention to her publisher's subtitle. Instead of serving up short-order history, she has made use of the work of historians and sociologists in order to produce an eminently readable survey of some of the more important events concerning the Jews in America.

Mrs. Gay devotes the first three chapters of her book to group portraits of the Sephardic, German, and Russian Jews, the well-known three "waves" of Jewish immigration to these shores. She describes the characteristic traits of each group, the European conditions which accounted for its emigration, its reception by Jews already settled here, and the newcomers' manner of adapting to life in America. Her account is superior to many other one-volume histories of ethnic and religious minorities in that it manages to avoid the long and tedious lists of "famous" men, "important" dates, and "illustrious" congregations. Moreover, Mrs. Gay does not content herself with a bland objectivity, but makes it clear that her sympathies are with those immigrants who "had the good fortune not to be troubled by the nostalgia that muddled so much Jewish thinking [in the 19th century] and is still causing trouble today." At the same time, she preserves fairness throughout her narrative, allowing the opponents as well as the advocates of most major ideological movements in the history of American Judaism to present their necessarily brief depositions.

In dealing with the first three

"waves," Mrs. Gay inevitably goes over familiar ground, but she adds an original and poignant account of the German, Czech, and Austrian refugees of the Hitler era, and the "displaced persons" who arrived after the end of World War II. Anti-Semitism in the United States and the Jews' organized response to prejudice and discrimination are examined in another chapter. The author concludes by summarizing the recent patterns of employment, social life, culture, voting habits, political behavior, religious activity, and philanthropic enterprises among American Jews.

THE BOOK as a whole is marked by a guarded yet unmistakable optimism. Mrs. Gay does not, to be sure, overlook the tensions of immigrant life and the continuation, even today, of some patterns of discrimination against Jews in the United States. But from the brief prologue, which notes that Jewish history, like all American history, "begins in the Old World and sadly," to the last pages, with its concluding observation that in America "all things are possible," she draws a sharp contrast between the Jews' European past and their American life style, seen as combining active participation in the general society with a rich and specifically Jewish existence.

Few are likely to quarrel with Mrs. Gay's estimate of the United States as a country in which the various restrictions hampering Jews in the past have been almost completely overcome. But since the selection of some historical events at the expense of others is necessary in all historical writing, and absolutely essential for the creation of a short survey, one is justified in wondering about the extent to which the omitted materials have modified the narrative, and permitted generalizations which would be difficult to support in a more scholarly work. For example, except for two paragraphs about the socialist Bund, the reader of this book is told nothing of the existence of strong Jewish labor unions during the first decades of the 20th century. This omission—like that of other schismatic tendencies in American

Judaism—minimizes the class conflicts between Jewish entrepreneurs and workers and thus leads to a picture of the American-Jewish subcommunity that understates the social tensions present in it.

Nor is the reader fully informed of the extent of American manifestations of anti-Semitism. To be sure, Mrs. Gay does make it clear that Jews have encountered prejudice in this country since colonial times, but she tends to see the rise of serious widespread anti-Semitism in the United States as a product of the xenophobia and status fears of native-born Protestants in the 1890's. Since historians still debate the origins of American anti-Jewishness, and particularly the role of Populism in its genesis as a turn-of-the-century manifestation of nativist phobias, the author of a basic survey may be excused for declining to settle a problem that continues to provoke heated debate and *ad hominem* arguments in professional journals. But she might have given some consideration to such phenomena as the anti-Jewish actions and utterances during the Civil War, including an army order expelling Jews as a class from territory administered by the United States army. And rather unaccountably, she omits any reference to the Leo Frank trial and lynching of 1915, an event that gave impetus to the formation of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Yet, if Mrs. Gay now and then minimizes conflict and tensions between Jew and Jew, and between Jew and Gentile, blandness—or "consensus" as it is called nowadays—is by no means her book's most pervasive quality. For instance, she is forthright in reviewing the abominable record of all governments, including that of the United States, at a time when thousands of Hitler's desperate victims needed asylum in the late 1930's; and she emphasizes the recency of much that is taken for granted by the young American-born Jews who today are finding employment in certain industries and entering vocations (like college teaching and engineering) still largely closed to Jews only twenty years ago.

Furthermore, in order to deal briefly with subjects like the Jewish Centers, Conservatism, Reform, Orthodoxy, and Reconstructionism, Mrs. Gay has often succeeded in reducing masses of data to neat capsule summaries that reveal essential features of typical American-Jewish institutions and movements.

HER discussion of the Reconstructionist formula of "Judaism as a civilization," for example, illustrates both the effectiveness and inevitable shortcomings of these thumbnail sketches. Thus, she observes that Mordecai M. Kaplan's idea "removed the necessity of a logical connection between belief and practice" by redefining Judaism as a "historical phenomenon." This made it possible for some Jews to give up belief and yet to retain rituals that, without a faith to sustain them, had become illogical. She concludes that although Rabbi Kaplan's ideas won many followers among his students, created much discussion and led to the adoption of the Reconstructionist *Sabbath Prayer Book* by five congregations, they had no "permanent effect on the Jewish community as a whole."

This may be fair enough as a generalization in a brief survey for the beginning student. However, it seems to me that as a weathervane to the theological currents in American Judaism since the turn of the century, Reconstructionism cannot be dismissed so lightly. For does it not indicate that religion, at least the old-time revealed Jewish religion, is not exactly "safe" even among the rabbis to whom the laymen have entrusted it for preservation? If Reform today has its Rabbi Sherwin Wine, who has the courage to say publicly what many of his rabbinic colleagues believe privately—that God is a kind of shorthand for man's moral quest for improvement—Reconstructionism proved that even for Conservative rabbis, history itself can replace the God of history.

Mrs. Gay's brief look into the future is most noncommittal, even for a writer engaged in analysis rather than in the prediction of things to come. In a book such as

this, an enumeration of some emerging trends—the rising rate of intermarriage among native-born, college-trained Jews; the frequency of conversions to Judaism of the partners to such marriages; the ambivalent place of *all* supernaturally based faiths in a secular age; the increasing numbers of Jews on college and university faculties and the concomitant estrangement between "town" and "gown" Jews—would perhaps have been more meaningful than the posing of the oft-heard query concerning Jewish "survival" in a modern egalitarian setting.

Finally, the publisher's decision to omit annotations from the list of "suggestions for further reading" seems ill advised. Surely, for example, subsequent printings—should help readers to distinguish clearly between the first, now dated, edition of Lee J. Levinger's *A History of the Jews in the United States*, and Nathan Glazer's first-rate *American Judaism*.

MODEST PROPOSALS

TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION.

By JEROME S. BRUNER. *Belknap-Harvard University Press*. 176 pp. \$3.95.

Reviewed by EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG

"WHAT MUST BE plain in the preceding chapters," Professor Bruner observes toward the end of *Toward a Theory of Instruction*, "is that the issues to be faced are far broader than those conventionally comprised in what is called 'education' or 'child-rearing.'" This observation astonished me. Until I reached this passage, I had been willing to give Professor Bruner the benefit of the doubt by assuming that he had simply brought a conventional mind to bear on a problem which he had perceived as limited and decided to attack superficially. Any author has the right to define his own task; and he may not justly be blamed for deciding to write a trifle. If he does, his critics should judge him by the degree to which he succeeds.

But in the statement I have quoted, Professor Bruner assumes responsibility for having really tried to write a set of essays worthy of his title. The result, coming as it does from the pen of a distinguished psychologist, is curiously, yet not uniquely, inadequate. The writings of Bruner, Conant, and Gardner on education seem to me almost indistinguishable. All three men write as if not merely their critical faculties but their capacity even to analyze a problem in depth had been dulled by years of official responsibility and success; and all three are drawn to devote themselves to problems of education—in Mr. Gardner's case, of course, as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. There are differences among them; Conant is a generation older than either Gardner or Bruner. But they are all mandarins; and they all share a common reluctance to consider the ways in which the deficiencies in education they propose to correct are related to and derived from the fundamental character of the social system in which they—and the deficiencies—flourish.

Such reticence may be due less to discretion than to practicality. One of the usual consequences of successful operation within a system is that the operator comes to feel it his duty to plan his policies in such a way that they can be executed within its limits. Bruner accepts the practical limits of the American educational enterprise with a bland courtesy that precludes his questioning its fundamental quality:

It is quite plain that the success of any course depends upon how well it is handled by a teacher, and this is particularly so in social studies, where the attitude of the teacher speaks as eloquently as any materials in the course itself. . . . It is one thing to describe the nature of a course in terms of its underlying discipline and its pedagogical aims, and quite another to render these hopes into a workable form for real teachers in real classes. Teachers are sufficiently constrained by their work loads so that it would be vain to hope they might read generally and widely enough in the field to be able to give form to the course

in their own terms. . . . The materials, in short, have got to be made usable and attractive not only to the highly gifted teacher, but to teachers in general, and to teachers who live with the ordinary fatigue of coping with younger pupils day by day. They cannot be overburdened with reading, nor can the reading be of such an order as to leave them with a feeling of impotence.

This passage illustrates quite clearly the point of view which limits the book. It reads like a truism, but actually makes internally conflicting demands. Materials that are usable and attractive to teachers in general are not just simpler and more accessible versions of those that appeal to highly gifted teachers. They are likely to be altogether different in quality and to fill a different—indeed, a contrary—instructional purpose. Teachers-in-general like social-studies materials to be non-controversial, convenient in format—they should have the answers to discussion questions in the back of the teachers' edition—and remote enough from their pupils' real concerns not to disturb the reader in any concrete way. Really challenging materials *do* leave many teachers-in-general with feelings of impotence; and those feelings, honestly faced, are their last hope of becoming good teachers.

Bruner does not consider that teachers-in-general, fatigued by coping with their pupils rather than stimulated and refreshed by them, are themselves a major limitation on the power of the schools to give worthwhile instruction. He

accepts them as given, as he does the structure of the school system and the customary academic content of the course of study itself; assuming, apparently, that there is nothing fundamentally inimical to education in the character of the enterprise, its personnel, or the scope of its definition of reality. His set of "theoretical" recommendations is intended simply to facilitate instruction under the conditions that exist; the recommendations are psychological—learning theory fortified with a dash of psychodynamic spirit which lends the book a faintly modern flavor but runs no risk of expanding the reader's consciousness of the educative process.

What Bruner presents are suggestions, which he justifies in terms of psychological theory, for improving the conventional academic curriculum of the public schools. These, though sound enough as far as they go, do not constitute significant steps toward a theory of instruction. A theory of instruction cannot be wholly a psychological theory. It must take into account the character of the personnel presently employed, and the possibilities of recruiting others more suitable; the social function of the school system and the social forces to which it responds and contributes. When Bruner considers these, it is as limiting conditions which psychologically astute instruction might transcend. But the school, as an institution, is not that passive; certain of its functions are anti-intellectual and hostile to human growth; and these must be changed, not adapted to.

Bruner observes, for example, that "With children in elementary school, there is often a need to . . . re-establish in the child's mind his right not only to have his own private ideas but to express them in the public setting of a classroom," and that "Young children in school expend extraordinary time and effort figuring out what it is that the teacher wants—and usually coming to the conclusion that she or he wants tidiness or remembering or doing things at a certain time in a certain way." Indeed. But to write of these conditions as if they were deficiencies in the system to be corrected by improved instruction, is rather like suggesting that the ventilation be improved in the San Quentin lethal chamber, so that fewer people would die in it. The problem is not technical, but moral and political.

To operate schools in which most students were encouraged to develop—or even to preserve—their native wit and sensitivity would be to betray the role of the school in their socialization. Professor Bruner's suggestions imply, however, that the dismal effects of our schools on the human potential of their pupils result from technical failure rather than from social success. This is reassuring but must, I think, be regarded as one more example of the American tendency always to interpret the question, "What is wrong with it?" as if it meant only, "Why doesn't it work?" Usually the question does mean this; but as applied to our school system, or our foreign policy, the interpretation seems morally rather obtuse.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

JOHN W. ALDRIDGE, a new contributor, is the well-known literary critic. His most recent book is *Time to Murder and Create*.

STANLEY ELKINS, who teaches at Smith College, is the author of *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life*.

ROBERT A. NISBET contributed "What is an Intellectual?" to our December 1965 issue.

JOHN J. APPEL teaches American history and literature at Michigan State University.

EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG has written frequently in these pages on the problems of education in America.



Take flight with us to the 16th century. We'll treat you like a king.



This is Chaumont, in the Loire Valley. It was the royal hideaway of Catherine de Medici and her husband, Henri II.

You can hide away in the Loire Valley, too. This is chateau country, and each chateau has its own story to tell. Listen to the names. Chambord. Amboise. Chenonceaux. Vendôme. Ussé.

They've been waiting for you for 400 years or more. You can see them all, and more, tomorrow. With us.

We'll whisk you back to any century you like, via twentieth century jet. To the city of London, or the City of Light, or the Eternal City. Straight through to any of 27 European cities. Ask a Pan Am Travel Agent to help you.

En route, we can feed you like a king, with cuisine by *Maxim's of Paris*. And entertain you like a king, with *Theatre-in-the-Air*. It's 10 great shows in one, including a fine film. And it's

now playing on most of our flights to Europe. (The surcharge is \$2.50.)

You can charge your fare, if you like. On your Diners Club or American Express Credit Card. Or use our Pay-Later Plan.

No charge for the good feeling that comes from flying the very best there is.

World's most experienced airline

First on the Atlantic
First on the Pacific

First in Latin America
First 'Round the World



With scores of brands to choose from, the fact is more Americans buy more Cutty Sark than any other Scotch Whisky. Cutty Sark is "from Scotland's best Distilleries" and the **No. 1** reason is in the bottle. Why not try Cutty Sark yourself?

The Buckingham Corporation, Importers • New York, N. Y. • Distilled and Bottled in Scotland • Blended 86 Proof